

The Role of Dysfunctional International Organizations in World Politics:

The Case of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

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Summary

Dysfunctional international organizations are anomalies in world politics. Neither rationalist nor constructivist attempts to explain their existence, persistence and growth have provided viable results, so far.

However, beyond enhancing efficiency and effectiveness of international cooperation, less obvious functions of international organizations exist. Drawing on a primarily realist perspective, this study argues that states can use international organizations to obscure unwillingness to cooperate or solving common problems and diffuse responsibility or shift blame when commonly agreed upon solution do not work out as expected. In such situations, dysfunctions of international organizations might even be welcomed by states, because they provide obvious reasons for failure and make blame-shifting strategies more credible.

This argument is explored in a case study of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) – a dysfunctional yet growing international organization. The case study argues that states have only a limited interest in cooperating on drug control matters at the international level. Co-existence rather than cooperation is the major aim states pursue. Because states do not want to leave the achieved state of co-existence, they are not interested in a strong and functioning international organization in the field.

The growth of the organization can be almost exclusively attributed to the technical assistance projects of the UNODC. However, a closer look at a recent high-profile assistance project shows that even in the operative realm states are not interested in the success of the organizations. Much more, they use the UNODCs technical capabilities to obscure their unwillingness to cooperate substantially on drug control matters when their interests are only marginally affected.

The study concludes that in the case of the UNODC blame-shifting by states is one of the main reasons for the UNODC's budget growth despite its dysfunctions. Although it remains unclear to what extent this insight can be generalized to all dysfunctional international organizations, the mechanisms identified seem to provide viable explanations for other dysfunctional organizations operating under similar circumstances.

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Abbreviations

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ATS	Amphetamine-Type Stimulant
CCPCJ	Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
CND	Commission on Narcotic Drugs
CPR	Conference Room Paper
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DPKO	United Nations Department for Peace Keeping Operations
ECHR	European Court for Human Rights
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FAA	Foreign Assistance Act
GNB/U-44	UNODC Project “Guinea-Bissau Anti-Trafficking – Establishment of a Specialized Unit within the Judicial Police to investigate and combat Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime”
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IDPC	International Drug Policy Consortium
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMO	International Meteorological Organization
INCB	International Narcotics Control Board

INCSR	International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
IO	International Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ODCCP	United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
OIOS	United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services
ONDCP	U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy
TNI	Transnational Institute
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNDCP	United Nations Drug Control Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFDAC	United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control
UNGASS	United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UIA	Union of International Associations
UNIOGBIS	United Nations Integrated Peace-Building Office in Guinea-Bissau
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
WHO	World Health Organization
WDR	World Drug Report

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1 Introduction

In 1910, there were 37 intergovernmental organizations. Today, more than 250 of them populate world politics¹.

Despite this unprecedented growth, scholars of International Relations have not much to say about the role of these organizations and the bureaucracies operating them in world politics. What international organizations (IOs) are, what they do and how they affect world politics have been questions virtually absent in the study of international relations since the early 1970s, when a comparative study of eight IOs concluded that IOs only mattered in world politics when their “work has little salience for the major states” and that record of the idea that they could form a “series of autonomous, functionally defined centers of power” was “not very promising” (Cox and Jacobson 1973: 428).

Institutions are of great concern to International Relations theory, but the study of formal IOs has never gained leverage. In the worldviews of most theoretical approaches to international politics, IOs did not play a significant role. Realists and neo-realists have been concerned with long established institutions such as the balance of power or war. Formal IOs and international bureaucracies are treated as epiphenomenal to the order states create through these institutions (Mearsheimer 1994/1995). Neoliberal theorizing has concentrated on how states can gain from institutionalized international cooperation. The question is how “sets of principles, norms, rules and procedures” (Krasner 1983a) do change expectations among states and reverse ‘market failure’ in international politics (Keohane and Martin 1995). Some constructivists have been interested in IOs as structures which provide favourable conditions for state socialization (Checkel 2007b, Johnston 2003, Stone 2004). Scholars concerned with transgovernmental relations considered IOs as an antiquated form of state cooperation bound to disappear in insignificance if they do not radically change (Slaughter 2004).

However, the study of IOs has returned to IR in two forms. First, by those concerned with ‘global governance’, IOs have become seen as the core of an emerging governance

¹ What IOs are is controversial. The Yearbook of IOs offers at least five answers to the question “How many international organizations are there?” (see, for example, UIA 2005). The numbers shown here are conservative estimates. They include four types of international governmental organizations denominated as ‘federations of IOs’, ‘universal membership organizations’, ‘intercontinental membership organization’ and ‘regionally oriented membership organizations’. If ‘subsidiary and internal bodies’ of IOs are also counted as IOs in their own right the number increases to 617 for the year 2010 (UIA 2010).

architecture which does not solely rely on states (see, for example Muldoon 2004: 10) and are an important remedy for the gaps still yawning in this architecture (see, for example Weiss and Thakur 2010).

Second, in the light of blatant and often scandalized failures of IOs – such as the UN’s failure to react appropriately on the genocide in Rwanda or the IMFs and the World Bank’s performance in alleviating poverty on the African continent – a range of scholars have raised the question how IOs can become dysfunctional and why states are not acting as decisively as one could expect against these dysfunctions.

The first reason for studying IOs has been dismissed forcefully by orthodox scholars. Drezner (2007: 63), for example, argues that “governance processes need to be separated from governance outcomes” at an analytical level in order to understand what impact international and other non-state organizations can have on what is decided in international politics. His conclusion is, that it is still the great powers who make the ‘rules of the game’ in international politics. The talk about IOs making a difference is not entirely wrong, but in Drezner’s (2007: 85-87) perspective, attempts to influence decision-making processes by IOs only matter when powerful states let this happen. Outcomes of political processes depend on what powerful states want rather than on who is involved in the process.

The second perspective on IOs, however, presents a thornier problem to IR theory. Even to those theories committed to a strictly state-centric perspective on world politics dysfunction matters. After all, states create IOs because they expect them to solve problems they cannot solve alone or in decentralized forms of cooperation (Abbott and Snidal 1998). In a world of rationally acting states, the persistence of dysfunctional IOs needs to be explained.

In the past decade, IR scholars have identified a range of organizations which do not act in the way states have expected them to. In some cases this results in a reduced problem solving capacity of these organizations. The International Monetary Fund, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Secretariat’s Department of Peace Keeping Operation (Barnett and Finnemore 2004) or the World Bank (Weaver 2008)) have been declared to be dysfunctional IOs. The observation that IOs produce counterproductive results, pursue their mandates selectively or violate norms they have created themselves or to which they have committed themselves publicly is not restricted to scholarly analysis of IOs. Indeed, for a long time media and watchdogs have been pointing at the fact that IOs are often not doing what they should do in order to solve the problems they have been created to solve.

So far, theoretical accounts to dysfunctional IOs have not been able to convincingly explain why they persist and sometimes even grow. Existing explanations, mostly arguing from a sociological perspective on organizations, are helpful to explain why IOs become dysfunctional. In these perspectives, organizational culture drives the behaviour of IOs with the effect that organizations have a tendency of institutionalizing behaviour which is good for the protection of the internal culture but disadvantageous for the problems the organization has to deal with. States accept what dysfunctional IOs do to be right thing to do because IOs have the authority and constitutive power. This authority and power make IOs “central actors on the stage of world politics” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 156) and provides them with the ability to change the perceptions of states about what solutions are appropriate for problems. Because they are authoritative and powerful IOs have the ability to socialize and persuade states.

However, sociological theories of organizational dysfunction struggle to convincingly explain why states support such organizations and enable their growth despite their obvious dysfunction. The theoretical explanation put forward – the authority and constitutive power of IOs and their effects on perceptions and preferences of states – is theoretically underdeveloped and empirically difficult to prove even when an interpretative methodology is applied.

At the core of the shortcomings of existing explanations of dysfunctional IOs is their neglect of state interests. Existing explanations ignore the possibility that state could be central for the creation, persistence and growth of dysfunctional IOs not despite but because of their dysfunctional behaviour. In these explanations, states are largely passive bystanders in world politics operating in a normative structure created among others by (dysfunctional) IOs.

This study explores the argument that states can have an interest in IOs behaving dysfunctional. They serve states when the tasks they perform are only of limited interest to states.

Once mandated, dysfunctional IOs come under pressure to act, despite the lacking commitment of states to really engage in the solution of a problem be it through international cooperation or be it through the investment into the operative capacities of IOs. Because dysfunctional IOs are often weak political actors, they have no meaningful capacities to blame states for the failures they produce.

This makes dysfunctional IOs valuable agents of states in world politics. They do what I call the “dirty work” for state by sorting out state preferences in their operative work. They deal

with the impediments of problem management on the ground and – on this basis – succeed or fail to implement projects states have designed to manage problems by which they are only marginally concerned. In the case of failure, dysfunctional IOs provide states with the opportunity to blame someone else for the consequences of their lacking commitment.

Dysfunctional IOs have functions for states. States use them to separate talk from action. The fact that dysfunctional IOs often are hypocritical actors which themselves seek to separate talk from action is what makes them interesting for state. They provide states with opportunities to act, where they otherwise would not take action at all.

Dysfunctional IOs are places for states to dump the problems they are not concerned with but which nevertheless exist in world politics. Their function is to make even symbolical actions of states more meaningful and if they fail to do so, to take the blame.

Dysfunctional IOs are convenient agents for states. This is why their dysfunctions are accepted by states despite their failure to increase efficiency in international cooperation. This is why they are supported by states despite the fact that they contradict important norms in international politics. This is why they grow despite some of them are more often than not failing to accomplish the missions they are assigned to. Because they can be kept in this convenient role by states, they persist and grow.

The processes described above are complex. This study concentrates on a single case to exemplify the relationships between state interests and dysfunctional behaviour of IOs. It is concerned with revealing the mechanisms which link state interests and dysfunctional behaviour of IOs². Doing so enables this study to show how the lack of interests of states in international cooperation renders an IO dysfunctional and how this dysfunctional behaviour can nevertheless result in growth of the organization without states getting significantly socialized or persuaded into the adherence.

In-depth case studies are particularly insightful when attributes of the case defy conventional and existing theoretical explanations for similar cases (Rueschenmeyer 2003). In the case of the UNODC, existing explanations are only of limited value to understand the development of the organization in the past two decades. The UNODC is dysfunctional. It has grown over the past years. But it has had no visible effect on the preferences or perceptions of states. Without this, however, the persistence and growth of the organization can hardly be explained as a

² On the methodological advantages of case studies as a tool to reveal causal mechanisms rather than causal effects, see Gerring (2007: 43-48) and George and Bennet (2005).

function of its constitutive powers. The remainder of this introduction outlines the puzzling characteristics of the UNODC.

What Are Dysfunctional International Organizations?

Dysfunction is the core concept of this study. Defining dysfunction, however, is not an easy task since there is no measurement of such a thing as dysfunction. Claiming that an IO is dysfunctional is inherently an interpretative task (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 35-36). Therefore, the main question in defining dysfunction is against which background the behavior of an IO should be judged in order to make a reasonably founded claim that it is dysfunctional.

Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 35) argue that the dysfunction of IOs is a matter of degree and perspective and that these two dimensions of dysfunction cannot be identified straightforwardly. Setting the standard for dysfunctional behaviour high is counterproductive because in every organization dysfunction can be observed. IOs are created and run by human beings. They are social entities, not only structures which reduce transaction costs, produce information and provide services for states. And because this is the case, IOs can never work perfectly. Some degree of dysfunction is inevitable but acceptable and declaring every organization not running perfectly as dysfunctional would not provide a definition on which a theory can be created and developed. Setting it low comes with similar problems. Understanding all behaviour of IOs as acceptable because it emerges from the social relationships which hold organizations together does not allow assuming a meaningful perspective on variations in the behaviour of IOs.

One way to make the definition less dependent on the observer's judgment is to judge the behaviour of IOs against the expectations of their founders – rational states. According to Abbott and Snidal (1998), rational states create IOs because they perform functions unilateral action or decentralized forms of cooperation among states cannot achieve. IOs centralize information about problems and the behaviour of states – thereby reducing transaction cost – and as partly autonomous actors they act as enforcers of agreements among states. In this sense, a functional IO enhances the “efficiency of collective activities” and affects “the understandings, environment and interests of states”. Furthermore, because IOs are neutral actors, they should operate with impartiality in “managing interstate disputes and conflicts” (Abott and Snidal 1998: 5). Performing such tasks successfully is the baseline for a functional IO. Those which make international cooperation less efficient and lack the neutrality to settle disputes among states are dysfunctional.

Above this baseline, several degrees of dysfunction can be identified, however. Here, the issue of perspective is more salient. One form of dysfunction is what Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 34-41) have termed the ‘pathologies’ of IOs. Pathological behaviour of IOs is defined as behaviour that “violates the self-understood core goals of the organization” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 38) and which “significantly exceeds the inevitable minimum of noise and leads the organization to act in ways that are inconsistent with its social purpose” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 35). Contrary to the baseline of dysfunction established above, these are clearly interpretative standards of dysfunction because ‘self-understood goals’ and ‘social purpose’ do need further explanation in order to become meaningful categories for the definition of dysfunction.

A second form of dysfunction has been identified as what Brunsson (1989) calls ‘organizational hypocrisy’. Similar to what Barnett and Finnemore observe as dysfunctional behaviour of IOs, organizational hypocrisy can be seen in the discrepancy between what an IO says it does and what it is actually doing. Therefore, organizational hypocrisy is about the separation of talk and action in IOs. According to Weaver (2008: 19), organizational hypocrisy becomes manifest as the “selective pursuit of mandates, (...) weak compliance with rules, and (...) half-hearted or thwarted efforts to carry out new agendas”.

Pathologies of IOs and organizational hypocrisy are helpful concepts to develop a nuanced understanding of dysfunctional behaviour of IOs. They provide guidelines that help identifying dysfunctional behaviour of IOs which does not necessarily result in obvious failure of the organizations as such, but only in parts of what organizations are expected to achieve.

In this sense, dysfunction is indeed a matter of perspective. The behaviours described by Barnett and Finnemore (2004) and Weaver (2008) can make perfect sense for those within the organization. Pathologies and organizational hypocrisy often serve the survival of the organization (Weaver 2008: 4-5). Consequently, defining dysfunction, apart from the obvious failure to fulfil the basic expectations of states, necessarily means to take a position.

Elusiveness Instead of Authority: The UNODC as a Dysfunctional International Organization

The UNODC’s major dysfunction is its elusiveness. In its ‘Operational Guidelines’ (UNODC 2003: 12) the organization states that “a comparative advantage of the Office is its very DNA as a multilateral entity, namely as an honest broker representing the interest of no single Member State”.

Despite its technical mandate, design and self-understanding the UNODC has found avenues to attempt to become an actor in the politics of international drug control. It participates in the normative dispute states are leading in international drug control. It often does so indirectly through its publications and especially in its most prominent document – the World Drug Report (WDR). Indeed, this publication was established to provide states with knowledge about illicit drug markets. The initial idea was that the WDR functions as a statistical compendium of what is known about the dynamics of transnational drug markets and the effectiveness of interventions therein. However, by interpreting statistical data, introducing thematic chapters and in the forewords of the reports, executive directors and staff of the organization have introduced their own perspective on international drug control making it also a political document.

In many ways, the UNODC does not resemble an impartial actor in world politics. As one advocacy network has put it:

“The UNODC performs at its strongest when it is providing objective analysis and expertise to member states, and facilitating policy debate between conflicting positions. However, all too often, the Office has operated as a political actor in its own right, siding particular member states, or simply defending the effectiveness of existing policies and programmes.”³

The organization’s support for the prohibition of narcotic drugs as the core norm of international drug control is part of the dysfunction of the organization. Prohibition has not only proved to be ineffective, its consequences are counterproductive for the aims states want to achieve by controlling drugs. It has created lucrative black markets but has so far had no measureable effect on the levels of production, trade and consumption of controlled substances.

I will argue that this kind of dysfunction has changed over time. What the UNODC says about prohibition and its effects has come closer to what can actually be observed on illicit black markets in recent years. However, the UNODC has remained firmly supportive of an interpretation of the international drug conventions⁴ that aims at solving the ‘world drug

³ International Drug Policy Consortium, Introduction to the UNODC. See: <http://www.idpc.net/policy-advocacy/global-advocacy/global-system-drug-control/unodc/read-more> [retrieved November 14, 2011].

⁴ The international legal framework which builds the basis of the international drug control system consists of three international conventions: The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 as amended by the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, (hereafter, 1961 Single Convention), the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971 (hereafter, 1971 Psychotropic Substances Convention) and the

problem’ by restricting the use of drugs for designated purposes only and which attempts to achieve this goal by criminalizing substances and controlling the supply-side of illicit drug markets.

There are alternatives to prohibition-based drug control. Indeed, these alternatives have become more important in the domestic drug control policies of many Western European states and in recent years also in some states outside this region. These alternatives are commonly summarized under the headings of ‘harm reduction’ and ‘decriminalization’. Harm reduction and decriminalization are measures in drug control which do not directly aim at creating abstinence or a ‘drug free society’. Much more, these measures are aimed at reducing the effects of drug consumption on public health.

The UNODC has not ignored that such alternatives to prohibition have been developed in the past two decades. But in its publications, the organization has remained elusive about its own position concerning such measures and has so far failed to fully endorse the scientific knowledge which points at the positive effects of harm reduction. Although in some instances, the UNODC has made clear statements in favour of harm reduction, over the past years it is difficult to identify something like a position of the organization on the issue of alternatives to prohibition. For an IOs which calls itself as a “global leader in the fight against illicit drugs”⁵ remaining elusive on one of the major topics in international drug control in the past two decades is dysfunctional. Such behaviour does not provide the guidance and leadership functionalists and constructivists expect from IOs.

Combined with a relative neglect of alternatives to prohibition, the UNODC’s commitment to a prohibitionist understanding of how control over narcotic drugs can be achieved, the organization engages in self-defeating behaviour. Although it has become obvious that prohibition does not achieve its aims – and although this is widely accepted within the organization – in public the organization perpetuates the myth that the international drug conventions based on prohibition are the single most important tool to achieve the aim to “minimize and eventually eliminate the availability and use of illicit drugs in order to ensure the health and welfare of humankind”⁶.

United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (hereafter, 1988 Trafficking Convention).

⁵ See, UNODC webpage: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/index.html?ref=menutop> [retrieved November 14, 2011].

⁶ Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Report on the fifty-second session; E/CN.7/2009/12, p.38.

The public commitment of the UNODC to prohibition and its neglect of alternatives is a pathology which places the UNODC just above the base-line of an IO which does not fulfil the functional expectations of states. In a conflict-ridden issue-area such as international drug control, an IO that takes sides in the normative discourse under the veil of evidence-based expertise and impartiality does neither contribute to the management of disputes among states, nor is such an organization helpful in the development of international norms or making collective activities efficient or effective. It is impossible to determine if some states would be better off if regulation of drug control matters would take place in a decentralized setting. However, in any case, the UNODC's contribution to the management of the political conflicts in international drug control is rather limited. Its firm commitment to the prohibition norm has not affected states in their positions towards alternatives to a prohibitive approach to international drug control.

If one takes the UNODC's claim seriously that providing the "knowledge and understanding of drugs (...) issues and expand the evidence base for policy and operational decisions"⁷ is part of the UNODC's mandate, than – as will be shown in greater detail in chapter four of this study – it can indeed be said that the organization is pursuing its mandate only selectively and 'half-hearted'.

The Growth of the UNODC

The UNODC has been created as a technical organization. According to its mandate, it performs functions which Abbott and Snidal (1998) have identified as being essential for the enabling cooperation among states. Besides its function as an international secretariat for the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), which is the central policy making body for international drug control, and the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), which oversees the legal market for narcotic drugs, the UNODC performs genuine tasks. It collects data from states about the illicit production, trafficking and consumption of all sorts of controlled substances, provides states with guidelines and best practice in implementing the international drug control conventions and performs field missions in order to improve the capacities of states to make international drug control work. Currently, the UNODC is running 9 country offices, 27 project offices, 8 regional offices and two liaison offices and is involved in projects on most continents of the world. Staff of the organization currently comprises approximately 500 employees worldwide.

⁷ As stated on the UNODC's webpage: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/index.html?ref=menutop> [retrieved November 14, 2011].

The mandates of the UNODC had been largely defined by its historical predecessors – the Division of Narcotic Drugs, the Secretariat of the INCB and the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) – which were merged under the umbrella of the United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) by General Assembly Resolution 45/179 in 1990. ‘Crime’ in the organization’s name refers to the fact that in 2002 the United Nations Crime Fund was merged into the UNDCP and with that the Programme also became the Secretariat of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) and provides analytical functions for this commission, too. However, in terms of funding as well as within the organization, the ‘drug component’ is still dominating. For example, in 2010, from the overall budget of USD 242.9 million, 63.3% or USD 153.7 million had been administrated to the drug programme of the organization⁸.

The organization still remains divided between its drug programme and its crime programme. Although the ‘drug fund’ and the ‘crime fund’ are included under the same organization, they have largely remained separate from each other. It is therefore possible to look at the UNODC as an actor in international drug control without considering its ‘crime programme’.

The budget of the organization arises from three different sources: the UN regular budget, general purpose funds (e.g. unearmarked voluntary contributions from states), and special purpose funds (e.g. earmarked voluntary contributions from states). The organization’s overall budget between 2003 and 2009 has amounted to USD 184.3 million on average. Since 2003, the UNODC’s budget has been increasing with the exception of the year 2009, when special purpose funds dropped significantly. However, on average, the UNODC’s budget has been growing by 15% per year on average over the past eight years.

Contributions to the budget from regular UN budget and unearmarked contributions together amount to roughly 20% of the organization’s budget on average. Between 2003 and 2008 the share of unearmarked and regular budget contribution to the overall budget have decreased from 32.6% in 2003 to 12% in 2008. In 2009 and 2010, the share of unearmarked and regular funds has been 14% (see table 1).

Most of the UNODC’s budget is arising from earmarked contributions. This means that states ‘donate’ this money to the UNODC for the provision of designated projects. Between 2003 and 2010, earmarked contributions to the organization averaged at USD 151.7 million, ranging from USD 63.7 million in 2003 to USD 246.9 million in 2008.

⁸ see, UNODC website: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/donors/index.html?ref=menuaside> [retrieved November 14, 2011].

The relatively high share of earmarked contributions to the organization suggests that states are first and foremost interested in the UNODC as an IO which performs more or less clearly defined projects for states. According to the UNODC, the dependency of the organizations on voluntary contributions pledged on an annual basis is problematic. In its 2010 Annual Report, the organization described its funding mechanism as “inadequate” and “unsustainable” in the light of “ever-rising expectations” by states (UNODC 2011b: 66). However, states do not seem to be willing to change the funding structure of the organization. Despite the fact that the General Assembly has expressed general concerns about the financial situation of the organization in the light of the budgetary decrease in 2009 (UNODC 2011b: 67), it is unrealistic to expect a change in the funding mechanism of the organization. For the foreseeable future, the UNODC will have to depend largely on voluntary contributions from states.

The donor basis of the UNODC has changed over the past decade. In the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s – when the UNODC’s overall biannual budget was around USD 100 million (UNODC 2003: 4) – the UNDCP and shortly after the merger, the UNODC were mainly financed by voluntary contributions of the U.S., which was the most important single contributor to the UNODC between 1997 and 2003, contributing up to one third of its budget (Fazey 2003).

In recent years, other donors have gained importance. Today, the UNODC is receiving more funding from states which do not have an interest in the promotion of a strongly prohibitionist international drug control. A comparison of the donor structure for the years 2006-2009, for which comparable and sufficiently disaggregated data are available, reveals three dynamics in the funding structure of the organization. First, funding for the organization originates from a relatively small basis. Twenty-four states have contributed between 73% and 81% of the UNODC’s overall budget. However, in each year between four and six states provided 50%⁹ of the overall budget of the organization. Second, states which are known for their commitment to the prohibition norm in domestic and international politics¹⁰ and states which have openly committed themselves to alternative approaches to drug control¹¹ are represented

⁹ In 2006 Brazil, the European Commission, Sweden, the U.S. and UK; in 2007 the European Commission, Canada, the U.S., Sweden, Colombia and Italy; in 2008 Colombia, the U.S., the European Commission and Brazil; in 2009 Colombia, the European Commission, Canada, Sweden and Germany provided roughly 50% of the UNODC’s budget.

¹⁰ Japan, Russia, Sweden and the U.S.

¹¹ At the 52nd Session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, a group of twenty-six states made a statement in which they announced that the term “related support services” which was used in the political declaration of the Commission to describe various forms of treatment of drug abusers, will be interpreted by them as including measures commonly referred to as harm reduction measures (see, Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Report on the fifty-second session; E/CN.7/2009/12, p. 119). This was the first time that the term harm reduction was used in

in this group. The UNODC does not have a coherent donor basis with a common interest in prohibitive drug control.

Table 1: UNODC Annual Budget 2003 – 2010 in Million USD

	Regular Budget	General Purpose	Special Purpose	Total
2003	13.2	17.6	63.7	94.5
2004	16.1	15.8	76.9	108.8
2005	16.1	15.2	104.9	136.2
2006	17.7	14.4	126.1	158.2
2007	17.7	14.7	163.8	196.2
2008	20.5	13.3	246.9	280.7
2009	20.5	11.1	204.2	235.8
2010	21.3	16.1	226.8	264.2

Source: UNODC website¹² and Annual Reports of the UNODC (2007a, 2008b, 2009b, 2010a)

Third, on the other hand, the budget share of those states known for their commitment to prohibition has been decreasing. The share of those states which prefer alternative policies and the European Commission¹³, which can also be counted to the actors in international politics who put an emphasis on alternatives in drug control, has been increasing.

While no single state can be seen as responsible for the growth of the UNODC budget, those states which have openly committed to alternative approaches of drug control have become more important for the UNODC in the past years¹⁴.

In sum, three observations about the development of the UNODC's funding can be made. First, states invest more in international drug control. With the exception of the decrease of 2009, the UNODC's budget has been rising steadily. Second, the UNODC's donor basis has expanded. At the turn of the century, the organization was mainly financed by the U.S. However, in the past years the U.S. has been replaced by a range of other donors. These

an official document of the Commission. Here, states which were included in this group are considered as having openly committed to alternative approaches to international drug control. The group included: Australia, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saint Lucia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK.

¹² <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/donors/index.html?ref=menuaside> [retrieved November 14, 2011].

¹³ In the EU Drugs Strategy for 2005-2012 and the EU Action Plan on Drugs for 2005-2012, the EU has adopted a commitment to harm reduction measures as a common position. See, COM(2005) 45 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on a EU Drugs Action Plan (2005-2008), Brussels, February 14, 2005.

¹⁴ Donations from Japan, Russia, Sweden and U.S. accounted for 18% (2006), 17% (2007), 15% (2008) and 14% (2009) of the overall budget. Donations from the group of twenty-six and the European Commission accounted for 31% (2006), 29% (2007), 23% (2008) and 33% (2009) of the overall budget.

donors have different interests in international drug control, as they are not representing a prohibitionist approach to drug control domestically as well as internationally.

Table 2: Major Donors 2006 – 2009 in Million USD

	2006	2007	2008	2009
Australia	5.4	5.6	1.8	5.4
Austria	0.9	2.3	1.8	2.3
Belgium	2.5	0.2	1.5	0.5
Canada	2.8	16.7	15.5	19.3
Denmark	1.8	2.8	1.5	2.3
EC	15.8	21.7	26.6	26.4
Finland	3.1	1.2	2.4	3.1
France	2.7	3.4	3.6	3.6
Germany	2.3	2.6	8.0	13.5
Ireland	1.5	2.0	1.3	0.3
Italy	6.3	9.7	8.5	1.2
Japan	2.2	2.1	2.1	5.1
Luxembourg	0.7	1.4	1.3	1.1
Netherlands	5.3	9.3	9.6	12.6
Norway	3.8	7.3	7.7	8.2
Spain	1.4	2.1	1.4	0.7
Sweden	13.2	15.1	12.6	15.3
Switzerland	0.6	0.9	0.5	0.9
Turkey	0.6	1.0	0.6	0.7
UK	10.9	5.1	4.4	5.8
USA	12.1	15.9	26.8	11.0
Brazil	36.8	1.9	24.7	2.9
Colombia	6.2	12.2	63.8	41.7
Russia	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Total	138.9	143.0	228.4	184.4
Share of Annual Budget	88%	73%	81%	78%

Source: Annual Reports of the UNODC (2007a, 2008b, 2009b, 2010a)

Third, states do not show any interest in changing the funding mechanism of the organization. Although the General Assembly has expressed concern regarding the decreasing share of regular budget and general purpose contributions, expecting a change in the funding mechanism in the foreseeable future is unrealistic.

Together, these observations provide a mixed picture of the UNODC's relations to states. The funding mechanism and the lacking prospects of its change in the coming years suggest that states have an interest in the UNODC as an organization which provides technical functions. On the other hand, the expansion of the budget and the expansion of the donor basis suggest that more states with different interests are contributing to an organization which is in many ways committed to the international drug control conventions and their prohibitionist approach.

This suggests that the interests of states are not exclusively in using the UNODC as a tool to promote prohibitionist approaches, as some authors have argued (Thoumi 2002, Fazey 2003). The UNODC, as suggested by recent developments in its funding structure, is not (anymore) a tool of powerful states promoting zero-tolerance and the war against drugs.

It remains unclear to what extent changes in the funding structure of the UNODC have redefined the role and behaviour of the organization. According to the conventional argument often supported by critics of international drug control, the funding mechanism of the organization provides an inroad to the politicization of its role and behaviour. The UNODC has often been depicted as a conscript in the U.S.-led war on drugs because a relevant share of its funding has been provided by the U.S. (Bewley-Taylor 2004). However, changes in the funding structure of the organization have not made the UNODC a promoter of alternative approaches to drug control or just a more balanced organization. In public, the organization still backs prohibition and demonstrates its loyalty to the international drug conventions.

Nevertheless, states in general and those with an interest in a less prohibitionist international drug control in particular have increased their contributions to the organization. States, especially those for whom current international drug control seems to be problematic, are maintaining and expanding a dysfunctional IO which seems not to serve its interests. This study attempts to explain why this is the case.

The Lacking Constitutive Powers of the UNODC

The best explanation for the persistence and growth of dysfunctional IOs has been put forward by constructivist scholars, so far. They argue that dysfunctional IOs survive because they are accepted as authorities in world politics. Their authority enables dysfunctional IOs to shape the normative structure in which states act and through that to alter the perceptions and preferences of states. The authority of IOs – including dysfunctional ones – makes states accepting their world view. In short, because IOs are authority in world politics, states are persuaded into accepting that what IOs do is the right thing to do.

This explanation, however, does hardly apply to international drug control. For the past two decades, conflict over norms rather than convergence of perceptions and preferences has dominated international drug control. At the centre of these conflicts stands the question how much cooperation among states is actually necessary in order to achieve significant reduction of the production and consumption of illicit narcotic drugs.

From a prohibitionist perspective, the need for cooperation is high not only when it comes to the fight against illicit production and trafficking but also concerning the reduction of demand for illicit drugs. In this respect, lenient enforcement of prohibition at the demand-end of illicit drug markets is as much part of the 'world drug problem' as the unwillingness and inability of state to control illicit production. The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), one of the most dedicated proponent of a prohibitionist international drug control and the enforcer of the international drug control conventions, has repeatedly argued that the international drug control conventions included obligations for states to enforce prohibition not only in production and trafficking but also in policies towards drug users.

There is, however, a range of states which reduced their efforts to crack down on drug. These states make use of so called harm reduction measures as a main pillar of their drug control policies. These measures do not primarily concentrate on abstinence-based treatment but on reducing the impact of drug addiction on the health of drug users. This means that harm reduction includes measures such as the distribution of needles or syringes and the establishment of drug substitution programs or drug injection rooms.

The conflict between those states pursuing a world-wide prohibition of drug use and those making use of harm reduction measures has largely concentrated on the question if the international drug conventions do allow for harm reduction measures or if states are actually obligated to persecute drug users in the way in which they persecute illicit production and illicit trafficking. Those arguing from a prohibitionist perspective in accordance with the INCB argue that the 'spirit' of the conventions obligates states to enforce drug prohibition and that, therefore, some of the harm reduction measures currently applied – such as the establishment of drug injection rooms – are in contradiction with the obligations of the international drug conventions. Those arguing from a harm reduction perspective, on the other hand, argue that the international drug conventions do provide them with a legal basis to introduce and maintain what prohibitionist see as lenient drug enforcement policies.

The conflict about of how much cooperation among states is enough has been present in international drug control for the past two decade and has been a defining feature of to issue-area.

The UNODC's elusiveness has not done much to resolve this conflict. In the past two decades, differences in preferences and perception in international drug control have become more distinct. In international drug control, there seems to be no such thing as socialization or persuasion of states – at least not among the advanced industrial states which were the protagonists of this normative conflict and the main funders of the organization.

Despite the fact that the UNODC is lacking the constitutive powers which could explain its persistence and growth, the UNODC's funding basis has approximately doubled over the past decade. And exactly those states which have been the main opponents of the UNODC prohibitionist position have been those which have contributed to the growth of the organisation most. Existing theoretical approaches to dysfunctional international do not offer an explanation for this. If states are not socialized into believing that what the UNODC does is the right thing to do, how can it be explained that these states are not only maintaining their funding but that some of them are also increasing their donations to the organization? The authority and constitutive power of dysfunctional IOs seems not to be the only (and maybe not the best) way to explain why such organizations survive in international politics. What, if not the constitutive powers of IOs, does explain their persistence and growth?

Outline

The aim of this study is to make a contribution to the development of theories of dysfunctional IOs. Dysfunctional behaviour has become an issue of both practical and theoretical concern, but existing theories have important gaps. The UNODC is used in this study to exemplify why IOs persist and grow even when they lack authority and constitutive power. In order to explain why the UNODC has been growing over the past years, I propose to include state interests in the explanation and to analyse the normative and operative functions of dysfunctional IOs separately.

Chapter two is concerned with existing theories that explain why IOs become dysfunctional and why states are willing to accept and enable the persistence and growth of such organizations. In this chapter I argue that existing theories put a strong emphasis on explaining why IOs become dysfunctional but provide only incomplete explanations for why they persist and grow. I conclude that the focus of these theories on treating IOs as

organizations obscures the fact that the persistence and growth of dysfunctional organizations is only possible when states are willing to accept the fact that the organization is not fulfilling its expectations. Dysfunctional IOs, the argument goes, can only survive if their dysfunction serves a function for states.

Chapter three is concerned with the politics of international drug control. The chapter argues that states have only a limited interest in achieving international cooperation of drug issues. They might lead extensive debates about the norms which should guide international drug control, but in essence, international drug control is based on a strong social norm (prohibition) and a weak international legal framework (the international drug control conventions). This enables some states – the advanced industrial states – to achieve a state of co-existence rather than cooperation in international drug control. Those states not interested in fully prohibiting drugs in their domestic drug control policies are able to carve out some room of manoeuvre by exploiting loopholes in the existing legal framework. Those state interested in strong prohibition insist on a ‘zero-tolerance’ interpretation of the existing conventions. The normative discourse emerging from that does not aim at the development of existing norms but at maintaining a convenient state of co-existence from which both side in the normative discourse profit.

Chapter four explores how the politics of co-existence in international drug control shape the role of the UNODC in world politics. The chapter argues that most states had no interest in allowing the UNODC a role in the normative discourse international drug control because the functions the organization could have provided were not of interest to states. Dispute, rather than dispute resolution was the aim of the normative debates in international drug control.

Chapter five than turns to the function a dysfunctional UNODC provides for states. By the example of the UNODC’s engagement in building police capacities against drug trafficking in West Africa, the chapter argues that a seemingly dysfunctional IO can be a valuable agent of state interests in the operative realm. In the case of Guinea-Bissau, which is in the focus of the chapter, the UNODC failed to achieve the stated aims of its main project – the creation of a functioning, specialized police unit able to fight drug trafficking on the territory of the country. However, in the course of the project, UNODC staff on the ground was able to engage local authorities in negotiations about the allocation of project resources which, in the end, improved the policing situation in the country. No state had an immediate interest to engage in capacity building in Guinea-Bissau. By delegating the task to the UNODC at least a process of capacity building was initiated. Furthermore, by taking the blame for the ‘failure’

of the project, the UNODC provides states with an opportunity to take action when they would otherwise have not.

In conclusion, chapter six argues that the dysfunction of IOs is not only a matter of perspective of the outside observer, as Barnett and Finnemore (2004) have argued. More importantly, the dysfunctions of IOs are also functional for states when normative consensus about what should be done in an international policy field lacks and states act rather symbolically on problems than in an attempt to solve a problem. In this sense, the chapter argues, dysfunctional IOs are valuable tools in the organized hypocrisy of world politics.

Drawing on this conclusion, the chapter then asks if reforming dysfunctional IOs by making them more transparent and accountable – as it has been suggested by a range of authors in the past decade – would actually bring positive change to world politics. I argue that what dysfunctional IOs do can only happen if transparency and accountability mechanisms are weak. Otherwise, states would not be able to make use of the operational capacities of IOs. The alternative to a dysfunctional IO would be not only normative but also operative paralysis.

2 Dysfunctional International Organizations in World Politics: Theoretical Perspectives

Dysfunctional IOs are puzzling phenomena. Created by states to solve problems they cannot solve alone and under the close scrutiny of their governing bodies, it seems unlikely that IOs can engage in counterproductive, self-defeating and seemingly illogical behaviour. And it seems even more unlikely that such organizations persist and grow despite the fact that their dysfunctional behaviour does not contribute to and sometimes even inhibits the achievement of the social goals which are inscribed in their mandates.

This chapter looks at existing explanations for why IOs become dysfunctional, why they persist and why they grow. It reconstructs existing explanations in order to assess their strengths and weaknesses.

Existing theories of IOs provide helpful conceptual tools to explain why states support dysfunctional IOs. First, they provide an understanding of IOs as actors in world politics. They do not deny that IOs are created and controlled by states. But instead of emphasizing the constraints that states put on IOs, they emphasize how their autonomy allows them to become authoritative and powerful actors in world politics. In the perspective of these explanations IOs are not – and never were – the handmaidens of states because. The autonomy of IOs makes them actors in their own right in world politics.

Second, they explain why IOs are actors that matter in world politics. IOs, the argument goes, are authoritative and powerful actors. Despite their lack of financial and other resources, they command resources that are important for the capabilities of states to solve problems. The most important of these resources are expertise on specific problems and impartiality. Because they are basing their actions on their expertise and because they take the measures to achieve the social goals inscribed in their mandates, the solutions IOs provide for problems of common concern are respected by other actors in world politics. This makes them authorities.

Third, they explain how IOs influence the behaviour state of states. IOs command power resources which enable them to change the behaviour of states. They socialize state. With their expertise, they contribute to the constitution of the world in which states act. They might not command power resources that can force states to change their behaviour, but they constitute the world in which states act and through that they change the preferences of states.

Fourth, these theories explain why IOs become dysfunctional. Because IOs are organizations, they develop their own routines in handling problems. These routines can develop into entrenched organizational cultures which are – because they enable the organization to

function efficiently – protected by the organization. Changes in expectations toward the organization or in problem constellations – indeed all changes in the ‘environment’ of the organization – are processed through this culture and as far as possible adapted to existing routines, rules and behavioural standards. Instead of adapting to changes in the outside world, organizations attempt to fit new problems into existing solutions. As a result they can become dysfunctional.

The explanations of the autonomy, authority, power, and dysfunction together form a causal narrative which allows to plausibly claim why states do not abandon dysfunctional IOs. Behaviour that appears to be defying rational logic to the outside observer, seems to be consequential and ‘the right thing to do’ when viewed from the perspective of the organization. Because states are socialized by IOs, they accept what IOs do. Through socialization, the solutions IOs provide for their common problems become seen as appropriate by states. And because states consider the actions of dysfunctional IOs appropriate, they understand their behaviour as functional. In this explanation there is no need for states to abandon a dysfunctional IO. They are fulfilling the expectations states have in them.

This causal narrative has proved to be helpful to make sense of a range of behaviours of IOs and states. Some of the most catastrophic failures of IOs to live up to their mandates and the norms to which they have committed themselves have been plausibly explained by the combination of autonomy, authority, power and dysfunction of IOs (see, for example Barnett and Finnemore 2004).

However, this causal narrative has decisive weaknesses. First, the core assumption of existing theories is that IOs are authoritative actors because they are organized as bureaucracies. It is the bureaucratic nature of IOs which leads states to accept the norms, rules and policies they propose. The legal-rational character of IOs is understood as the source of the authority of all IOs. Because most IOs are set up as bureaucracies, existing theories cannot fully explain variations in kind and degree of authority. In order to understand how a specific IO acquired its identity as an authority and how it became the authority it is, looking at organizations alone is not enough. Without developing an understanding of how states and other actors in world politics contributed to the construction of the identity of an IO, the explanation remains incomplete.

Second, existing explanations do not allow for a deeper understanding of the causal mechanisms which make IOs powerful actors. The claim that IOs have constitutive power –

that they have an influence on how states perceive problems and that these perceptions can alter the preferences of states – remains largely an assumption. Even if it can be shown that problem perceptions of IOs and states converge, this does not necessarily mean that they have a causal effect on how states perceive problems. Without spelling out the mechanism through which problem perceptions of IOs influence problem perceptions of states, there is no way to empirically test the assumption that constitutive power causally precede state perceptions and preferences.

Empirical studies of the constitutive effects of IOs have concluded that their potential to socialize states is smaller than theories of dysfunctional IOs suggest. Changes in problem perceptions of state representatives appear to be minimal even in the long term. Empirically, it would be at best difficult to prove the constitutive powers of IOs. With this, one of the core arguments of existing explanations for why states support dysfunctional IOs is theoretically underdeveloped and empirically difficult to sustain.

The five sections of this chapter develop the causal narrative of dysfunctional IOs, their autonomy, authority and power in greater detail. The first section is concerned with the autonomy of IOs, the second with their authority, the third with their power and the fourth with their dysfunction. The fifth section takes up the problematic aspects of these theories and argues that the weakness of existing theories in explaining the micro-mechanisms of socialization casts doubts on the existence of strong feed-back effects of IOs on states through their constitutive power.

The chapter concludes that in order to develop a better understanding of the existence and growth of dysfunctional IOs, a new perspective on dysfunctional IOs which includes the material resources of states and their interests in working with dysfunctional IOs needs to be developed.

The Autonomy of International Organizations

Neorealist and neoliberal theories of international politics have not acknowledged the agency of IOs. Neither neorealism nor neoliberalism provides a conceptualization of them as actors in world politics (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, Rochester 1986, Gallarotti 1991). As agency is the main quality that ontologically distinguishes actors from structures, it can be said without doubt that the two theories most commonly used to analyse international politics have not fully captured the role organizational agency plays in world politics. As many authors have observed, this lack of a meaningful conceptualization of IOs as actors in their own right is

mainly due to the state-centrism of neorealist and neoliberal theories, which hold as one of their basic assumptions that states are the only actors in world politics that really make a difference. Neoliberalism might allow for other actors to play a role in political settings beyond the state, but when it comes to explaining political outcomes, even in a neoliberal perspective, all other actors than states play only a minor role. As I will argue in this chapter, this is especially true for IOs.

The neglect of IOs as actors in their own right has been made most visible by a debate between neorealist and neoliberals about the meaning and value of international institutions in world politics after the end of the Cold War. While this debate showed that neorealism and neoliberalism profoundly differ in their understanding of international institutions and the assessment of their effect on world politics, it has also shown that both did not assign any particular meaning to IOs. In both the neorealist and the neoliberal perspective, world politics would look the same no matter if international governance arrangements were formalized in IOs or not. Therefore, IOs do not matter in world politics as organizations.

Neorealist conceptions of international politics as power politics have rarely paid attention to institutional features of the international systems. For neorealists, institutions are epiphenomenal to the distribution of power in the international system and their existence can be explained by the interests of great powers. Institutions will exist as long as the great powers can use them to further their own interests and will be abandoned when they are working against the interests of the most powerful states in the international system. As great powers have the capabilities to create the rules of the international system, they will not tolerate international institutions that do not favour their own interests. International institutions and IOs play only a marginal role in a realist conception of international politics. This perspective has been most prominently expressed by Hoffmann (1973: 73) Waltz (1979: 104-107; 209-210) and Mearsheimer (1994/1995).

Neoliberals, on the other hand, strongly emphasize the importance of international institutions (Axelrod and Keohane 1984, Keohane and Martin 1995, see also Krasner 1983a, Krasner 1983b). In the neoliberal perspective, international institutions are a key feature of international politics because they mitigate power relations and can bind the actions even of great powers. However, neoliberalism is not particularly concerned with formal institutions such as IOs. Institutions are understood as sets of principles, norms, rules and procedures around which the expectations of states converge (Krasner 1983a: 1). These institutions are explicit – in the form of international agreements – or implicit. But even in their explicit form,

international institutions are not necessarily connected to an IO. Some IOs might be created in order to facilitate the provision of public goods that emerge from states behaving according to institutional settings in international politics, but they are not a necessary condition for the functioning of an institution. What matters – in terms of changing state behaviour – is the existence of principles and norms, not the existence of an actor that in some way enforces behavioural change. In the neoliberal perspective, international institutions are self-enforcing and self-reinforcing because they enable states to overcome collective action problems by decreasing transaction costs and improving information.

Institutions are part of the structure in which states operate and IOs are the visible – mostly administrative – component of these structures, but behavioural change emerges from the existence of a structure that guides states' behaviour (Krasner 1983b: 359-367). As a result, IOs have no independent role in international politics in a neoliberal perspective.

However, not all IR theorists have ignored the agency of IOs in world politics. Some have argued that the formal structure of IO contains important features that make them more than just structures. Most prominently, Abbott and Snidal (1998) have argued that IOs provide states with functions they could not achieve with other forms of cooperation. Because IOs centralize governance functions and execute them with a degree of independence from the interests of powerful states, they can be used by states to solve cooperation dilemmas states could not solve in other ways. As most evident examples serve IOs that are charged to monitor the implementation of international agreements. An IO which is credibly shielded from direct interference by states is a more credible monitoring agency than any state. Because it is impartial, over-reporting or under-reporting of implementation is much less likely than when monitoring would be left to the parties of an international agreement (Abbott and Snidal 1998: 20). Abbott and Snidal list a variety of similar functions in world politics that can be carried out more efficiently by IOs than by states. Centralization and independence make them valuable agents for states when it comes to overcoming cooperation problems in international politics.

This does, however, not mean that Abbott and Snidal (1998) perceive IOs as fully autonomous actors in international politics. Although they do not deny that IOs have a degree of autonomy, they neither offer an explanation for why IOs are autonomous nor do they attempt to account for any behaviour that goes beyond what states assign IOs to do. In their perspective, IOs are the formal embodiment of structural features of international politics, but

they are not actors that can develop behaviours that are distinct from what states ask them to do. States remain in control and allow for agency only as long as IOs fulfil the tasks that solve their cooperation problems. In this functional perspective, IOs remain largely a feature of the institutional structure states build in order to achieve cooperation among them.

Perspectives that emphasize the structural advantages of IOs when compared to other forms of international cooperation have been provided by other IR scholars such as Martin and Simmons (1998) or Haftel and Thompson (2006). What they have in common with the neorealist and the neoliberal understanding of international institutions is that they emphasize the structural dilemmas IOs solve rather than the actor qualities of the IOs as actors.

No matter if seen as purely epiphenomenal or as administrative part of formal and informal international institutions, neorealist as well as neoliberal theory understands IOs as being not much more than - to use Mathiason's (2007: 10) metaphor - the "people who run a valet parking". Those running the valet parking of a hotel neither own the hotel nor do they have any influence on what is going on in the hotel. The hotel would even function very much in the same way without them. But at the same time, a valet parking is something costumers wish for, because it makes it more convenient to use the hotel and takes away some of the responsibilities costumers otherwise would have to care for on their own. Similarly, IOs might not be necessary to make international politics possible, but states build and maintain them, because they provide services they would only achieve at higher costs otherwise. But like people running a valet parking, who might drive cars but have no real control over them, IOs lack a clear sense of agency in the conceptions of neorealism and neoliberalism.

Some rationalist and constructivist scholars have challenged the view of neorealism and neoliberalism of IOs.

Rationalists, by applying principal-agent theory to IOs, convincingly argue that the behaviour of IOs is not so much determined by what states expect them to do then by the way in which the relationship between states and IOs is structured by power relations among states, cost of information, uncertainty and diverging interests of states and IOs. IOs are understood as entities in world politics that are given the permission to act - in a limited way - on their own terms and which use this permission to realize their own interests. Constructivists, on the other hand, understand IOs as entities in world politics that are also able to shape the relationship between them and states due to their ability to participate in the construction of the context in which states operate and which shape their preferences. Therefore, the constructivist perspective on the agency of IOs is less state-centric than the one of principal-

agent theory. In explaining the effects IOs have on political outcomes rationalist and constructivist approaches take a fundamentally different causal perspective: principal-agent theory explains organizational action of IOs by looking at state actions, while constructivist theory explains organizational influence of IOs by looking at how they influence state actions. Apart from this very profound difference, however, rationalists and constructivists share a common understanding of many of the properties of IO or are at least complementary in the 'blind spot' of the two perspectives (see also Weaver 2007).

Rationalists have challenged the structural conceptions of IOs by introducing principal-agent theory into the field. The starting point of all principal-agent approaches is the observation that organizations created to perform a specific task often do not perform this task in the way their creators have imagined them. This holds true for private as well as for public agencies, and, indeed, the first applications of principal-agent theory in political science were used to explain autonomous behaviour of bureaucratic agencies in U.S. domestic politics (see, for example, McCubbins and Page 1987).

In IR, principal-agent theory was used to explain the same observation – that IOs were acting autonomously, an observation neither neorealism nor neoliberalism could fully explain. Using principal-agent theory, scholars identified by and large the same mechanisms as explanations for autonomous behaviour of IOs as have been found to be at play in domestic politics. These mechanisms can be summarized as preference heterogeneity among principals, uncertainty about the effectiveness of a policy, the costs of information emerging from controlling agents, and the interests of the agent.

Preference heterogeneity among principals mainly explains why states create IOs with discretion. Because it is unlikely that all states involved in the creation of an IO have the same goals and preferences, but prefer cooperation over unilateral action, delegation to a partly autonomous body can be beneficial for all principals (Hawkins et al. 2006: 20). As principals benefit in many ways from delegation to a partly autonomous body (Hawkins et al. 2006: 13-19), it is likely that states will delegate decision-making power to an IO when their preferences over broader policy goals are shared but differ over detailed outcomes of cooperation. As Copelovitch (2010a) has shown, preference heterogeneity among main principals (i.e. the most powerful states in the international system) does actually lead to the creation of IOs with more discretion and creates opportunities for IOs to use this discretion in policy making (Hawkins et al. 2006: 28; see also McCubbins and Page 1987: 418).

Uncertainty about the effectiveness of a policy tempts principals to create agents with discretion because establishing cooperative agreements is costly for them. Basically, principals can choose between creating agents that are governed by a set of detailed rules or agents that are governed by discretion. Detailed rules are assumed to incur higher costs on principals because collective decision-making on these rules will be more difficult than endowing an agent with discretion. Especially when states are uncertain about the effectiveness of a policy or about the impacts of exogenous shocks on an IO, they prefer discretion over rule-based control, because they do not have to negotiate these rules again if it turns out that a policy does not work in the way it was expected (Nielson and Tierney 2003). A third reason why IOs are not seen as obedient servants in principal-agent theory is the costs of controlling an agent. Principal-agent theory suggests that control incurs costs on principals. In order for control measures to be effective, states have to take actions. They have to monitor the behaviour of IOs, interpret the signals they get from this behaviour and implement sanctions for undesired action (Hawkins et al. 2006: 28-30). These actions are resource intensive (especially in terms of time and knowledge) and can therefore be expected to be conducted imperfectly. Theoretically, principals can control agents tightly. Most delegation includes the tools for intensive control by states. They will, however, rarely use all these tools, because tight control incurs high cost on principals (Hawkins et al. 2006: 31) and because it potentially reduces the gains from endowing agents with discretion (Hawkins et al. 2006: 8).

The mechanisms described above are concerned with what states do and why these actions create opportunities for IOs to act autonomously. IOs, however, have their own distinct interests and use their discretion to pursue them. As Hawkins and Jacoby (2006) have shown, IOs under certain circumstance even exhibit behaviours which aim at intentionally counteracting the ability of states to control them and limit their discretion. By drawing on organizational dependency theory (the rationalist strand of organizational theory) they identify ways in which IOs can act strategically to defy a principal's ability to control them. All of these ways draw on the main assumption of organizational dependency theory: organizations want to establish a stable relationship with their environment that minimizes the potential impacts dependency has on its survival and growth (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 154-156). Organizational interests, therefore, are seen as the main driving force of international organizational behaviour by principal-agent theory (Vaubel, Dreher and Soylu 2007).

Basically, IOs have three different ways in which they can influence the relationship with their principals. Firstly, they can actively engage in the negotiation of delegation agreements and the interpretation of these agreements. Because the creation of IOs incurs costs on principals, states often refer to existing IOs when delegating new tasks (Hawkins and Jacoby 2006: 203-204). This allows IOs to engage in the negotiation of the terms under which delegation will be made. Furthermore, when a substantial number of states has delegated to an IO, it becomes less likely that the organization defers to the principals' interpretation of the terms of delegation (Hawkins and Jacoby 2006: 206-207). Delegation – as seen from the agent's perspective – has a decreasing marginal utility. When a sufficient number of states have delegated authority to an IO, acquiring new principals by invoking the impression of being a reliable executor of the principals' interests becomes less important for the organization. When the delegation to an IO has crossed this tipping point, an organization becomes more likely to gradually interpret the terms of delegation in favour of its own interests.

Secondly, IOs can attempt to increase their autonomy by protecting their core tasks from interference by their principals (Hawkins and Jacoby 2006: 210-211). Because control mechanisms of principals do not work perfectly, IOs can adopt strategies which make it difficult for states to control what they are actually doing. IOs can engage in superficial reporting about their activities and only publicly report those activities that are expected to be in accordance with the principals' preferences. 'Buffering', as such strategies are called, are an almost universal feature of all organizations (Powell and DiMaggio 1991, Brechin 1997: 173-175) and allow IOs to develop their core tasks in a way that fits the organizations' interests rather than those of its principals.

Thirdly, IOs can facilitate the access of non-principals to organizational decision-making processes (Hawkins and Jacoby 2006: 208-209). In the international arena, non-principals are often private organizations – such as advocacy networks – whose preferences differ from those of the principal. Because principals have incentives to include non-principals as part of the monitoring process in IOs, access is often granted by principals themselves. However, when the preferences of agents and non-principals align, it is likely that monitoring becomes inefficient and that facilitating access can result in greater autonomy of an IO.

Taken together, the mechanisms identified by principal-agent theory provide a relatively coherent explanation for why IOs can be understood as being autonomous rather than tightly controlled actors in world politics. The mechanisms identified by principal-agent theory all

point in the same direction. From a rationalistic point of view, it seems highly unlikely that states have incentives to make IOs their obedient servants.

In terms of autonomous behaviour most of the principal-agent literature is concerned with explaining one specific form of organizational behaviour - agency slack, i.e. autonomous behaviour of agents that is not in the interest of their principals. Although autonomy and agency slack differ in their meaning in important ways, in principal-agent theory, autonomous action is mostly understood to be agency slack (see also, Hawkins et al. 2006: 8). This, too, is at least partly the result of the rationalistic assumptions of principal-agent theory. As these assumptions make it plausible that principals create agents in a way which makes sure that they serve their interests, agent action that serves principals' interest (even when it goes beyond the principals' requirements) is not understood as autonomous action on the side of the principal (Hawkins et al. 2006: 8).

Constructivist scholars studying IOs have developed a theoretical perspective which takes up these shortcomings of principal-agent theory by looking at the organizations themselves. They argue that without understanding what happens within organizations, it is not possible to gain a full understanding of the interest and autonomy of IOs and the influence they can exert on political outcomes in world politics.

Constructivist theorizing on IOs draws heavily on organizational studies, a subfield of sociology. Originally concerned with the question of explaining widespread similarities of organizations, organizational studies have developed a variety of theories which explain similarities as well as variation in organizational design and behaviour. As compared to principal-agent theory, using organizational theories offers advantages for research on IOs.

Organizational theories take organizations serious. They open the organizational 'black box' and attempt to explain how the inner working mechanisms of organizations shape their interest, identities and behaviour. In contrast to principal-agent theory, organizational theories understand organizations as social rather than rational actors in world politics. While this might make a theory of the influence of IOs on world politics less parsimonious, it at least allows to establish an understanding of the principal-agent theory's main rationalist assumption of basically expansion-oriented IOs.

Sociological theories of IOs do not reject most of the ideas principal-agent theory has introduced to the study of IOs. Like principal-agent theory, sociological approaches assume that an organizations ability to act autonomously stems from the fact that states have delegated some authority to the organization. Furthermore, they agree that – at least in the

long term – IOs want to survive and that they have an inherent tendency to grow. However, they explain organizational behaviour not by rational calculations of IOs. The focus of sociological theories of IOs is not so much on showing that IOs are autonomous actors in world politics but rather on explaining what constitutes their autonomy and why they act in the way they do. Sociological theories argue that the behaviour of IOs can be best understood when seen as at the outcome of social processes within organizations (see for example Barnett and Finnemore 2004).

Organizational culture is the centrepiece of organizational behaviour from a sociological perspective. It includes a wide range of formal and informal practices within organizations that shape the identities of those involved in these organizations. As one scholar has put it, organizational culture includes nearly everything ranging from “dress norms, stories people tell about what goes on” to the “the organization’s formal rules and procedures, its informal codes of behaviour, rituals, tasks, pay systems, jargon, and jokes understood by insiders (...)” (Martin 1992: 1). Organizational culture is the product of the interaction of those engaged in it and it is reproduced them. It is the institution that distinguishes the organization from the social relationships in which it operates, its ‘environment’. Organizational cultures shape what organizations do by shaping the understandings of those engaged in the organization about what the aim of the organization should be and how this mission should be achieved.

Organizational culture, defined in this way, is certainly a blurry term but its analytical value lies in the departure from a purely mechanistic and functional view on organizations and organizational behaviour. An organization’s mandate or mission might be its initial *raison d’être*, but in a sociological perspective, organizations are able to evolve and develop an identity which can be fundamentally different from its functional origins. Organizational culture can drive organizational behaviour in a different direction than the creators of an organization have expected at the time of the creation of the organization (Brunsson 1989: 1-12, Ness and Brechin 1988, Brechin 1997: 195-198).

From a sociological perspective, this holds true for IOs as it does for any other (political or non-political) organization (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, Barnett and Coleman 2005, Nielson, Tierney and Weaver 2006, Weaver 2007, Weaver 2008). Barnett and Finnemore (2004) have convincingly argued that internal rules and procedures in IOs play a crucial role for what these organizations do and for how they do it. In their analysis of the reaction of the UN Secretariat to the emerging genocide in Rwanda in 1994, for example, Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 121-156) show that the Secretariat’s strong culture of non-intervention into on-going conflicts has significantly diminished its ability to see the developments in Rwanda

as being in the responsibility of its Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The guiding rule of the UN bureaucracy when it came to the deployment of peacekeeping forces and authorization of interventions was, that there needed to be a peace to keep. Without the agreement of all conflicts involved in a conflict, peacekeeping forces were not deployed by the UN. In the case of Rwanda, while there were some peacekeeping forces already deployed, they were not mandated make use of force to enforce the cease fire on which their mandate was based. Sticking to the rule that the UN's peacekeeping forces are exclusively authorized to take action according to their mandate led the organization to process information about the imminent genocide wrongly and resulted in the failure to take action that could have averted the mass killings.

Although it would be counterfactual to argue that the Secretariat's understanding of peace keeping rules as being only applicable when 'there is a peace to keep' (e.g. when cease-fire agreement between conflicting parties already exists) has caused the failure of the international community to intervene in this conflict, it can be said that the strong non-intervention culture of the Secretariat has at least impeded immediate international action in Rwanda. For an IO created to ensure peace and stability in the world and which has the protection of human rights inscribed in their mandate, Barnett and Finnemore argue, this is rather odd behaviour with catastrophic results which is best explained by the way internal cultures of organizations shape the way in which organizations perceive the world.

In sum, IR theories have developed two distinctive ways to explain why IOs are more than epiphenomena of the interests of powerful states or structures which enable cooperation among states. In the rationalist explanation, IOs are created to overcome problems emerging from the management of heterogeneous preferences among states but acquire a life of their own because the autonomous entities states had created to assist them in solving their own problems develop interests in their own right. These interests are defended by strategic action. In constructivist reasoning, states also create IOs to overcome collective action problems. But in doing so, they create first and foremost cultural entities which develop their own sense of what their *raison-êtr*e is and how this can be achieved. In the constructivist perspective the agency of IOs becomes even more eminent. Organizations reproduce themselves through their internal cultures and become autonomous from what states want from them not only because of differences in interests but also because they see their mandates through their own culture and gear their behaviour according to their own perception of what they are and what they should achieve.

Autonomy is the prerequisite to understand how IOs can matter in world politics as actor and not only as structure. Without autonomy, agency cannot exist. Theorists arguing from both rationalist and constructivist perspectives have presented explanations for how IOs can become autonomous actors in world politics which act according to properties connected to the organization rather than to its environment (e.g. interests or internal cultures). Explaining the autonomy of IO creates the basis for understanding the role they can play in world politics.

The Authority of International Organizations

Establishing that IOs are autonomous actors in world politics does not explain why and how they matter. The autonomy of IOs is a prerequisite for them to play a meaningful role in world politics, but it is not yet an explanation for how IOs make a difference.

Beyond the conclusion that IOs act strategically in order to maximize their autonomy, budget and staff, principal-agent theory does not add much to answer this question. Constructivist theories on the other hand have developed an extensive theoretical framework which explains why IOs are not only autonomous but also influential actors in world politics. The key to their influence, sociological theories argue, is the authority of IOs.

Political authority is an elusive concept. Although, at first sight, it seems to be a property of a particular actor, one cannot think of political authority as existing outside social relationships. It would not make sense to speak of an actor as having political authority if this actor would act alone, because authority, by definition, includes that an actor's behaviour is changed because of another actor's behaviour (or in anticipation of such an act). Without anyone paying attention to a political authority, it cannot become the property of an actor. Political authority, therefore, is an inherently relational concept and not an objectively measurable property of a particular actor¹⁵.

At the risk of oversimplification, the question who is an authority can be boiled down to the question why a particular actor is in charge. This, however, is an empirical rather than a conceptual question. Political authority, in its empirical sense, is social practice. It includes actors who claim that they are in charge for the treatment of a particular problem and actors which accept this claim as rightful, assuming that this particular actor has the capabilities to

¹⁵ See also Avant, Finnemore and Sell (2010: 9-10), for more extensive treatments of the concept of political authority see, Flathman (1980) and Raz (1990).

govern the problem in question and act according to the ‘guidelines’ issued by the actor how has put herself in charge (or was put in charge by acts of other actors). The trade-offs that come into existence through these mutually constitutive social acts are the social texture called political authority. In this sense, authority is not a fixed property of an actor. It emerges from social practice. Who is in charge, in the end, can only be derived from the attempt to understand the social relationships in which authority is enacted.

Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 20-22) argue that IOs are in charge because they are bureaucracies. As they put it, bureaucracies “are, by definition, authorities – they are rational-legal authorities in their domain of action” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 20). Because bureaucracy is seen as the embodiment of modern, depersonalized form of governance, bureaucracies are perceived to be legitimate decision-makers. In short, international bureaucracies embody the ideals of modern political legitimacy in their organizational structure.

Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 23-29) identified two specific forms by which international bureaucracies come to be seen as authorities in world politics. Because their bureaucratic organizational form makes it possible for them to credibly claim that they are impersonal decision-makers which base their decisions on expertise and normative considerations.

Expert authority stems from the accumulation of technocratic expertise in IOs. Basing decision-making on technocratic and scientific knowledge is an important part of the rational-legal ideal type of exercising power. As Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 24) have put it: “One reason we create bureaucracies is that we want important social tasks to be done by people with detailed, specialized knowledge”. The accumulation of specialized knowledge in IOs is an expression of the division of labour in modern governance. Decision-making based on expertise creates the appearance of depoliticized decision-making and substitutes interest-driven policies with evidence-driven policies. Together, Barnett and Finnemore argue, the appearance of adhering to modern principles of governance and the notion of depoliticized decision-making create a strong belief that IOs are legitimate decision-makers in world politics. This belief constitutes in parts the authority of IOs.

Moral authority largely stems from the perception of IOs as impartial actors in world politics. IOs are often created in a way that makes it difficult even for powerful states to directly influence their decision-making and behaviour (Abbott and Snidal 1998: 20, Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 23). Because they are shielded from direct state influence, IOs often appear to represent broader social goals as opposed to myopic political interests and to do so in a way

that serves these goals rather than their own interests. IOs are perceived to be servants of other actors rather than actors in their own right, and their mandate – social goals on which states could collectively agree on – often makes them appear impartial towards solutions for problems that are mainly driven by ideology or interests (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 23).

Taken together, the argument why IOs are authorities in world politics is rather straightforward. States create IOs as authoritative actors in world politics. They design them in a way which allows at least partially independent from the influence of particular states. They design them in this way because states want IOs to accomplish tasks other forms of international cooperation cannot. Only an autonomous actor can establish the rational-legal rule that is needed to solve problems without the interference of interests and political conflict. From this, IOs derive two specific forms of authority which are closely connected to their rational-legal appearance: expert authority and moral authority. In the best case, the legal-rational organizational form of IOs and their expertise and impartiality – which makes them moral authorities – are mutually reinforcing (see also, Avant, Finnemore and Sell 2010: 18-21). Basing decisions and behaviour on technocratic knowledge reinforces the rational appearance of IOs. Behaviour based on norms, principles and rules reinforces the legal appearance of IOs. And being constituted as bureaucracies reinforces the appearance that what IOs do is based on technocratic knowledge and the adherence of norms, principles and rules.

From a sociological perspective, IOs are authoritative actors in world politics because the sources on which their claim for authority is based on are not in conflict with each other. This allows IOs to solidify their position as rightful ‘governors’ in world politics. This is what differs them from many other actors in world politics which claim rightful rule. Actors whose sources of authority are in tension experience problems to achieve a similar position in world politics (Avant, Finnemore and Sell 2010: 21).

The Power Resources of International Organizations

Authority builds the basis for IOs to become actors in world politics that make a difference. But how do they affect world politics? What are the resources and mechanisms through which IO transform authority into behavioural change of other actors? In short: how do IOs exert power?

Barnett and Finnemore (2004) describe three distinctive mechanisms through which IOs are able to change their environment and, subsequently, influence state behaviour. They distinguish between the classification of problems, the fixing of meaning and the diffusion of norms.

The classification of problems – understood as the act of organizing information and knowledge about the world – is seen as the main power resource of IOs. As Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 32) put it: “Problems are not part of objective reality but are subjectively defined and constituted within social experience. Authorities help to create that subjective reality and to define what are the problems that require solutions”. Both expertise and moral authority play a crucial role for the way in which IOs identify and classify problems as well as for their ability to establish their classification as valid understandings of situations that require solutions. In terms of problem identification, the educational and technical training of international bureaucrats can have a strong effect on what IOs perceive to be problematic (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 24-27).

The fixing of meaning takes classification schemes one step further. While classification is mostly about sorting out what a problem is and which problems should be treated with priority, the fixing of meaning is about applying classification schemes to real world situations. Therefore, the fixing of meaning is about defining and redefining real world situations in the terms of classification schemes. It includes defining what kind of problem a given situation is, who is affected by the problem, how the problem should be solved and who is in charge of solving the problem (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 32-33). The expertise and moral authority of IOs play an important role in creating such problem frames. They help IOs to be perceived as those actors in world politics who are in charge of making sense of emerging new situations.

The diffusion of norms can be seen as the last step of IO action to establish a robust normative or ideational setting through which global problems are perceived. Unlike classification and the fixing of meaning, diffusion of norms includes active agent-to-agent action by IOs. It is often part of the mission and mandate of IOs to spread norms, and the accumulation of expertise IOs often leads to a technocratic understanding within IOs that the ways in which problems are seen by them is the way in which others should see the problems, too. Convincing others of the appropriateness of their understandings of problems is an inherent task of IOs (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 33).

Barnett and Coleman (2005: 600-602) identified two additional mechanisms through which IOs can change their environment: strategic social construction and manipulation. Both

strategies aim at changing the relationship between the organization and its environment by actions of the organization itself.

Strategic social construction “revolves around the active effort by the IO to change the normative or cultural environment so that it becomes consistent with the values and goals of the organization” (Barnett and Coleman 2005: 602). IOs actively try to shape the utility functions of other actors in a way that their utility function becomes consistent with what is best for the organization (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 910). Because organizational culture is, from the IO’s point of view, difficult to change, it can be easier and less costly for an IO to attempt to change the world views of other relevant actors in accordance with its own world views then to try to alter the internal culture of the organization.

Manipulation on the other hand is a much more direct strategy. It is not concerned with redefining the normative context in which IOs operate but with changing the material relationship between an IO and its environment in order to preserve its autonomy and organizational culture. In many ways, manipulation resembles the strategic behaviour of IOs described by Hawkins and Jacoby (2006) from a principal-agent perspective.

In sum, the mechanisms through which IOs influence their environment can be summarized in two broad categories - socialization and persuasion. While this is an analytical distinction due to the fact that some of the mechanisms described above can have both socializing and persuading effects, the distinction is important for empirical observations because socialization and persuasion change actor behaviour through different mechanisms. Socialization is an effect generated by a structure-to-agent relationship. Actors who get socialized act in a certain way because they believe that it is appropriate to act in this way in the given normative or ideational structure. This structure an intersubjectively shared set of beliefs about how the world that surrounds actors works and how actors should behave in such a world (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 24-43; 66-83)¹⁶. This does, however, not mean that this structure is a given or cannot be changed.

The normative structure in which actors operate is created and can be changed by them (Wendt 1987, Wendt 1999). Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 20-22) argue that IOs play an important role in building and changing the ideational and normative structure at the global political level because of their bureaucratic authority. IOs are seen as appropriate actors to shape the understanding of other actors in world politics because they were created to do so

¹⁶ On the different meanings of the term ‘agency’ in constructivist and rationalist understandings, see Barkin 2010: 100-118.

and have been given an appropriate organizational form that allows them to make credible claims to shape the ideas and norms about problems of global scope. Classification, the fixing of meaning and strategic social constructing seem to be the power resources of IOs that are more explicitly geared toward creating a normative structure which then affects the behaviour of other actors.

Persuasion, on the other hand, works on an actor-to-actor basis. It can be understood as the attempt by one actor to convince another that it is appropriate to act in a certain way. It is more direct because it is not so much about the question what normative structure is created for then about the question how actors that are reluctant to act in accordance with this structure can be convinced that acting appropriately is the best way to take action.

Manipulation and the diffusion of norms both include strong elements of persuasion, as they often include international bureaucrats actively promoting their world views to other actors such as non-governmental organizations, domestic bureaucrats or governments. It is, however, important to keep in mind that not all ways in which IOs can influence state behaviour are directly observable – as it would be the case with persuasion. Socialization might only be observable indirectly and by deeper investigation, as its the observation also includes answering the question who shaped an existing normative structure.

The power resources of IOs are ‘soft’. IOs lack the material resources to coerce. What has been identified as the power of IOs might be best understood as ‘constitutive’ forms of power (see also, Barnett and Duvall 2005). IOs shape the way in which other actors perceive problems and through which they define their interests, form their preferences and choose their courses of action (see also, Barnett and Duvall 2005).

Together, the autonomy, authority, and power of IOs explain why they are “central actors on the stage of world politics” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 156). Autonomy explains why IOs are more than structures through which others act in world politics. The mutually reinforcing sources of the authority of IOs explain why states and other actors in world politics tend to accept what they do and say. The power resources of IOs explain through which mechanisms IOs affect change in the behaviour of other actors.

Based on autonomy, authority and power a coherent causal narrative can be formed which explains why IOs, despite their lack of material resources and their dependency on states as their creators, matter in world politics.

Dysfunctional International Organizations

IOs are autonomous, authoritative and powerful actors in world politics. However, some of them are clearly dysfunctional. In order to complete the argument why dysfunctional IOs persist, this section provides an explanation for why IOs become dysfunctional.

Explanations of dysfunction draw heavily on the insights of sociological organizational theory. They argue that IOs – like all organizations – need to bridge the gap between the organization and its environment. They have to adapt to changing problem constellations, changing expectations on their effectiveness and, after all, changing normative structures in which they operate.

Adaption to change in the environment, however, is difficult for IOs. Organizational cultures change slowly, adaption to changes in the environment often happens incrementally and highly path dependent and in some cases, the organizational culture does not change at all. It is for this reason that IOs have been identified as recalcitrant actors in world politics (Ness and Brechin 1988: 247). As in any other organization, the culture – as a social construction and the product of social interaction in a relatively closed social system – of an IO is hard to change (Barnett and Coleman 2005, Nielson, Tierney and Weaver 2006).

Because IOs depend on a changing environment, the relationship between organizational culture and the environment of an organization is complex and often tense. Barnett and Coleman (2005: 600, 615-616) have argued that IOs – under the condition that their survival is not immediately threatened – will extensively engage in actions that aim at preserving their cultures rather than considering cultural change within the organization as a behavioural option.

The gap between environmental change and entrenched organizational cultures can render IOs dysfunctional. In order to ensure the survival of the organizational culture, IOs can become more concerned with fitting change in their environment in their existing cognitive framework, embodied in the organizational culture than with actual adaption to changed circumstances or problem constellations. They become irresponsive to their environment and eventually lose their ability to fulfil the expectations the environment has in them. In short, they become dysfunctional.

According to Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 38-41) IOs are especially prone to become dysfunctional because they are organized according to bureaucratic principles. Bureaucracy depends on the establishment of routines: “[R]ules, specialization and compartmentalization”

(Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 39) make bureaucracies what they are: efficient, impersonal and rational organizations which perform complex social tasks.

The heavy dependence of IOs on routines and division of labour to perform the tasks they have been mandated to perform bear the risk of becoming dysfunctional. Routines can become entrenched and once a division of labour is established, it can become difficult to change. As long as routines and division of labour are in congruence with the problems they have been created to solve, this entrenchment is unproblematic. It ensures efficient performance of the complex social entities called IOs.

However, if problems change, old tasks become less important and new tasks gain in relevance, and entrenchment can lead to problems of adaption in IOs. Because routines and division of labour shape how those within IOs perceive problems, they can impede change in organizations. In order to protect their organizational cultures, IOs stick to their routines and division of labour, creating a gap between the real world and how this world is perceived and treaded within the organization.

Dysfunction comes in different forms. Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 39-40) identify a range of different forms of organizational behaviours which can render IOs dysfunctional. They range from extreme forms of rationalization in which routines become ends in themselves to insulation of entire organizations from feedback from their environment.

The effects of entrenched routines on what IOs do (and do not) can be profound. The role of the DPKO's behaviour in the outbreak of the genocide in Rwanda serves, again, as a paradigmatic example here. It is one of the best documented failure of an IO to manage its different roles as an actor in international politics and a provider of services (Barnett 2003; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Piiparinen 2008).

In managing peace keeping operations, the United Nations Secretariat – of which DPKO is a part – has two different roles. First, the organization provides advice to states. In accordance the charter of the UN, the Secretary General can bring to the attention of the Security Council any issue he or she considers a threat to international peace and security. In this role, the Secretary General is an actor in international politics. Although he or she has only little influence on what states actually decide or to what extent the issues are debated in the Security Council, the charter of the UN entitles the Secretary General to take part in setting the agenda of the Security Council.

Secondly, the UN Secretariat through DPKO manages UN peace keeping operations around the globe. The UN Secretariat serves as the headquarter of these operations and implements decisions of member states about the deployment of the troops in the field and the

interpretation of their mandates. In this function the UN Secretariat is not so much an actor in international politics as it is a service provider accountable to member states.

In the case of Rwanda, the DPKO's role as a provider of information to the members of the Security Council has been crucial for the failure of the UN to react timely on the developments which lead to the death of approximately 800'000 people between April 6 and July 19, 1994.

With the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) deployed in Rwanda, the DPKO had a direct link to the situation on the ground. UNAMIR's force commander General Roméo Dallaire was directly accountable to the DPKO and reported to the department. Based on UNAMIR's mandate established in Security Council Resolution 872 of October 5, 1993, the DPKO decided on the course of action of the peacekeepers on the ground. The mandate, however, left room for interpretation, as the resolution stated that UNAMIR had to "contribute to the security of the city of Kigali, *inter alia*, within a weapons-secure area established by the parties in and around the city"¹⁷.

As long as the cease-fire agreement on which UNAMIR was based upon was respected by all parties to the conflict in Rwanda, interpretation of the mandate was unproblematic. It included patrolling the areas designated in Security Council Resolution 872, controlling the movements of combatants and seizing visible illegal weapons. However, it did not provide the basis for a proactive role of UNAMIR forces, especially against plans to break the cease-fire agreement (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 139).

When General Dallaire informed the DPKO in January 1994 in a telegram that he had knowledge of a plan by one of the conflicting parties which endangered the cease-fire agreement and which included massacring civilians and peacekeeping troops, the DPKO reacted conservatively. It ordered Dallaire to terminate a plan to raid an alleged weapons cache which – according to Dallaire's information – played a crucial role in the implementation of the plan. In the understanding of the DPKO, UNAMIR's mandate did not allow for such action as it had been based on the use of tactics including the consent of all parties to the conflict. At the same time, the DPKO – despite the potential dangers for the security situation in Rwanda emanating from the plan described by Dallaire – did not take action to inform the Security Council in order to request a more robust mandate for its peacekeeping forces in Rwanda. The DPKO's failure to do so is widely recognized to have had a crucial impact on the deterioration of the security situation in Rwanda after January 1994.

¹⁷ Security Council Resolution 872 (1993), para. 3.

The DPKO's failure to respond appropriately to Dallaire's warnings has been explained in different ways. One way, and this is also the internal perspective of the DPKO, is to understand the DPKO as an agent of the Security Council. In this perspective, the DPKO was anticipating the Security Council's reluctance to approve a more robust mandate for the peacekeeping forces in Rwanda after the failure the UN had experienced with a robust mandate in Somalia. In this perspective, the DPKO acted as a subservient bureaucracy, implementing the decisions of states (see Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 143-144).

A second explanation is concerned with the political meaning of Dallaire's information provided to the DPKO: In this perspective, two aspects of the fact that Dallaire was providing the DPKO with new information about the situation in Rwanda are important. The UNAMIR was not perceived to have a preventative function. It had been deployed to implement a cease-fire agreement which was based on the consent of all parties to the conflict. An early warning mechanism was not foreseen in its mandate. According to Piiparinen (2008: 711) this meant that Dallaire's cable was perceived within the DPKO as an individual attempt to "rupture" the strict partition between bureaucratic categories, that is, between preventive deployment and peace settlement". UNAMIR forces had no intelligence gathering capacities because states did not want UN peacekeeping troops to appear to 'spy' on any party to a conflict (Piiparinen 2008: 716). Entering intelligence – no matter how crucial it was – into the political process could have opened up questions about what the DPKO was doing to exert control over peacekeeping forces on the ground.

Related to this, the implication of having early warning mechanisms is to be able to develop contingency planning. Without contingency planning, early warning mechanisms are not helpful to achieve goals on the ground. According to Piiparinen (2008: 715-716), contingency planning within the DPKO was perceived as a political act. The UN has no forces on its own, nor is it expected to have any interests which are going beyond the mandates it received from the Security Council. Planning ahead on the basis of information gathered by a peacekeeping mission on the ground would therefore be seen by states as a political act, even if the Security Council has the last word about such an expansion of a mission. The UNAMIR forces had already been watered down by the Security Council from over 5'000 personnel proposed by its planning committee to an actual force of 2'548 deployed troops. This reduction was justified by the Security Council with the commitment of all involved parties to the cease-fire (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 139).

Taking Dallaire's information and his request to seize the illegal weapons cache would have made it necessary that the Secretary General or the DPKO would become involved in politics,

challenging long-standing, politically motivated understandings of what the DPKO is authorized to do – such as in the case of the blurring distinction between peacekeeping and preventative deployment – or questioning political decisions about the size, control and use of peacekeeping forces on the ground. This presented a risk to the DPKO as it meant to overstep rules which had been working in the interest of organizations and of powerful states (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 139; Piiparinen 2008: 715). Or, as Piiparinen (2008: 716) has put it: “[T]he key consideration in the UN was less the rescue of civilians than the decision over whether an intervention in Rwanda would bestow credit or disgrace, success or failure, on the organization”.

A additional explanation is concerned with the internal workings of the DPKO. This perspective argues that the rules of peacekeeping – impartiality of peacekeeping troops and the exclusive use of consent-based measures – played an important role for the DPKO to not take Dallaire’s warning seriously. In this explanation, the organizational culture of the DPKO impeded the UN Secretariat from taking action because the deteriorating security situation Dallaire observed could not be integrated in the existing ways in which peacekeeping had been conducted at the beginnings of the 1990s (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 143-154).

Impartiality of peacekeeping troops and consent based measures play an important role in this explanation because these rules were embedded in a larger framework of rules which the DPKO deemed to be decisive for the functioning of peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping had been developed as a monitoring tool for peace-agreements in interstate conflicts. After a cease-fire in a war had been negotiated, one way to ensure that the parties were adhering to its provisions was delegating the monitoring of cease-fire agreement to the UN as an impartial third party. Monitoring of cease-fires, however, would only work properly when all parties involved in the agreement would consent to the appointment of a third party. Otherwise, the impartiality of peacekeeping troops would not have been ensured. After the end of the cold war, when the UN became involved in intrastate conflicts, the rules of impartiality and consent of all parties to the deployment of peacekeeping troops was sustained although it became more difficult to live up to them. In intrastate wars there was often no formal procedure of ending conflicts, it was unclear who the involved parties of a peace-agreement might be and what consent would mean when parties to the conflict involved governments, would-be governments and rebels. Shortly after the cold war, the UN had become involved in some peacekeeping operations which turned into peace-enforcement and subsequent failure exactly for this reason. Bosnia and Somalia are prominent examples of how the UN failed in peacekeeping operations because it departed from the rules of impartiality and consent in the

wake of humanitarian crises. These spectacular failures lead the UN to return to the requirements of consent and impartiality for the deployment of peacekeeping operations (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 131-132). A return to established and working routines was seen as the best way to preserve the organization from more failures in operations which were not clearly defined as peacekeeping or enforcement of peace according to chapter VII of the UN Charter. In the case of Rwanda, the DPKO so strongly stuck to the rules of consent and impartiality because, according to Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 142), “the rules of impartiality and consent shaped the DPKO’s interpretation of the mandate” and “led the DPKO to predict that any enforcement operation might transform Kigali into another Mogadishu”. In short, the signs of escalation detected by forces on the ground were ignored by the DPKO’s headquarter because they did not fit into the rule-driven, routinized understanding of the meaning of peacekeeping. Instead of preventing a humanitarian crisis – the initial aim of peace-keeping in interstate as well as intrastate wars – the aim of the operation in Rwanda had become to stick to the rules the DPKO had established itself.

But why would states not only accept such behaviour from entities they created to solve problems but also support them by remaining members of these organizations, invest in them and sometimes even decide to expand their budget and staff?

Taking what has been said in the above sections together, the explanation for why dysfunctional IOs persist and grow appears relatively simple. In this causal narrative, the explanation is to be found in the way states perceive what IOs do. The explanation why dysfunctional IOs persist and grow is built on three constitutive – and necessary – elements. Because IOs are authorities and have an impact on how states perceive the world, states accept what they decide, propose and do as the appropriate thing to do. The profound influence IOs have on the perception of problem constellations and on the perception of what is the right thing to do in any given situation ensures that the behaviour of a dysfunctional IO is understood to be functional by states.

Dysfunctional behaviour of IOs appears only dysfunctional to the outside observer, seen from within the context in which the actions of an IO takes place, this behaviour is functional. Seen from this perspective, states have no reason to abandon them. In the perspective of those involved in such decision, IOs are acting appropriately.

Weaknesses of Existing Explanations

Theoretically, the persistence and growth of dysfunctional IOs is explained by their autonomy, authority and power. This causal narrative makes a plausible claim about how organizational cultures, legal-rational sources of authority and constitutive power resources interlink to produce the phenomenon of persisting and growing dysfunctional IOs.

This section looks at the empirical evidence that has been gathered on the authority, autonomy and power of IOs over the past decade. It asks if and to what extent the causal narrative developed to explain why dysfunctional IOs persist and grow can be sustained in real world settings. Because few studies have been concerned with the question raised here, the review of empirical studies concentrates on asking how each of the constituting elements of the causal narrative – autonomy, authority, and power of IOs – have been observed in empirical studies.

A review of the existing literature reveals that the notion of organizational autonomy and agency is widely confirmed in empirical studies. Studies which are concerned with the authority of IOs are rare but the cases they analyse show that IOs actually make claims for authority in world politics and sometimes are accepted as such by other actors.

The power resources and the mechanisms through which IOs exert their ‘soft’ powers have been studied even less extensively. However, those who have studied the potential of IOs to socialize and persuade other actors in world politics have come to the conclusion that these mechanisms only work under very specific circumstances. This conclusion exposes a core weakness of the causal narrative explaining the persistence and growth of dysfunctional IOs and opens up the question if there are other, more convincing explanations for this phenomenon.

The autonomy of IOs has been robustly confirmed in empirical research. Scholars working from a variety of perspectives have found empirical evidence for autonomous behaviour of IOs in world politics. When it comes to agency of IOs, the challenge of empirical research is – as Martin and Simmons (1998:730) have put it – “to focus on how, not just whether, international institutions matter in world politics”. Organizational agency has been described in various case studies that cut across issue areas and organizational contexts. Clearly, some organizations feature prominently in this research. The European Union (Scharpf 1994, Pollack 1998, Pollack 2002, Tallberg 2000, Tallberg 2002, Tsebelis and Garret 2000), the

World Bank (Finnemore 1996, Park 2007, Park 2009, Woods 2002, Woods 2004, Woods 2006, Weaver 2007, Weaver 2008, Weaver 2010, Xu and Weller 2009) and the IMF (Abdelal 2007: 123-161, Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 45-71, Best 2010, Chwioroth 2010, Copelovitch 2010a, Copelovitch 2010b, Lombardi and Woods 2008, Woods 2004, Woods 2006) have received more attention from scholars than other IOs (see also Haftel and Thompson 2006: 254).

Other IOs have received less attention until recently, although there are some single-case studies and increasingly comparative studies on organizations other than the 'usual suspects'. For instance, the 'Managers of Global Change' (MANUS) research project focused on a comparative study of nine IOs in international environmental politics (Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009, Biermann, Siebenhüner and Schreyögg 2009) and a series of edited volumes by Reinalda and Verbeek (1998, 2004), and Joachim, Reinalda and Verbeek (2008) empirically investigated different ways in which IOs act autonomously. These studies are concerned with a variety of different organizations which range from the European Union (van der Vleuten 1998, Kerremans 2004) to the G7/8 (Bayne 2004), the World Meteorological Organizations (Schemeil 2004) and the UNHCR (Freitas 2004). Other studies focused on single-case studies or small-n comparative studies of IOs such as the WTO (Xu and Weller 2007), the WHO (Cortell and Peterson 2006), the UNESCO (Jacobi 2007), different international judicial bodies (Hawkins and Jacoby 2006, Danner and Voeten 2010) and different human right bodies (Carpenter 2010, Oestreich 2007).

All of these studies find that IOs are, to some extent, autonomous actors in world politics. While this finding is not surprising and might be to some extent an artefact of the theoretical perspective these studies adopt (and especially their strong emphasis of rejecting neorealist and neoliberal hypotheses on IOs), they at least show that, when conceptualized in the right way, it seems possible to show that organizational agency exists in IOs and that both principal-agent theories and sociological approaches find ways to empirically confirm their theoretical assumptions.

Taken together, these studies contribute to our understanding of the circumstance under which IOs can develop autonomous behaviour. In this respect, assumptions of principal-agent theory as well as sociological theories seem to be empirically observable. Taking a principle-agent perspective, Colepovitch (2010a) for instance shows that preference heterogeneity among powerful principals of the IMF leads to a greater leeway for IMF staff in lending decisions. Similarly, Danner and Voeten (2010) find that the increasing autonomy of the ICTY and the

ICTR over time can be best explained by the growing interest of powerful states in independent rather than interest driven decision-making in international courts. Hawkins and Jacoby (2006) find that states have allowed the ECHR to acquire more autonomy over time because they were convinced by the organizations that it best represents its common preferences.

Preference heterogeneity among principals and the costs of creating new IOs seem to be most crucial for the emergence of organizational agency and autonomy. Some of the mechanisms proposed by principal-agent theory such as costs of negotiation and control seem to be less easily observable in real world settings, but the importance of the two mechanisms described above seem at least to suggest that the underlying delegation problems exist. In sum, the most important contribution of empirical studies conducted under a principal-agent perspective to the understanding of IOs is that they showed that structural (i.e. the costs of agent creation) as well as situational (i.e. preference heterogeneity) factors exist that enable IOs to become actors in their own right.

Sociologically oriented studies have shown that IOs are able to use the latitude they have due to these structural and situational factors. Most of these studies (especially Barnett and Finnemore 2004, Oestreich 2007, Weaver 2008) find that the specific organizational cultures shape the ways in which these organizations act. Barnett and Finnemore (2004), for instance, show that the mainly economic expertise accumulated in the IMF has played a crucial role for the development of the – often criticized – lending and conditionality policies of the Fund. Weaver (2008) similarly shows that the identity of World Bank staff as being both expert authorities and international bureaucrats at the same time can explain the Bank's failure to live up to its own anti-corruption standards. And Oestreich (2007) has shown how the internal structures and cultures of human rights bodies explain why some issues are taken up in international campaigns while others are largely ignored by them and how these internal settings shape the framing of international human rights issues. Similarly, Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009) find in their comparative study of nine international environmental organizations that leadership within organizations has a strong influence on how IOs act in world politics.

In sum, sociological studies have shown that the behaviour of IOs does not consist of purely rational calculations about organizational survival and growth. Although it has been shown that organizational survival plays, at a very basic level, a role in the formation of organizational cultures and in the selection of the tasks they are willing to perform (Barnett

and Coleman 2005), for most organizations, cultural considerations are more important than organizational survival and growth (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Organizational growth is a fact for most organizations, but often happens rather unintentionally than out of rational calculations (Barnett and Finnemore 2004).

While states are unlikely to fully override organizational culture as a driving factor of organizational behaviour, powerful states can limit and guide the behaviour of IOs in important ways. Sociological studies, however, have argued that the relationship between an IO and its environment is neither linear nor unidirectional. Much more, the relationship between states and IOs often seems to be co-constituted by their interactions.

Few studies are concerned with the authority of IOs. Most prominently, Barnett and Finnemore (2004) have explicitly aimed at uncovering the authority of IOs. In the three cases they study (IMF, UNHCR and the DPKO) Barnett and Finnemore find that the authority of these organizations played a crucial role in making the organizations important and influential actors in decision-making processes. In general, it can be said that all three organizations had an influence on state behaviour because they were perceived by other actors as being in a position in which their expertise or impartiality (or both) would or could not be successfully contested by other actors because these organizations were bureaucratic actors created exactly for the purpose of being impartial and accumulating specialized expertise. Furthermore, what connects the three cases is the finding that authority is not a given. The authority of the three organizations under study all built up over decade-long interactions between the organizations and states to a point where the organizations were accepted as expert or moral authorities.

Barnett and Finnemore find that both forms of authority they identify at a theoretical level can play a role in world politics. In their perspective, the IMF relies heavily on its economic expertise (which is not only accumulated in the IMF but often also produced in its research department) in order to influence decision-making on lending and conditionality. Because states are lacking the capacity and expertise to identify emerging financial crises and designing interventions, the expertise of the IMF plays an important role for the ways in which states decide on macroeconomic interventions in a financial crisis. This, of course, gives the IMF the possibility to design interventions in a way that fits its own organizational culture.

In the case of the UNHCR, Barnett and Finnemore find that its moral standing as a protector of state interests and refugee rights has played an important role in states accepting the UNHCR's handling of refugee crises around the world. Because states believe that the

UNHCR is enacting the rules they jointly decided on in the best possible way, they would allow it to design interventions in refugee crises and sometimes even allow the organization to decide which situations are to be seen as a 'crisis' that deserves (or demands) intervention in the form of repatriation as a permanent solution for these situations.

The UN Secretariat's authority, in the perspective of Barnett and Finnemore, stems from a combination of its expertise on peacekeeping and its moral standing as the acting part of an IO that is first and foremost concerned with securing international peace. Barnett and Finnemore show that the UN Secretariat was believed to be the adequate authority to bring the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 to the attention of the UN's Security Council. In this sense, states left it to the Secretariat to decide if the Rwanda case was a situation in which the UN's rules on peacekeeping would justify at least a call for an intervention (expert authority) and if the case was to be seen as a threat to international peace (moral authority). In Barnett and Finnemore's interpretation, the failure of the international community to act timely in the Rwanda case can be traced back – at least to a certain extent – to the failure of an authoritative actor in world politics (i.e. the Secretariat) in making other actors aware of the situation and its implications for international peace and security.

Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 18-19) understand the authority of IOs to be largely independent from the classical categories of organizational theory. From their point of view, neither the way in which these organizations are funded nor the operational involvement of other actors in decision-making and execution of concrete operations plays a crucial role for an organization to develop and maintain their authority. Authority seems to operate relatively independent from relationship these organizations have to their environment.

Some studies, while not explicitly being concerned with the authority of IOs, have nevertheless revealed that the influence of IOs on world politics might be based on a sense of authority of these organizations. Finnemore's (1996) and Jacobi's (2009) studies of the UNESCO, for example show that this organization has successfully diffused norms about educational systems and induced change in domestic educational politics. Much of the ability of the UNESCO to do so seems to depend on its ability to construct itself as an actor that is working for the world-wide improvement of educational systems and the states' beliefs about the UNESCO's primarily 'good' intentions. Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009) find that the influence of environmental IOs on political outcomes depends on a range of factors that lie inside and outside these organizations. From the factors that are to be found within organizations, organizational leadership seems to play an important role for an organization to successfully shape political outcomes. While leadership is not to be equated with the rational-

legal authority Barnett and Finnemore (2004) identify as the source of organizational authority (it is, in fact, quite the opposite of this as leadership depends on the charismatic form of the Weberian ideal types of legitimacy), this finding nevertheless shows that different forms of authoritative behaviour obviously play a role in what IOs can achieve in world politics.

Sociological theories of IOs have proposed two broad mechanisms through which they affect political outcomes - socialization and persuasion. Although empirical studies have shown that IOs have an influence on political outcomes, few studies have actually looked into the ways in which these two mechanisms work. In this sense, it can be said that while it is established that IOs do have influence, it remains unclear if they do so by the merits of the proposed mechanisms. The few studies which have attempted to reveal mechanisms of influence suggest that both persuasion and socialization are actually at work when IOs influence political outcomes. However, these results cannot be generalized and they leave nearly entirely open under which conditions these mechanisms work (this critique does not apply in the same way to research on influence and socialization within the European Union, see the edited volume of Checkel (2007a) on this issue). While this is a critique that applies to most research in IR that is concerned with 'sociological' processes (Checkel 1998, Drezner 2003: 7-8), it seems especially disturbing in the case of IOs, because they do not have, in most cases, other power resources available (Adler and Bernstein 2005: 295-296).

Persuasion, although not from an exclusively constructivist perspective, has been studied in greater details by Woods (2006: 65-83) in her study of the World Bank's and the IMF's influence on lending decisions. Woods identifies it as a core dilemma of the two institutions that "politics too often gets in the way" (Woods 2006: 65) of implementing the economic restructuring plans the two organizations develop. The only way for the Bank and the Fund to have their ideas implemented is to find "willing and able interlocutors in borrowing governments" (Woods 2006: 65). Persuasion, which partly emerges from the bargaining power of the two organizations and partly from the willingness of domestic actors to accept the proposals of the Bank and the Fund, plays a crucial role in this process. The most important finding of Woods study of persuasive power of IOs – at least in terms of this study – is that the power of the Bank and the Fund does not entirely rest on their ability to impose conditionality on states that receive loans from them. Nor can it be exclusively explained by the authority of its expertise, as for example Barnett and Finnemore (2004) have claimed in the case of the IMF. Conditionality does not work mechanically but is often not as effective as

the two organizations wish it was (Woods 2006: 71). Without having domestic counterparts that share their understanding of macroeconomic processes and are in the position to influence domestic decision-making, not even the Bank and the IMF – two of the most powerful IOs which deal with states that are often at the verge of collapse and therefore willing to accept more than other states – are able to persuade states to adopt and implement their plans. For the IMF and the World Bank, two positions in the decision-making process seem favourable. When economic decision-making is made by executive or by an insulated elite or when economic matters are seen as largely technocratic and are institutionally detached from politics, the IMF and the Bank seem to be able to more successfully persuade states that their plans should be implemented (Woods 2006: 76). However, without domestic bureaucrats that share the economic mind-set of the Bank's or the IMF's staff, it seems unlikely that they will succeed in persuading governments to implement their policy proposals (Woods 2006: 73). Persuasion, like ideas, 'does not float freely', as Risse-Kappen (1994) has put it. At least when IOs are the actors that attempt to persuade states, their power to persuade seems to rely on the existence of a common understanding of what an issue is about and on the access to those who hold the power to change policies within states.

Some, like Barnett and Finnemore (2004), claim that socialization of domestic actors could be a precondition for the power of IOs to persuade. However, for analytical purposes, persuasion and socialization can be viewed as two separate processes rather than as standing in a hierarchical relationship. Johnston (2003) has studied the micro-processes through which socialization by IOs occurs. His case study focuses on the socialization of Chinese diplomats and bureaucrats through their continued participation in decision-making processes in the ASEAN. In particular, Johnston is interested in the way in which participation in a multilateral forum changed the perspective on security and national interests of those that participated in the forum. His study has a quasi-experimental character because before their initial exposure to ASEAN decision-making Chinese diplomats and bureaucrats had little contact with multilateral processes and had an understanding of security that was rather focused on national security than on a collective notion of security governance (Johnston 2003: 147-149). Johnston finds that over time, the Chinese diplomats and bureaucrats in question actually changed their behaviour and that their mind-set became less focused on a concept of national security that was based on sovereignty and independence. They were more willing to commit to participate in power-constraining institutions and were more concerned with the image China had within the ASEAN than with the distribution of power in South East Asia. Over time, their calculations changed towards reputation costs rather than

losses of material power (Johnston 2003: 174). Johnston (2003: 188) identifies a range of mechanisms and conditions under which socialization worked in the case under study. Most importantly, repeated exposure to ‘counter-attitudinal’ information seemed to play a central role for socialization. Furthermore, in the China case, it seemed also important that domestically, the diplomats and bureaucrats were relatively autonomous to their superiors, which gave them the freedom to develop and adjust their understanding of security over time. At the international level, it seems important that the organizations within which socialization occurred were relatively small, consensus-based and informal. However, even in such a setting, Johnston (2003: 188) sees side-payments and threats of reputational sanctions as crucial elements of the socialization process. Without material and non-material incentives, attitudinal change seems unlikely.

Taken together, the two studies show that the proposed difference between persuasion (as an actor-to-actor process) and socialization (as a structure-to-actor process) to a large part seems to be an analytical differentiation. Both cases include structures (consensual understanding of the issue at hand in the case of the World Bank and the IMF; institutional design in the case of the ASEAN) as well as more direct actor-to-actor process as explanatory factors of the influence of IOs.

Furthermore, the two studies show that neither persuasion nor socialization is exclusively an outcome of what IOs do. They certainly play an important role in setting the stage for norms and ideas and can therefore be seen as agents of change. But the process seems to be more complicated than Barnett and Finnemore (2004) suggest. Without appropriate domestic settings, IOs seem not to be able to fully take advantage of their power resources. In other words, there seems to be no generalizable ‘constitutive’ form of power which could be deduced from the authority of IO – be they dysfunctional or not.

The insight that the constitutive power of IOs is limited at best because it is mitigated by domestic political settings has profound effects on the explanation of the persistence and growth of dysfunctional IOs. Because all three elements of the explanation – autonomy, authority and power – are necessary to make the claim plausible that dysfunctional IOs persist and grow, the causal narrative developed in this chapter seems only of limited value to answer the question at hand. An IO whose power resources are limited in the ways described by Johnston and Woods can hardly be assumed to constitute the perceptions of problems and appropriate behaviour of states to an extent to which dysfunctional behaviour is perceived as functional by states.

The lack of empirical evidence for salient constitutive effects of IOs on how states perceive the world makes it necessary to adapt the existing causal narrative or consider alternative explanations for the persistence and growth of dysfunctional IOs.

Developing an Alternative Perspective on Dysfunctional International Organizations

If existing explanations for the persistence and growth of dysfunctional IOs cannot be sustained empirically, how are they best developed to make sense of the fact that dysfunctional IOs persist and grow? This section discusses three options to develop alternative explanations.

First, the persistence and growth of dysfunctional IOs could be explained as the result of symbolic action by states. This is the simplest explanation for the persistence and growth of dysfunctional IOs.

As for most social phenomena, however, a simple explanation is not necessarily a good explanation. Symbolic action can only partly explain why states create IOs. And it does not explain why states allow dysfunctional IOs to survive and enable their growth. After all, if states are rational actors, it seems unlikely that they are willing to invest resources – time, money, staff – in an IO which defeats the aims which it has been created to achieve. IOs are more than cover-ups for the unwillingness or incapacity of states to solve common problems. Otherwise states would hardly be willing to pay for them and a growing budget of a dysfunctional IOs would be even harder to be explained than it is when it is assumed that IOs are taken seriously by states.

Secondly, the conditions under which state socialization works could be further explored. Doing so would provide a deeper understanding of the micro-mechanisms of the power of IOs. The growing literature on transnational relations is – among others – concerned with explaining how ideas influence what states do in international politics. This literature disaggregates the state to those who actually act on behalf of states, looks at the ways and structures in which these actors develop and exchange ideas and how these ideas enter decision-making processes. This literature argues that ideational exchange among bureaucrats in epistemic communities, transnational, and transgovernmental networks plays an important role for what states do in international politics (see, for example, Haas 1992, Risse-Kappen 1995, Slaughter 2004). Furthermore, this literature is concerned with explaining the dynamics in transgovernmental networks. A range of studies provide insights on why certain actors in transgovernmental networks have more influence on ideas, agendas and policies than others

(Raustiala 2002, Hertel 2006, Bob 2005, Ohanyan 2009, Kahler 2009, Lake and Wong 2009, Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2009). These studies emphasize that the establishment and success of ideas is a highly complex process which is driven by material power, contestation and competition among ideas and positions of particular actors within networks. Locating the role of representatives of IOs in transnational networks and epistemic communities could provide a deeper understanding of the conditions under which IOs become authoritative and powerful actors in world politics. Integrating insights from the study of transnational networks into sociological theories of IOs would provide fine-grained explanations for the authority and power of IOs. Through this, it could provide an understanding of the micro-mechanisms which drive states to support even dysfunctional IOs.

However, in respect of this study, doing so would only be partially helpful. While such a theory would provide a general argument about how IOs – even dysfunctional ones – can obtain powerful roles in transnational networks, it runs the risk of being overturned by a single case. A single dysfunctional yet persisting IO which does not operate under these conditions would put the explanation back to square one.

The UNODC is such a case. It is a dysfunctional IO because of its strong commitment to a social norm which has counterproductive effects and does not contribute to the solution of ‘world drug problem’. Its constitutive powers are minimal at best, because since its foundation problem perceptions of states have rather diverged than converged. And yet the organization has been growing over the past years. The question which needs theoretical clarification here is not so much how IOs can become influential actors in world politics but how a distinctive group of IOs – those which do not fulfil the expectations of states – persist and grow.

Thirdly, to make a general argument about dysfunctional IOs I suggest to concentrate on a differentiation of expectations states have in IOs. Existing accounts to IOs are caught in what might be best called a ‘functionalist trap’. They assume that states create IOs because they want to *solve* problems they cannot solve themselves. In the functionalist reasoning, this means that they create IOs to provide them with what they lack to take collective action: reduced transaction costs, information about problem constellations and information about the behaviour of other states. In the constructivist reasoning, states create IOs to develop and teach them the norms that will lead to the achievement of broader social goals.

There are, however, other ways to understand what states do and want in international politics. An important – but often ignored – feature of international politics is the gap between

what states declare and what states actually do to solve a problem. Krasner (1999) offers an explanation for this pattern by adapting the concept of organized hypocrisy – initially developed to explain the behaviour of organizations – to make it a useful tool for the analysis of international politics.

Organized hypocrisy is about the gap between what actors say and what they do. It explains why principles and practice in international politics are often decoupled, creating the appearance that actors behave hypocritical (Krasner 1999: 226). According to Krasner (1999: 71-72), such behavior is neither exclusively explained by power politics nor by suboptimal outcomes of coordination games between states. It is best explained by looking at the way in which institutions and behavior relate to each other in international politics.

In international politics, institutions are never fully embedded (Krasner 1999: 226). Norms and rules sometimes are durable and sometimes do constrain behavior, but they are ambiguous. States might follow them for some time, but if it is their interest, they can and do disregard them if it is in their interests and they have the power to do so. In international politics “logics of consequence can override logics of appropriateness” (Krasner 1999: 238).

Institutions are not embedded in international politics because they are not consequential. They do not produce the kind of patterned behavior in states that one would expect from rules which could be considered institutionalized. States violate rules and norms on a regular basis – even those rules which are considered to be the foundation of international order. According to Krasner (1999) even sovereignty cannot be considered an embedded institution among states.

Institutions are not consequential in international politics but they do play an important role. They are expressions of interests and policies of powerful states (Krasner 1999: 59). They can reduce transaction costs, provide salient solutions or reduce enforcement costs. In many instances attempting to achieve conformity in behavior of other states through establishing set of rules and norms which reflect their interests is rational behavior of powerful states.

Institutions in international politics might not be consequential, but they can be durable.

In order to understand why principles and practice are often decoupled in international politics and why states attempt to create the appearance that they adhere to principles in their actions, Krasner suggests scrutinizing the motivations of those acting in international politics. In his perspective (1999: 43) analyzing states as unitary actors does not help to understand organized hypocrisy. Those who act in international politics are the rulers of states, those who make political decision. Their primary motivation is to remain in office and consequentially,

to satisfy the interests of their supporters. Rulers respond much more to domestic pressures than they do to the structure of the international system as it is imagined in the neorealism or neoliberalism or to the social structure in which international relations are embedded as constructivism suggests (Krasner 1999: 14; 64).

Focusing on the motivations of rulers to act explains organized hypocrisy. Organized hypocrisy, according to Krasner 1999: 65), is rooted in the need of rulers to satisfy demands of different constituents at the same time. Decoupling talk and action – acting hypocritical – allows rulers to secure immaterial resources from their external environment and realize the material interests of their constituents at the same time. In order to remain in power, rulers sometimes must create the appearance to adhere to certain (international) norms which legitimate their behavior and at the same time violate them.

Sovereignty – Krasner's object of study – might be the most obvious case to connect the motivation of rulers to remain in office with hypocritical behavior of states in international politics. Sovereignty builds the core of statehood. International recognition and autonomy provide rulers with normative resources and creates certainty about how they will be treated by other rulers. Sovereignty is not the condition sine qua non of the existence of a state – but it is in many ways helpful to those ruling a state (Krasner 1999: 14-25).

From this point of view, rulers are only willing to make concessions about sovereignty when staying in office is directly threatened. At the same time they have a clear motivation to act hypocritical – pretending that their actions are not compromising their autonomy and international recognition.

Understanding international politics as organized hypocrisy offers alternative perspectives on the role of IOs. Unlike in a functionalist perspective, states operating in world politics dominated by organized hypocrisy might create IOs because they enable them to *deal* with problems in the way that serves their *individual interests* best. The difference between these two perspectives on state expectations lies in what is assumed about the goals of international cooperation. In the functionalist and constructivist perspective, states are assumed to engage in international cooperation to achieve more or less clearly defined ends. Cooperation, the institutionalization of principles, rules, norms and procedures and the creation of IOs work, because states consent about what they want to achieve and how they want to achieve it at least in broad terms. In the perspective suggested here, consent among states might not exceed the statement that there is a problem which each state cannot approach individually. If, how and to what extent this problem should be solved, however, is not subject to this consensus.

What the appropriate way of solving a problem is, is rarely clear from the outset in international politics (Krasner 1991).

Furthermore, states might experience trade-offs between different interests. International cooperation can impose costs on states they are not willing to accept. The creation of international rules might be helpful to solve social problems at a global level but puts the power of those engaged in creating these rules at risk. An agreement on a binding set of principles, norms, rules and procedures – even when it seems appropriate to create solutions for a problem at hand – might not be in the interest of those engaged in creating these rules. As Krasner (1999: 72) has argued: “in an environment characterized by multiple norms, power asymmetries, and the absence of authoritative structures that could resolve conflict, rulers can select among strategies that deploy normative as well as material resources in different and sometimes original ways”.

One of these strategies is to engage in international action that states cooperation among states as its aim to solve a problem while at the same time attempting to keep cooperative action as unaccommodating as possible. Making no or only few concessions which would enable the creation of a sustainable solution of a problem in order to realize individual interests is always an option for states in international politics.

Despite such conflicting perspective on how to solve a problem best, containing the problem can be in the interest of states at the same time. States might not want to commit themselves to binding rules, but taking action on unfolding problems can be nevertheless important, and cooperative action in dealing with these problems is possible despite the fact that a broad consensus about how the problem should be solved does not exist. Beyond normative discourse, taking pragmatic action is often a central feature of international politics.

Pragmatic action is to be distinguished from symbolic action here. While in symbolic action there is no intent to achieve any change in a given situation, pragmatic action aims at bringing change to a problem. However, the commitment to change a given situation is mitigated by the interest of states. Pragmatic action does not aim at achieving change at any possible means but only if other interests are not seriously touched by the attempt to solve a problem. In this sense, pragmatic action comes down to the point where states agree that ‘doing something is better than doing nothing’ but not more.

In such a perspective, functional IOs might only be of limited interest for states. Concerned with facilitating consensus on problem solutions and developing norms on how to deal with cooperation problems, they neglect their operative functions which could be the most

interesting functions IOs provide to states. Dysfunctional IOs, on the other hand, can play an important role for states in achieving pragmatic results through international cooperation. They enable states to engage in what could be called ritualized normative discourses which do not necessarily aim at creating consensus among states but help to secure normative resources towards various constituencies. Because they are dysfunctional, there is no need for states to take their political role seriously. At the same time, dysfunctional IOs provide states with a tool to take pragmatic action in the wake of unfolding crises in which they would be otherwise paralysed by normative requirements.

If states use IOs to deal with problems in the sense of addressing them rather than seriously attempting to solve them, then dysfunctional IOs – which often are weak actors in international politics – are the best choice for states. Dysfunctional IOs, because of their weak political position, hardly have the means to hold states accountable for their lacking commitment to sustainable problem solution. And if the attempts to deal with a problem fail, dysfunctional IOs can be easily blamed for the failure. In this sense, dysfunctional IOs are ‘convenient’ agents of state interests when they lack commitment to sustainably address problems. They serve as a way for states to take action without taking the risks of failure.

If international politics is, as Krasner (1999) has put it, organized hypocrisy, states use dysfunctional IOs to maintain the gap between talk and action. Dysfunctional IOs persist and grow because they do not provide states with solutions. Sometimes states expect IOs to deal pragmatically with problems, and dysfunctional IOs are better equipped to do so.

3 The Politics of Co-Existence in International Drug Control

The core assumption of existing explanations for the persistence and growth of dysfunctional IOs is that states create IOs to enable international cooperation – be it through the distribution of reliable information as in rationalist theories or be it through the diffusion of perception and norms as constructivist theories argue. Indeed, it is this assumption that makes the search for explanations for dysfunctional IOs important in the perspective of rationalist and constructivist theories. And it is this assumption that forces existing theories to rely on causal mechanisms such as ‘buffering’, ‘persuasion’ and ‘state socialization’ which are conceptually flawed and difficult to reveal in real world settings.

I have argued in the previous chapter that there are reasons to believe that states do not necessarily and indeterminately engage in international politics to achieve cooperation. If world politics work according to the logic of organized hypocrisy, the purpose of politics among state and even the creation of international institutions or IOs can be much less ambitious. They provide states with the necessary means to separate talk from action and problem solution from pragmatic problem management. In short, I have argued that states might be as likely to use international politics to achieve co-existence rather than cooperation and to defend the status quo rather than to induce change.

In this chapter I argue that international drug control is an example of an issue in international politics in which achieving a state of co-existence is the primary aim of states. International drug control is dominated by the social norm of narcotic drug prohibition. While this norm was initially sought of being first and foremost a viable way to solve a problem of technical cooperation, over the past five decades, it has become obvious that the prohibition norms needs to be adapted if it should be effective and in coherence with other norms. This, however, has never happened. The social norm of narcotic drug prohibition still prevails largely unchanged in international politics.

The chapter traces the reasons for this lack in norm development. In doing so, it looks beyond the often made argument that the U.S. is dominating international drug control and impedes norm development by making use of its power. The chapter looks at the interests and behaviour of those states which have become to be seen as the potential driving forces of normative change in international drug control – namely Western European and increasingly Latin American states which have domestic drug control policies deviating from the ‘zero-

tolerance' approach purported in the international drug conventions. The chapter asks how these states have attempted to defend their interests in international politics and why these attempts did not induce norm development. The chapter finds that although one of the reasons are actors in international drug control politics which try to impede norm development, the main reason for the lack in norm development are loopholes in the international drug control conventions. These loopholes make it possible for states making use of alternative policies to develop legal niches to co-exist with states favouring zero-tolerance approaches without changing the normative and legal basis of international drug control.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section is concerned with the political aspects of international drug control. It argues that international drug control, initially perceived to be a largely technical problem, has normative implications which have incited normative discourse in the politics of international drug control. The second section is concerned with the normative basis which has made international drug control appear to be a technical issue for the most time of its existence. The technical aspects of international drug control have been driven by the fact that the social norm underlying it – narcotic drug prohibition – has been and still is widely accepted and uncontested even when it has adverse consequences. The third section looks at the correspondence of the existing legal framework in international drug control with the strong norm of narcotic drug prohibition. It argues that, despite the existence of a strong norm underlying international drug control, its legal framework is weak as it provides ample opportunities for states to exploit loopholes in the legal framework to create domestic policies which are not entirely compatible with the norm of narcotic drug prohibition¹⁸. The fifth section argues that states do not have an interest in either closing these loopholes or creating a new convention which would institutionalize the flexibility achieved through the exploitation of the loopholes in the existing convention. The sixth section concludes that the behaviour of states in the politics of international drug control in the past two decades suggests that achieving co-existence rather than cooperation was the primary aim states pursued in the politics of international drug control.

¹⁸ A similar observation has been made by Percy (2007) concerning the international law governing the use of mercenaries in wars.

International Drug Control: Technical Cooperation and Normative Trade-Offs

The aim to eradicate or significantly reduce the production, trade and consumption of illicit drugs has driven international initiatives to establish a global system of drug control for the past five decades.

According to the 1961 United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the aim of international drug control is to restrict the use of narcotic drugs to ‘medical and scientific uses’¹⁹. All other forms of using narcotic drugs – commonly referred to as ‘recreational’ uses – are seen as illegitimate and should be prohibited by states. The close control of the uses of narcotic drugs is justified with the adverse health consequences and addictive potential of narcotic drugs. Although there are other interpretations of the nature of international drug control (Bayer and Ghodse 1999) most analysts of international drug control agree that the prohibition of drug use is the core norm of international drug control (Brunn et al. 1975, Nadelman 1990, Bewley-Taylor 1999, McAllister 1999, Paoli, Greenfield and Reuter 2009).

Prohibition is institutionalized in three international agreements which establish what can be called ‘the international drug control system’. The 1961 Single Convention is concerned with the control of plant-based narcotics drugs, the 1971 Psychotropic Substances Convention establishes controls for synthetic substances, and the 1988 Illicit Trafficking Convention regulates the control of precursor substances of plant-based and synthetic substances. Furthermore, the three conventions request states to criminalize the production, trade and – to a large extent – consumption of the substances under international control by the conventions. In addition to the requirement of criminalizing narcotic drugs, the international drug conventions established a globally controlled market for the legal production and trade of narcotic and synthetic drugs. The aim of this controlled market is to ensure the availability of controlled substances for legitimate uses. The legitimate market is administrated by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) to which states report their annual estimations of legitimate demand. On the basis of this demand estimates, the INCB authorizes the production of raw materials and processed substances. Notification of shipments should avoid the diversion of precursor substances, raw materials and processed narcotic and synthetic drugs. The combination of criminalizing what is seen as illegitimate use and the establishment of a controlled market for legitimate uses of drugs together serves as a way to ensure the availability of drugs for medical purposes and at the same time deter the diversion of legally produced drugs or the production and trade of illegally produced substances.

¹⁹ 1961 Single Convention, Preamble.

The international drug conventions are best understood as the attempt of states to regulate a social problem through technical cooperation on legitimate production and the collective prohibition of illegitimate uses of narcotic drugs.

The effectiveness of internationally institutionalized prohibition is questionable because the effects of prohibition are notoriously difficult to measure (MacCoun and Reuter 2001, Paoli, Greenfield and Reuter 2009). However, in its 2008 WDR, the UNODC has argued that, when compared to the situation a century ago, international drug control has been highly effective. Production, trade and consumption of opium and its derivatives have significantly dropped in South East Asia, which was the region on which concerns about opium addiction has concentrated at the beginnings of multilateral drug control efforts (UNODC 2008a). The U.S. Office on National Drug Control Policies has made a similar argument in a publication in 2007 (see Paoli, Greenfield and Reuter 2009). While it is true that the global production of opium has dropped from 30'000 tons at the beginnings of the 20th century to approximately 7'000 tons at the beginnings of the 21st century, drawing the conclusion that this drop of more than 70% can be attributed to the establishment and development of the international drug control system seems difficult. Such an analysis assumes that except the introduction of international measures against illicit drugs, nothing else has changed in the past century.


A less aggregated perspective on drug markets shows a different picture of the effectiveness of international drug control. Between the years 1998 and 2007, for which sufficiently comparable data exist, the global markets for opium and cocaine – the two plant-based drugs of highest concern according to the 1961 Single Convention – have either been stable or growing. For cannabis, estimates are more difficult to produce. However, the UNODC assumes that existing evidence suggest that between 125 and 203 million people worldwide have used Cannabis as a recreational drug in 2009 (UNODC 2011a: 175). Amphetamine Type Substances (ATS) have been growing in an unprecedented way in this period of time.

International drug control has not reached the aim of significant reduction of problems associated with drugs set with the adoption of the 1961 Single and reiterate at the United Nations Special Session on the World Drug Problem in 1998.

The enforcement of prohibition is associated with a range of adverse effects which were unforeseen at the time international drug control was established. While these adverse effects are not causally linked to the ineffectiveness of international drug control in a direct way, they

explain at least partly why international drug control has not reached its aims in the past five decades.

Figure 1: Illicit Production of Opium and Cocaine 1998 – 2007 in Metric Tons²⁰



Source: UNODC (2011: 60) and Reuter (2009: 26)

The first and most obvious yet unintended effect is the existence of a lucrative transnational black market for controlled substances. The 1961 Single Convention was negotiated on the assumption that most of the narcotic drugs used for recreational purposes originated from the diversion of legitimately produced drugs (McAllister 1999). In this perspective, an overproduction of raw material and an oversupply of processed drugs enabled the existence of a market for recreational users. By establishing a controlled market in which overproduction and oversupply was not possible because producing licenses were administrated on the basis of estimates for medical and scientific demand, the shadow markets for recreational users would have been dried out.

The problem with this attempt to control narcotic drugs is that diversion accounts only for a small part of the existing black market. Most drugs are grown, processed and traded in full illegality. Although it is impossible to proof, it is commonly acknowledged that prohibition raises prices for narcotic drugs (Reuter and Kleiman 1986), making the trade with illicit drugs a lucrative business. The UNODC estimates that global black markets for controlled substances are worth USD 320 billion (UNODC 2005).

²⁰ Figures shown are averages of UNODC estimates and the ONDCP estimates used by Reuter (2009). Estimates differ between 2% and 47% for opium and between 0% and 23% for cocaine. Average deviation of estimates between 1998 and 2007 is 10.5% for opium and 5.6% for cocaine.

Secondly, enforcement of prohibition leads to dislocation of production and trafficking routes. Because the business with illicit drugs is lucrative and demand is insensitive to changes in prices, producers and traffickers have a strong incentive to ensure supply. This leads to the effect that crackdowns on production sites reduce overall production of narcotics only in short-term. As Friesendorf (2007) has shown, the production of heroin and cocaine shifts around the globe to places where law enforcement capacities of states are weak when production opportunities are restricted in one place by national or international law enforcement efforts. The same holds true for drug trafficking when law enforcement efforts are increased (Kenney 2006).

Thirdly, enforcement of prohibition strengthens the organization of drug trafficking. Confronted with increased levels of enforcement, drug traffickers are strengthening their efforts to conceal their activities. The networks through which drugs are trafficked have proved to be innovative in their methods to evade law enforcement efforts. Increased law enforcement activities, therefore, make drug traffickers more difficult to detect and criminal activities surrounding the narcotic drug business more organized (Andreas 2001, Andreas and Nadelmann 2006, Kenney 2006).

Fourthly, enforcement of the criminalization of consumption increases the health problems associated with drug consumption. There is no evidence that the strict enforcement of drug laws has an effect on the levels of consumption. However, as the experiences of Portugal with the ‘decriminalization’ of drug consumption shows, strict enforcement is likely to increase the mortality of drug users as well as to decrease their propensity to seek treatment or at least professional advice (Greenwald 2009). This keeps demand for illicitly produced substances high and, more importantly, puts the health and lives of drug consumers at additional risk.

The second set of non-technical problems international drug control is confronted with is that prohibition is conflicting with other domestic and international norms. Most significantly, norm conflicts can be identified between prohibition and the respect of human rights (see, for example, Barrett et al. 2008).

An illuminating example of this is what has become known as the ‘Taliban Opium Ban’ (Farrell and Throne 2005, Paoli, Greenfield and Reuter 2009), which is commonly seen as a success story of prohibition in recent years because it reduced global opium production by approximately 80% within less than a year.

Afghanistan is the major producer of illicit opium in the world. It is estimated that up to 80% of all opium produced illicitly is grown in Afghanistan. In late 2000 and during the year 2001

the Taliban government cracked down on opium production in the areas under its control. The aim of the crackdown was to eradicate all poppy cultivation and thereby eliminating the production of opium in the areas controlled by the Taliban. Within a relatively short period of time, this aim had been achieved. The cultivation of poppy in Taliban-controlled areas had been reduced between 94% and 99%, according to estimation techniques, causing a significant reduction on global opium production in the year 2001 (see figure 1). Prices in the large demand markets in Western Europe did not react significantly on the slump in production for several reasons, including the brevity of the total ban – which ended with the U.S. invasion in Afghanistan in November 2001 – and the willingness of the Taliban to allow the sale of opium stocks (Paoli, Greenfield and Reuter 2009: 74). However, if the Taliban could have sustained their crackdown on poppy cultivation, it is likely that the reduction in production would have had effects on market prices. Starting at less than USD 100, shortly before the end of the ban in September 2001, farm-gate prices for a kilogram of opium amounted to USD 675 (Paoli, Greenfield and Reuter 2009: 74). From a prohibition perspective, the Taliban Opium Ban has been successful because it showed that the eradication of cultivation is possible within a relatively short time with a strong effect on global production.

From a human rights perspective, the opium ban was disastrous, as the opium ban created new opportunities for a totalitarian government to demonstrate its power. The enforcement of the ban included close monitoring of local poppy producers with holding village leaders accountable for the noncompliance and public punishment for transgressors. Farrell and Throne (2005) present a detailed account of the punishments used to deter the production of opium which ranged from forcing peasants to destroy their own crop and, after having done so, being sent to prison over public humiliation to public beatings and whippings. There are no official accounts of the extent to which the Taliban regime used such punishment. However, the quick response of production levels and farm-gate prices suggests that public punishment was harsh and common enough to deter even those peasants who had built their existence on the production of poppy and opium.

According to Farrell and Throne (2005), the opium ban was not a home-grown initiative of the Taliban regime. The UNODC and other international actors were deeply involved in persuading the Taliban to establish a ban on opium production in Afghanistan using the carrots of international development aid and the sticks of international isolation of the Taliban regime to gain leverage. Although it remains unclear to what extent international involvement influenced the decision of the Taliban to enforce the ban, it seems likely that the Taliban were

interested in development aid which had been promised to Taliban leaders by the then executive director of the UNODC, Pino Arlacchi, in 1997 according to unofficial accounts (Farrell and Throne 2005) – and an increase in international reputation by enforcing the ban (Felbab-Brown 2006). The unwillingness to extend the ban on the sales of opium stocks strongly suggests that the Taliban pursued other aims with the opium ban than contributing to a reduction in global heroin production (Paoli, Greenfield and Reuter 2009: 70).

What can be seen in the example of the Taliban Opium Ban is that international drug control rarely is a purely technical issue. As Mena and Hobbs (2010) have pointed out, enforcing drug prohibition is often a question of neglecting human rights. Although the political dimension of international drug control does not always become as obvious as it does in the case of the Taliban Opium Ban, most issues of international drug control can be approached from a prohibition and a human rights perspective, leading to trade-offs in decision- and rule-making.

Besides efforts to eradicate the cultivation of narcotic drugs – not only by the Taliban in Afghanistan but also by local governments, the U.S. and other international actors in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand – the treatment of drug users has led to normative conflicts in international drug control. According to the 1988 Trafficking Convention, the possession and use of drugs should be made a criminal offence by members of the convention. In most states, this provision of the convention is strongly enforced, if not in practice (because they lack the capacity to do so) than at least in their laws. In the past two decades, however, a range of mostly Western European states has started to introduce practices which aim at treating drug addiction as a serious medical condition instead of a criminal offence. Harm reduction measures, as these practices are commonly named, aim at treating instead of punishing drug users and at reducing the negative consequences on health instead of achieving abstinence in drug users. They range from the distribution of syringes to injection drug users over the provision of outreach to the supply of heavily addicted users with substitution substances or the distribution of heroin. Some states, such as Portugal and Brazil, have started to decriminalize the consumption of drugs, turning the criminal offence into an administrative one and punishment into therapy.

Nearly all of these measures have been denounced as being in conflict with prohibition (MacCoun and Reuter 2001). However, those states relying on harm reduction measures in their drug policies have successfully argued that they are within the provisions of the conventions. It seems important to point at the fact that much of the discussion surrounding harm reduction was led in the context of human and/or basic rights of drug users, suggesting

that not only the prohibition of supply, but also the prohibition of demand is causing trade-offs between different norms in international politics which can hardly be solved on the basis of technical evidence.

Rather, the highly technical approach of international drug control, established on the basis of the consensus that prohibition should be realized in a system of a controlled market, has produced side-effects which nearly inevitably rendered international drug control a political issue. In short, international drug control, as all international cooperation, is a political issue. Or to put it in the words of Bull (1977: 170): “It should not be assumed that international problems are always best approached as problems of technical management (...)”.

The Strong Norm of Narcotic Drug Prohibition

Since more than a century, when the first multilateral drug control agreement had been negotiated in Shanghai in 1909, international initiatives to control drugs have been driven by the desire to restrict the use of narcotics to a minimum.

States never aimed at fully prohibiting them. Narcotic drugs have important medical uses. But since narcotic drugs have become available on a large scale outside the regions where they have been grown traditionally, states aim at restricting their availability to those in need for them for medical reasons. Prohibition is meant to confine the uses of narcotic drugs to what has become seen as ‘legitimate’ over the past century.

It seems obvious why states want to control drugs. Narcotic drugs are dependency-developing. Their wide-spread availability poses serious challenges to public health, produces social costs and depletes work force. Such concerns motivated states in the late 19th and the early 20th century to introduce drug legislations at the national level which aimed at the restriction of the use of newly discovered narcotics such as heroin and cocaine (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006: 37-38; McAllister 1999).

Since the conference in Shanghai international efforts to control opium, its derivatives and many other mind-altering substances have developed in what one can be called an international drug control regime (Nadelmann 1990), and the history of international drug control is often seen as a success story of functionalist management of a transnational problem (see, for example, UNODC 2008a: 173-222). Because drugs do pose a strong and immediate threat to the society, states created an ever tighter framework of international law

through which drug use, which “constitutes a serious evil for the individual and is fraught with social and economic danger to mankind”,²¹ is restricted to the necessary minimum.

However, the history of international drug control can hardly be told as the story of a spill-over from the management of a national drug crisis to the global prohibition and criminalization of the production, trade and possession of even small quantities of mind-altering substances. Between Shanghai in 1909 and Vienna, where the 1988 Trafficking Convention was negotiated, lie eight decades of international norm development which hardly resemble a functionalist story. The history of international drug control is the history of the institutionalization of the social norm of prohibition which, after a century of norm elaboration, “governments challenge only at the cost some international embarrassment” (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006: 19). Defection from the norm today seems nearly impossible because it would “deeply damage the country’s moral standing in the international community” (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006: 229)²².

The norm of prohibition, which at the outset of the international efforts to control drugs was not established in the way it is today (McAllister 1999)²³, has been elaborated, developed and institutionalized by influential individuals, bureaucrats of powerful states, transnational norm entrepreneurs and government representatives to what it has become today (Brunn et al. 1973, Nadelmann 1990, Bewley-Taylor 1999, McAllister 1999, Andreas and Nadelmann 2006: 37-46).

Commonly, the 1961 Single Convention is seen as a decisive point in the international institutionalization of drug prohibition. Before the adoption of the 1961 Single Convention, drug control was regulated internationally by a range of drug control treaties which had been developed over the past five decades. These treaties often were contradictory and represented the patchwork of state interests and different perspectives on drug control which had been present in the negotiations of these treaties (McAllister 1999). With the adoption of the 1961

²¹ 1961 Single Convention, Preamble.

²² Bolivia has denounced the 1961 Single Convention on July 29, 2011. The denouncement was a tactical move of Bolivia’s government in order to enter a reservation into the 1961 Single Convention concerning the traditional chewing of coca leave. The Bolivian government has announced to rejoin the 1961 Single Convention the same day the denouncement will be effective (January 1, 2011). The 1961 Single Convention prohibits the chewing coca. However, Bolivia and other Latin American states have problems to suppress it, which made it necessary to enter reservation if Bolivia did not want to breach the convention. The Bolivian initiative was accompanied by diplomatic consultation with the United Nations and the U.S., which effectively mitigated the impression that Bolivia was defection from the international drug control regime. In this sense, it is questionable if Bolivia’s action can be considered as ‘defection’. See, the respective press release of the United Nations: http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs//2011/110624_Bolivia.doc.htm [retrieved November 14, 2011].

²³ For example, negotiations on international drug control initiatives undertaken during the period of the League of Nations were often more concerned with mitigating the public health aspects of drug consumption than with the criminalization of trade, production and possession (McAllister 1999).

Single Convention, states proofed that they were willing to remodel this patchwork of diverse interests in and understandings of international drug control into a legal text which established a global system to control drugs comprehensively.

Latest since the adoption of the 1961 Single Convention, the prohibition of narcotic drugs has entered the stage in which “social pressures on all states to acknowledge and enforce the norm are quite powerful” and in which “international institutions and conventions emerge to play a coordinating role” in ensuring implementation of the drug prohibition norm into domestic law (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006: 21). With the 1961 Single Convention, drug control has also become what one might be able to call an internationally accepted social norm.

Social norms are “collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors” (Katzenstein 1996: 5). Social norms guide behaviour and international norms guide the behaviour of states. However, the existence of a social norm – even of one that enjoys widespread acceptance – does not determine behaviour. No norm is ever fully complied with. Therefore, the existence of enforcement mechanisms and the acceptance of these mechanisms is strong indicator for the acceptance of a norm. Acceptance of enforcement mechanisms points at acceptance of a social norm.

Formally, enforcement of the international drug conventions is in the competence of the International Narcotics Control Board. This ‘expert body’ oversees the implementation of the obligations of the international drug control conventions into domestic rules and procedures and can propose sanctioning states which do not comply with their obligations²⁴. This enforcement mechanism is weak. The INCB makes rarely use of it, not because there is widespread compliance with all the provision of the international drug control conventions but because the impediments to actually sanction a state for transgressing obligations under the conventions are relatively high.

There is, however, a much stronger and – as I will argue – more accepted informal enforcement mechanism which does not so much concentrate on compliance with international conventions but on the underlying norm of drug prohibition. This mechanism is mainly unilateral. The U.S., which has been one of the major proponents of the internationalization of drug control based on the prohibition of drugs since the early 20th century, has made efforts to increase compliance with the prohibition norm by establishing a unilateral system of sanctions against states which were not able or willing to suppress the illicit production of narcotic drugs. Unilateral enforcement of drug prohibition is often erratic

²⁴ 1961 Single Convention, Article 14 and 1988 Trafficking Convention, Article 22.

but it is exactly the inconsistency of the enforcement which makes a strong case for a deeply accepted, strong social norm of prohibition at least among the powerful states in international drug control.

At the centre of unilateral U.S. enforcement of the provisions of international drug control conventions lies a certification mechanism. Under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 as amended, the U.S. State Department assesses and certifies the compliance of other states with U.S. and international drug control provisions – especially with those of the 1988 Trafficking Convention. In its International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, the State Department identifies countries which are a direct or indirect source of transnational drug flows to the U.S. Countries identified as non-compliant to the international drug conventions and representing a major source of narcotics face “decertification” and – depending on congressional decision – sanctions including cutting U.S. assistance up to 50% and voting against financial assistance in the World Bank and other international financial institutions. The president can determine not to take these measures if a country facing decertification has taken measures to comply with applicable drug control provisions and national interests are placed at risk by cuts in foreign assistance. Congress can override the presidential decision with a two-third majority.

The amended FAA does not further specify to which countries the certification process applies. In practice, however, certification only applies to countries that meet a threshold of producing five metric tons of opium or derivatives or five hundred metric tons of coca or cannabis per year²⁵. Countries meeting this threshold are included in the “major list”. Since 1987, when the certification process was established, thirty-two states have been included in this list. Half of them have remained in the list from 1987 to present.

The provisions of the FAA seem to create an automatic mechanism which enforces national and international drug control provisions. If a state meets the threshold and does not make attempts to get into control of its drug problem, sanctions will enforce compliance with provisions.

According to Friman (2010), however, inclusion on the major list and ranking as cooperative/noncertified or eligible to national interest waiver are politicized processes which first and foremost are concerned with preservation of U.S. national interests. Measurements which are used to include a country into the major narcotics list are difficult to justify because neither tonnages nor hectares can be appropriately measured. Furthermore, it remains unclear

²⁵ In 1994 measurements for threshold criteria were adapted: 1000 hectares of illicit poppy and coca or 5000 hectares of illicit cannabis, respectively.

to what extent these measurements actually do say something about the extent to which drugs produced from these crops are reaching U.S. drug markets.

Placement of countries into the categories available under the FAA ('fully cooperative', 'noncertified' and 'national interest waiver') also lacks a clear definition. Although the major narcotics list is based on numerical thresholds, there is neither a specification of production or plantation reductions which would justify categorization as fully cooperative, nor are the standards against which the President's decision to grant a national interest waiver can be measured. According to Friman (2010: 88), this makes the certification process vulnerable to influence by government officials.

More importantly, however, the discretion in the certification process makes its effectiveness questionable. Certification rates have ranged between 57.7% in 1995 and 91.3% in 2002 and 2004 respectively. Since the certification process has been effective, countries were decertified in 56 instances and national interest waivers were granted in 47 instances. Several countries had lost their status as certified but were recertified within short time spans. Others were decertified but dropped from the major list later without clear signs of cooperation or measurable changes in their significance for transnational drug trade. Some have seen a row of certifications, national interest waivers and decertification. Afghanistan has been decertified twice and recertified after regime changes. Despite the fact that the country is by far the most important source of illicit opium and the situation on the ground has hardly changed, Afghanistan has remained certified since 2002 (Friman 2010: 89-91).

In relation to the norm of narcotic drug prohibition, while the implementation of the norm in domestic law has not been problematic²⁶, compliance has been complicated by the fact that the activities subject to prohibition are "easily concealed" and that consumer demand for narcotic drugs is "substantial, resilient, and not readily substituted for by alternative activities or products" (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006: 22). The effectiveness of the norm of drug prohibition, which produces collective expectations among states, is therefore limited by the capacity of the individual state to exert control over the production, trade and consumption of illicit drugs²⁷.

This fact produced the paradoxical situation that some states, despite their willingness to comply with the prohibition norm, were not able to actually gain control over the production

²⁶ Nearly all states are parties to the three international drug conventions and most states actually followed the norm by introducing prohibitive laws.

²⁷ For a discussion of variations in state capacity to control the production of illicit drugs and its effects on the 1988 Trafficking Convention, see Jojath (2009: 111-113).

and trade of narcotic drugs. For this reason, while the prohibition norm was widely accepted since the 1960s, compliance was difficult to achieve for ‘technical’ rather than ‘political’ reasons. Even if states – especially those in which narcotic drugs are cultivated – had been willing to comply with the prohibition norm, they lacked the sheer capacity to gain control over cultivation and production efforts. Although these ‘enforcement’ efforts were deemed to fail because states affected by sanctions rarely were in the position to gain control over cultivation and production, weakening such states by sanctioning them unilaterally was likely to have adverse effects.

Despite its erratic implementation and dubious effects on actual levels of drug production, unilateral enforcement of the provisions of the international drug control conventions has never incited criticism among states – at least not among those which were not affected by these efforts. While it has been an issue in the academic and advocacy literature (see for example Bewley-Taylor 1999: 172 or Raustiala 1999: 111) in the political process, unilateral action by the U.S. was never seen as problematic despite its disruptive potential on efforts to control the illicit production of narcotic drugs.

This acceptance of the unilateral enforcement mechanism established by the U.S. shows the strength of the social norm of the prohibition norm. Not only were states willing to accept the unilateral enforcement strategies which had been developed despite the existence of a formally constituted sanctioning mechanism. They were also willing to accept it despite its potential adverse effects on the technical problem they attempted to solve by international cooperation.

The Weak Law of International Drug Control

States have paired the strong norm of drug prohibition with a detailed framework of international law. The three international drug conventions make explicit provisions about how international drug control should be organized in order to achieve the restriction of narcotic drugs to medical and scientific uses. The 1961 Single Convention and the 1971 Psychotropic Substances Convention, for example, regulate which substances are subject to control and establish which controls apply to which substances²⁸, or under which circumstances and how controls over a particular substance can be changed and through which international bodies such changes in the so called ‘scheduling’ of substance can be achieved²⁹. Even as detailed provisions as the obligation that the chewing of coca leaves had

²⁸ 1961 Single Convention, Article 2.

²⁹ 1961 Single Convention, Article 3.

to be abolished within 25 years in states where this practice had been considered as traditional had been included in the 1961 Single Convention³⁰.

The 1988 Trafficking Convention is even more strongly concerned with regulating state behaviour in a very detailed manner. Article 3 of the convention, for example, lists 31 activities related to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances which states should criminalize and adds that the criminalization of these activities should “take into account the grave nature of these offences” and should, therefore, be punished with “imprisonment or other forms of deprivation of liberty, pecuniary sanctions and confiscation”.

The degree to which the three conventions seek to regulate state behaviour in concern to narcotic drug and the way in which the conventions delegate the supervision of what states do to control drugs has led Jojarth (2009: 134) to the conclusion that the international drug control conventions represent ‘hard law’ in the sense of Abbott and Snidal (2000). In a less scholarly manner, Thoumi (2010) has described the international drug control conventions as a “straight jacket”, from which states interested in more liberal and less supply-oriented drug control policies can hardly escape.

There are, however, loopholes in the conventions which make the law of international drug control a less tight-fitting ‘straight jacket’ than some describe it. Even the INCB – who is one of the strongest defenders of a prohibitionist interpretation of the international drug control conventions – has acknowledged that not all the terms used in the 1961 Single Convention are as clearly defined as they seem at first sight (INCB 2004: 38).

Two of these loopholes have been exploited by states to implement drug policy measures which deviate from a strong prohibitionist interpretation of the convention.

The first loophole is a lacking definition of the core terms of the 1961 Single Convention – ‘scientific’ and ‘medical’. Despite the centrality of these terms, they do not appear in the 1961 Single Convention’s Article 1 which defines the terms used in the Convention. Neither the subsequent 1971 Psychotropic Substance nor the 1988 Trafficking Conventions provide a definition of the two terms.

What ‘scientific’ and ‘medical’ uses actually meant became relevant when some Western European states started to experiment with what has become commonly known ‘harm reduction measures’. In general, such measures provide drug users with services and treatment which do not aim at achieving termination of drug use in the first place. Much more, improving the health conditions and social well-being of individual drug users is the

³⁰ 1961 Single Convention, Article 49.

aim of such measures. Needle/syringe exchange programs, heroin maintenance and opioid substitution therapy as a means of treating drug dependence and injection rooms all aim at improving the health conditions and social well-being of individual drug users – especially of those severely addicted to substances commonly referred to as “hard” drugs . Convincing them to lead a “drug free” live is rated second in the aims of these measures – if it is at all.

Because ‘scientific’ and ‘medical’ lack further definition, the international drug conventions leave room of manoeuvre to states which are willing to experiment with harm reduction measures. In heroin maintenance and substitution programs, narcotic drugs in Schedule I and IV³¹ of the 1961 Single Convention – to which the highest measures of control apply – are distributed to drug users with the argument that maintenance as well as substitution are therapeutic measures. The use of heroin and opiate derivatives for substitution of heroin in this sense is understood to be of medical use. Therefore, the use of heroin and opiate derivatives in state sponsored programs can be seen as being in accordance with the obligations of the 1961 Single Convention and the 1988 Trafficking Convention despite the fact that these therapies do not necessarily lead to abstinence from substances regulated under these conventions. Some states, such as Switzerland, have used this definitional loophole systematically to develop drug policy measures which deviate from a strictly prohibitionist approach to control drugs.

The second loophole is the fact that all penal provisions of the 1961 Single Convention and the 1988 Trafficking Conventions are subject to constitutional principles and basic concepts of the legal system of each states³². Although the consumption of drugs is not subject to any penal provisions in the three conventions, provisions of the 1988 Trafficking Convention suggest that states are also expected to criminalize the possession of drugs. Several states have eased this obligation by de facto or de jure ‘decriminalizing’ the possession of small quantities of drugs for personal use with the argument that incarceration for a minor offence such as the possession of a small amount of drugs is not compatible with the basic concepts of their legal system.

De facto or de jure ‘decriminalization’ of the possession of small quantities of drugs for personal consumption has led to some variations in the way – especially European and Latin American – states treat drug possession. Some states, such as Portugal, have fully ‘decriminalized’ the possession of small amounts of drugs, making it an administrative rather

³¹ Heroin is on Schedule I and IV; Methadone, often used in opiate substitution therapies, is on schedule I.

³² 1961 Single Convention, Article 36; 1988 Trafficking Convention, Article 3.

than a criminal offence (Greenwald 2009). Personal use, in the Portuguese definition, means the quantity required for an average individual consumption during a period of 10 days (Greenwald 2009).

Similar laws, although referring to smaller amounts of drugs, have been put into force in Brazil, Argentina and Mexico in the past decade³³. In other countries such as Germany or the Netherlands, directives are maintained which allow the police to ignore the possession of small amounts of drugs for personal use. Decriminalization is most advanced for the possession of cannabis for personal use. For this drug, which is still included in Schedule I and IV of the 1961 Single Convention, Holland, Switzerland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and a dozen states of the U.S. have released laws or established police practice which decriminalizes the possession of small amounts for personal use.

The exploitation of loopholes in the international drug conventions increased variations in drug control policies across countries in the past two decades. However, to what extent this can be understood as a challenge to the international prohibition norm in international drug control is another question. Most states did not introduce harm reduction measures and decriminalize drugs because they did not agree with the idea that addictive substances need to be controlled. Much more, they did so to solve problems which purely prohibitive measures could not solve.

For example, in Switzerland³⁴, harm reduction measures were adopted in the wake of a severe increase in the consumption of heroin which resulted in one of the highest rates of substance-related deaths in Europe and North America³⁵. Zurich, the biggest city in Switzerland, was the epicentre of this heroin crisis, had adopted strictly prohibitive measures against drug users during the 1980s. These measures, however, were not effective. Drug use and drug trade persisted and intensified in the city, creating an open drug market which the police, despite stepping up enforcement, was not able to control. Whenever the police cracked down on open drug markets in one place, they would re-emerge in another shortly after. Around such open drug markets, public security deteriorated significantly.

³³ See, "Mexico and Argentina move towards decriminalising drugs", *The Guardian*, August 31, 2009.

³⁴ See, for a comprehensive discussion of the Swiss case, MacCoun and Reuter (2001: 278-286; 287-296).

³⁵ In 1992, substance-related death amounted to approximately 62 per million inhabitants, or 419 in absolute numbers (Joarth 2009: 108). MacCoun and Reuter (2001: 278) described Switzerland as the "leader of the European nations in the prevalence of heroin addiction and the extent of HIV among its heroin addicts" at the beginnings of the 1990s.

This and the rapid spread of HIV among injection drug users led the city – in coordination with the government of the canton of Zurich and the Swiss Government – to adopt innovative measures. These measures included the introduction of a needle exchange program, a clinical heroin maintenance trail and a substitution program. Within years, from the approximately 30'000 heroin users in Switzerland at the beginnings of the 1990s, 23'000 had joined a heroin maintenance or substitution program. HIV transmission rates and substance-related deaths dropped significantly and open drug markets in Zurich and Switzerland shrank³⁶.

The aim of these measures was only partly to better protect drug users. While this certainly played a role for those engaged in designing the harm reduction measures, concern about drug users alone would not have enabled the harm reduction measures to become a defining element of Swiss drug policies. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the police was heavily burdened by fighting petty drug offenders, which increasingly consumed resources. The Swiss Police Federation, for example, first and foremost supported the introduction of harm reduction measures because it would enable police forces to concentrate on drug traffickers rather than drug users and because an estimated 1 million Swiss Francs per day was disposed from illicit heroin market through maintenance and substitution programs³⁷. The aim of the introduction of harm reduction measures in Switzerland – which made the exploitation of loopholes in the international drug conventions necessary – was not to undermine the prohibitive norm embodied in the international drug control conventions but to pragmatically deal with problems related to the consumption of drugs prohibition could not solve.

Similarly, the decriminalization of possession of small quantities of drugs does not directly question the social norm of drug prohibition. Criminalization of petty drug law offenders puts heavy burdens on law enforcement and judicial systems, especially when even the possession of small amounts of drugs is punishable with incarceration. In the U.S., up to a quarter of all prison inmates are convicted for drug offences, many of them for the possession of small quantities of drugs. Decriminalization is a means to relieve law enforcement and the judicial system from prosecuting minor offences which often are seen as 'victimless'. The resources invested in and the costs of the prosecution of petty drug offenders are often seen as wasted when compared with the gains society gets from strict enforcement of prohibition.

Decriminalization of drug use does not necessarily mean that states are challenging the fundamental idea of drug prohibition. Even the Netherlands, known for its liberal cannabis

³⁶ Interview with Swiss government representative, Zurich, September 4, 2009.

³⁷ Interview with Swiss government representative, Zurich, September 4, 2009.

policies, has recently announced that it will step up law enforcement activities against drug traffickers of all kinds³⁸.

In sum, it can be said that loopholes in the international drug control conventions have provided states with ample flexibility in the design of their drug control policies in a way which solves the problems they have been confronted with. Some analysts have argued that this flexibility is not enough to provide states with the possibilities to create truly liberal drug policies (Krajewski 1999, Bewley-Taylor 2003). To do so, the international drug conventions needed to be amended. This, however, seems unlikely because the amendment process is complicated and riddled with institutional impediments which are difficult to overcome. In this sense, the statement that with the international drug conventions states have matched a strong norm with a weak law needs to be qualified to the extent that this does mostly apply to advanced industrialized countries which are only partly vulnerable to economic pressure from prohibitionist states.

For this group of states, however, exploiting the loopholes in the international drug control conventions provided the flexibility they needed to design policies which departed from a strictly prohibitionist understanding of drug control. To what extent actions of these states aimed at challenging the social norm of prohibition, however, cannot be determined by looking at what they are doing in their domestic drug policies.

Fighting the Exploitation of Loopholes: The Tug-of-War of International Drug Control

The exploitation of loopholes in the weak international drug control law has created normative discourses among states. Because the drafters of the 1961 Single Convention did not include a definition of the terms ‘medical’ and ‘scientific’ into the text of the convention, states became engaged in an extensive normative discourse about the question what the two terms actually meant when applied to domestic drug control measures which included practices such as the distribution of heroin – which had been placed in the heavily controlled Schedule IV of the 1961 Single Convention³⁹ – to drug addicts. Because the 1961 Single Convention made all penal provisions related to drug offences subject to constitutional

³⁸ Interview with Swiss government representative, Bern, February 1, 2010.

³⁹ Article 2 of the 1961 Single Convention requests states to establish a range of control measures for substances listed in Schedule IV of the Convention which do not apply to other controlled substances. In particular, states are requested to “prohibit the production, manufacture, export and import of, trade in, possession or use of any such drug except for amounts which may be necessary for medical and scientific research only”. Besides heroin, cannabis and cannabis resin are included in Schedule IV.

limits⁴⁰ and the 1988 Trafficking Convention states that its criminalizing provisions are subject to “constitutional principles” and “basic concepts” of the legal system of each state⁴¹, states could engage in debates about the question if prohibition of narcotic drugs necessarily meant the criminalization of all acts related to drugs. And because the 1961 Single Convention stated in its Preamble that the convention had been established in concern “with the welfare and health of mankind”, the question was brought up how much prohibition was too much when the human rights of producers and the health of consumers of narcotic drugs were concerned.

The discrepancy of a strong norm embodied in weak international law made international drug control prone to normative conflict. In their essence, normative conflicts in international drug control revolved around the question if ‘the spirit’ or the ‘the letter’ of the three conventions was the proper standard to judge the cooperative behaviour of states. While some states were concerned with exploiting the loopholes and ambiguities of the international drug conventions in order to justify practices in domestic drug control, others attempted to keep interpretations of the conventions as close as possible to the prohibition norm.

This can be best seen in the normative debate led around the question if harm reduction measures are in line with the provisions of the international drug control conventions or if they do overstretch the interpretation of the term ‘scientific and medical use’. This debate has largely been carried out as a ‘proxy war’ between the International Narcotics Control Board – which is mandated to interpret the international drug control conventions in case of ambiguities – and Western European states most extensively involved in harm reduction in their domestic policies, i.e. Switzerland and the Netherlands⁴².

The role of the INCB in normative conflict in international drug control is decisive for two reasons. First, according to the 1961 Single Convention, the INCB functions as an impartial international body which interprets the conventions in the case of ambiguities. Over the years, the INCB has become accepted as a ‘quasi-judicial’ body in international drug control, which

⁴⁰ 1961 Single Convention, Article 36.

⁴¹ 1988 Trafficking Convention, Article 3.

⁴² Other debates were led in the CND. See for example : „The United Nations and Harm Reduction“, Transnational Institute Drug Policy Briefing No. 12, March 2005 (<http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/brief12.pdf> [retrieved November 14, 2011]) and “The United Nations and Harm Reduction – Revisited: An Unauthorised Report on the Outcome of the 48th CND Session”, Transnational Institute Drug Policy Briefing, No. 13, April 2005 (<http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/brief13.pdf> [retrieved November 14, 2011]) for a summary of the thematic debate on harm reduction measures at the 48th Session of the CND. However, as no official records of deliberation in the CND are published, this section concentrates on the INCB’s annual reports and interviews conducted with Swiss government officials and former INCB members.

takes decisions about how the international conventions should be implemented. Therefore, it was seen as being in charge of dealing with the question to what extent harm reduction measures were in line with the obligations of the international drug control conventions. Secondly, since its inception, it had functioned as what had been called the ‘guardian’ of the international drug control conventions (Bewley-Taylor and Trace 2006). In its reports, it mostly interpreted the conventions in a conservative way, favouring a prohibitive perspective on drug control over alternative approaches. Because of that, the INCB became seen as a handmaiden of those powerful states which were in favour of a strictly prohibitive implementation of the international drug control conventions. Because of this, normative conflict in international drug control is often most intense when it takes place between the INCB and states.

Harm reduction caught the INCB’s attention first in the early 1990s. In its 1993 Annual Report, the INCB made a first reference to harm reduction, stating that it “acknowledges the importance of certain aspects of ‘harm reduction’ as a tertiary prevention strategy for demand reduction purposes”⁴³. The report continues: “The Board considers it its duty, however, to draw the attention of Governments to the fact that ‘harm reduction’ programmes are not substitutes for demand reduction programmes”⁴⁴. Although the INCB does not further specify the terms ‘tertiary prevention strategy’ and ‘demand reduction’ in its remarks, this formulation suggests that it differentiates between harm reduction measures and demand reduction in general. Simply put, it can be argued that by 1994, the INCB considered harm reduction measures as policies that might reduce demand for certain prohibited substance but only partially contribute to the aims of the international drug conventions – the ‘real’ reduction of demand by abstinence-based treatment or prevention of drug use.

That said, the INCB never clarified these vague statements during the coming decade. It repeatedly suggested, however, that it was concerned that harm reduction measures could threaten the achievements made by international drug control efforts for two reasons.

First, the INCB was concerned that harm reduction measures could proliferate without being properly evaluated. For example, in its 1997 Annual Report it commented on a Swiss heroin maintenance program: “The Board expressed its doubts about one element of the new policy in Switzerland, namely a project for distributing heroin to addicts, and recommended that the

⁴³ Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1993, E/INCB/1994/1, p. 5.

⁴⁴ Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1993, E/ICNB/1994/1, p. 5.

scientific merits (...) and the results should be evaluated by the WHO.”⁴⁵ and regretted that “(...) pressure groups and some politicians are already promoting the expansion of such programmes in Switzerland and their proliferation in other countries”⁴⁶ although it was “not convinced the limited positive results claimed by the Swiss Government can be attributed solely to the distribution of heroin itself”⁴⁷. While the diplomatic language of the reports allowed the Board only in a limited way to express its concerns, they were more explicit on other occasion. Officials of the Board are cited as having stated in reference of the Swiss trial that “anyone who plays with fire loses control over it” and that such experiments would send “a disastrous signal to countries in which drugs were produced” (cited in MacCoun and Reuter 2001: 294). Some statements of the Board furthermore suggest that it assumed that harm reduction measures could facilitate drug consumption. For example, in its 2003 Annual Report the Board states that “any prophylactic measures should not promote and/or facilitate drug abuse”⁴⁸.

Secondly, the INCB feared that harm reduction could divert states from implementing abstinence-based policies. In its 2000 Annual Report the Board stated that it regrets that harm reduction has “has diverted the attention (and, in some cases, funds) of Governments from important demand reduction activities such as primary prevention or abstinence-oriented treatment”⁴⁹. The background of these concerns was that the Board classified harm reduction measures mainly by its impact on what it understood as the core of the international drug control regime – the distinction between medical and scientific uses (which were explicitly allowed by the conventions) and all other forms of uses (which were prohibited). Although not directly mentioned in the conventions, the Board had a well-established understanding that this distinction implied that the ‘spirit’ of the conventions aimed at promoting abstinence from drug use. Including harm reduction in the abstinence-based classification of drug control was essentially difficult for the INCB because harm reduction measures aimed at a medical purpose (treating drug dependence or reducing the negative health consequences of drug use) but at the same time were not directly oriented towards ending – in the interpretation of the Board – an internationally prohibited practice. Especially, injection rooms posed a problem to the categorization of the INCB as they had a medical purpose (increase of the health and well-being of consumers) but the drugs consumed in such rooms seemed also to be consumed for non-medical purposes. The position of the Board was further complicated by the fact that the

⁴⁵ Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1997, E/INCB/1998/1, para 366.

⁴⁶ Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1997, E/INCB/1998/1, para 367.

⁴⁷ Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1997, E/INCB/1998/1, para 368.

⁴⁸ Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2003, E/INCB/2004/1, p. 36.

⁴⁹ Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2000, E/INCB/2001/1, p 60.

drug conventions did not define the term ‘medical and scientific use’, which built the basis of the INCB’s classification of international drug control. The meaning of ‘medical or scientific’ was therefore largely left to what states made of it.

After a decade of attempting to convince states that harm reduction was threatening the achievements of international drug control, the INCB resorted to a threefold strategy to end this problem in its 2003 Annual Report. First, it defined how harm reduction measures were related to the relevant international provision. It declared that needle sharing programs and opioid substitution were within the provision of the conventions⁵⁰, while injection rooms were not, a position it had already expressed before⁵¹. This decision was made with reference to “the fundamental provisions of international drug control treaties which oblige State parties to ensure that drugs are used only for medical or scientific purposes”⁵². However, the Board left open on which provision it based its interpretation of what the ‘fundamental principles of international drug control’ were. A legal advice the INCB requested from the UNODC Legal Affairs Section, for example, shows that the conventions could be interpreted also in another way. The report states that it “would be difficult to assert that, in establishing drug-injection rooms, it is the *intent* of Parties to actually *incite* to or *induce* the illicit use of drugs, or even more to associate with, abet or facilitate the possession of drugs” and that therefore the establishment of drug injection rooms “would still fall far from the intent of committing an offence as foreseen in the 1988 Convention”⁵³.

Secondly, it repeated its concerns about the potential dangers of harm reduction measures by urging states to “carefully analyse the overall impact of such measures, which may sometimes be positive for an individual or for a local community while having far-reaching negative consequences at the national and international level”⁵⁴, and reminded them that “experience of developed countries and their evaluation of the therapeutic usefulness, safety and efficacy of a drug might not necessarily be applicable to developing countries, et vice versa”⁵⁵.

Thirdly, it provided a definition of medical use as understood in the three drug control conventions. It did so because it was convinced that “the drafters of the international drug conventions did not purposively leave the term ‘medical use’ ambiguous but that they could not reach agreement on a universal definition”⁵⁶ and that the Board had to provide such a

⁵⁰ Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2003, E/INCB/2004/1, p. 36-37.

⁵¹ Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2003, E/INCB/2004/1, p. 37.

⁵² Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2003, E/INCB/2004/1, p. 49.

⁵³ Flexibility of Treaty Provision as Regards Harm Reduction Approaches: Prepared by the Legal Affairs Section UNDCP, E/INCB/2002/W.13/SS.5. para 27-28, emphasis in original.

⁵⁴ Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2003, E/INCB/2004/1, p. 37.

⁵⁵ Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2003, E/INCB/2004/1, p. 38.

⁵⁶ Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2003, E/INCB/2004/1, p. 38.

universal definition “for the purpose of carrying out its own work”⁵⁷. The definition makes reference to medicines as substances that are “improving health and well-being”, “preventing and treating diseases (including the alleviation of symptoms of that disease)” and to medical consumption as “medicine (...) consumed by patients for the purpose of improving health and well-being (...) and treating disease (including symptom alleviation)”⁵⁸.

The INCB’s attempt to defend its classification of international drug control as essentially abstinence-based failed. By defining ‘medical use’ in such open terms it opened up even more room for interpretation.

After this failed attempt to end the debate surrounding harm reduction by transforming its longstanding classification of drug policies in a set of definitions and instructions on harm reduction, the Board resorted to a strategy of discouraging states from opening injection rooms⁵⁹ and not actively encouraging states to make substances for opioid substitution treatment available⁶⁰. However, it made no further attempts to bring the harm reduction in line with its well-established understandings of the aims of drug control. In the past seven years, the Board has not changed its stance towards needle exchange and substitution therapy – which are not obstructed but also not promoted despite their therapeutic effect which falls under the INCB definition of ‘medical use’ – and injection rooms – which are seen as violating the provisions of the 1988 Trafficking Convention and actively criticized in the INCB’s annual report.

Reactions on the INCB’s interpretations of harm reduction measures by the most notorious states were hardly to seek consensus. In terms of direct allegations against Switzerland that its drug policies are violating international obligations, for example, Swiss representatives used the general debate of the CND on an annual basis to underline that the harm reduction measures implemented were in line with the international drug conventions⁶¹.

This strategy was successful as far as relations between the Switzerland and the INCB have improved since 2006. In 2006, Switzerland and the Netherlands were invited by the INCB for closed hearings in 2006. According to Swiss government representatives, the hearings with the INCB had been surprisingly open-minded after more than a decade of harsh criticism. For Swiss officials, it therefore came as a surprise that the INCB did not attempt to convince them to finally abandon harm reduction measures and return to a law enforcement-based approach

⁵⁷ Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2003, E/INCB/2004/1, p. 38.

⁵⁸ Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2003, E/INCB/2004/1, p. 38.

⁵⁹ Sometimes by threatening to use its sanctioning powers, see Bewley-Taylor (2004).

⁶⁰ Although this was in contradiction with the INCB’s obligation to ensure the availability of substances controlled under the international drug conventions for medical reasons and its practice for substances other than heroin and methadone, see Csete and Wolfe (2007).

⁶¹ Interview with Swiss Government Representative, Bern, September 2, 2009.

to drug control. To the contrary, Switzerland and the Netherlands could convince the INCB that the harm reduction measures they make use of are compatible with the obligations especially of the 1988 Trafficking Convention. Since these hearings, the INCB has reduced criticism of Dutch and Swiss policies significantly⁶². Switzerland, in this sense, successfully entered a normative debate with the INCB about what drug control is about and how it should be done.

Analysts of international drug control has argued that normative discourse in the CND and in international drug control more generally has reached an “impasse” which needs to be broken in order to move international drug control in a less prohibitive direction (Jelsma 2002). In order to do so, according to Jelsma (2002), those states interested in change in international drug control should “bring together a critical mass of like-mindedness” in order “to become more assertive about their achievements, to bring a refreshing tone to the UN level and to support Southern countries eager to take steps in a similar direction”.

Despite the fact that after the INCB’s failed attempt to define the term ‘medical use’ in a more meaningful way, Switzerland and other states making use of more liberal domestic drug policies were hesitant to address the question of harm reduction in a more principled way in order to achieve development or change of the conventions in the direction of a less prohibitionist approach. States which engaged in harm reduction domestically did not push for a new consensus in international drug control.

The most assertive action of states making use of harm reduction measures in their domestic drug control policies took place during the debate of the 52nd session of the CND. As in relations between the INCB and states involved in harm reduction, it has also been a controversial issue in the CND⁶³. The term “harm reduction” was not used in official documents of the CND because zero-tolerance proponents believed that using the term could lend legitimacy to practices which were violating obligations of the international drug control conventions and that this could open a gateway for more states to make use of harm reduction measures.

This changed in 2009, when the CND reviewed the progress of international drug control efforts since 1998. During the final session of the 52nd CND, Germany declared on behalf of

⁶² Interview with Swiss government representative, Bern, September 3, 2009.

⁶³ See, for example: „The United Nations and Harm Reduction“, Transnational Institute Drug Policy Briefing No. 12, March 2005(<http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/brief12.pdf> [retrieved November 14, 2011]) and “The United Nations and Harm Reduction – Revisited: An Unauthorised Report on the Outcome of the 48th CND Session”, Transnational Institute Drug Policy Briefing, No. 13, April 2005 (<http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/brief13.pdf> [retrieved November 14, 2011]).

26 ‘like-minded’ states that it would interpret the term ‘related support measures’ – as it was used in the CNDs political declaration marking the diplomatic punch line of the CNDs 52nd session – as including measures that are commonly referred to as ‘harm reduction measures’⁶⁴. With this statement, the term for the first time found entry into a politically binding document in international drug control. Among those objecting to this statement was the U.S. However, the U.S. was not concerned with the idea of harm reduction per se but with the fact that the German statement was not in accordance with the consensus states had agreed upon and that it therefore could put the resolution and the success of the review conference in danger.

The German statement in the CND was not an attempt to push for a new consensus in international drug control. Consensus about the resolution had already been at the verge during deliberations leading up to the official debate⁶⁵ and the U.S. had put great effort in finding a wording for the resolution which was accepted by all states⁶⁶. The term used in the resolution – ‘related support measures’ – already had been a compromise. Much more, the initiative of the ‘like-minded’ group of states resembled the strategy of Switzerland in its decade-long conflict with the INCB about its harm reduction measures. By maintaining conflicting perspectives on what international drug control is – i.e. by insisting on the interpretation that harm reduction is fully compatible with the obligations of the international drug control conventions – states maintain their room of manoeuvre in domestic drug policies. This move of the ‘like-minded’ states might have been the most assertive action of states to bring the term harm reduction into an official document of the CND. However, neither was it a critical mass of states which moved to action nor was this action meant to achieve a new consensus of what international drug control should do (and not do). To the contrary, the aim of the group of states which took action in the 52nd session of the CND was to make sure that what they had achieved by flexibly interpreting the international drug control conventions was acknowledged in an international resolution. Affecting change or development of norms in international drug control, however, was not the primary aim of these states.

Normative conflicts in international drug control are not led to achieve a new consensus in international drug control, nor do normative conflicts aim at creating a counterbalance to those international actors which support zero-tolerance drug policies.

⁶⁴ Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Report on the fifty-second session; E/CN.7/2009/12, p. 119.

⁶⁵ Interview with Swiss government representative, Bern, September 2, 2009.

⁶⁶ Interview with Swiss government representative, Bern February 1, 2010.

Flexibility in the three drug control conventions is working to the advantage of those states which solve their problems with drugs in ways can be seen as deviating from the strong social norm of prohibition. Loopholes in the conventions are providing them with the opportunities to choose from a range of policies. Maintaining normative conflicts – as opposed to seek consensus – is in the interest of these states because substantive discussion about change could threaten what one could call a ‘convenient state of affairs’ in international drug control for most advanced industrial countries, in which they are able to fend off attempts to interfere in domestic drug control policies of the INCB and powerful states by referring to the ambiguities in the treaties.

In sum, it seems hardly in the interest of these states to push for change in international drug control for the sake of those ‘Southern countries’ which are bearing the highest costs of the current international drug control regime.

Bewley-Taylor (2003: 171) has argued that “[i]t seems that the time is not too distant when further movement within states away from the prohibitive paradigm will only be possible through some sort of change or defection from the regime”. The discussion of normative conflicts in international drug control suggests that change or defection might not necessarily be in the interest of these states. The status quo in international drug control – which one representative of a ‘zero-tolerance’ state has described as a “tug-of-war”⁶⁷ – serves the interests of those states which want to maintain their room of manoeuvre in their domestic drug control policies.

Normative Conflict and Co-Existence in the Politics of International Drug Control

International drug control is often portrayed as a struggle of scientific knowledge against policies based on ideology. The prohibition of narcotic drugs is understood as an American invention imposed on the rest of the world with the power and resources of a hegemon. The three international drug conventions are seen as an American tool to diffuse and institutionalize the social norm of narcotic drug prohibition on a global level. And where political pressure is not enough, the U.S. uses brute force to ensure narcotic drug prohibition. The problem with narcotic drug prohibition, however, is that it does not work. In the five decades since states have – by establishing the 1961 Single Convention – declared prohibition the most important standard against which state action on drug matters is to measure, only a

⁶⁷ Interview with Swedish government representative, Vienna, February 18, 2010.

few things have changed to the better. Most have remained the same or even become worse. This is why the social norm of narcotic drug prohibition has become seen as an ideology. The ‘war on drugs’ might serve political purposes, the expansion of bureaucracies and American hegemony, but after all, it does not solve the ‘world drug problem’.

Against the ideology of narcotic drug prohibition stands evidence that alternative approaches to control drugs work. Decriminalization of drug possession for personal consumption, substitution therapy and heroin maintenance might not be aiming at achieving a drug free society, but these measure reduce harm inflicted on drug users, bring more drug users into therapy, can – if applied on a large scale – affect the demand for illicit drugs and enable law enforcement agencies to concentrate on those who earn money with drugs rather than those who are getting destroyed by them.

International drug control is the arena where ideology combined with material power wins against scientific evidence. The U.S. – together with a few other wealthy states – dominates discourse, manipulates IOs and uses the UN system to enforce compliance with the prohibition norm. The persistence of an out-dated and ineffective international regime is ensured by those who created it for their own profit. States and staff of IO staff willing to achieve progress in international drug control and base politics on scientific evidence get the short end of the stick in this struggle because they lack the power to make a stand against the most powerful state in the world and its allies in international drug control.

This chapter has developed a different perspective on international drug control. In this perspective, states do not engage in a struggle for either prohibitionist ‘zero-tolerance’ drug policies or ‘pragmatic harm reduction oriented’ approaches to drug control. Nor are they engaged in a struggle about the question if drug policies should be based on ideology or science. International drug control is mainly about organizing co-existence among states with different drug problems and different approaches to manage them. European – and increasingly Latin American – states making use of pragmatic solutions are not primarily interested in creating an international norm or legal framework which ends prohibition and establish pragmatic, science-based drug policies as a global standard. This might be the aim of individuals within the bureaucracies of these states, as it is the aim of some individuals in the American and other bureaucracies to spread the belief in prohibition as the best way to control drugs. As states, I have argued here, their interest in international drug control is to maintain the room of manoeuvre loopholes in the international legal framework provide them.

This explains why normative conflict has been a defining element of the politics of international drug control in the past two decades. To achieve co-existence, neither a consensus on normative questions nor an IO supporting states in elaborating norms is necessary. To the contrary, both could destabilize the balance between the efforts of some states to arrange themselves in the niches the international conventions provide and those of the INCB, the U.S. and other states to keep the loopholes as small as possible. Politics of international drug control is not about ideology. It is about achieving a consensus about how co-existence should be organized.

This is not to say that the current state of international drug control – in which a weak law enables deviance from a strong norm – is convenient for all states. The normative conflicts described in this chapter were mainly lead among advanced industrial states. Those who bear the highest costs of the prohibition of narcotic drugs are the production and transit states in Latin America, Central or Southeast Asia and to some extent West Africa. In these states, narcotic drugs create problems which go beyond social control and public health. In Mexico, Colombia and in Afghanistan, drugs fuel violence and corruption. They are a threat to the security and sovereignty of these states. For these states, only a substantial consensus on how to deal with the ‘world drug problem’ could change the situation.

To change the situation, serious commitments of advanced industrialized countries to reduce their illicit demand for drugs and invest in the societies of production and transit countries would be necessary. Such a commitment, however, is not to be expected anytime in the near future.

4 Elusive Off-Stage Commentaries: The UNODC's Role in International Drug Control

Rationalist and constructivist explanations of dysfunctional IOs argue that states listen to IOs because they perceive them as impartial actors in world politics that help them to overcome cooperation problems. Constructivists go even further and argue that IOs – dysfunctional or not – are so deeply embedded in the social relationships in world politics that they are able to persuade and socialize other actors into behaviour which should lead to the achievement of the social goals underlying international norms. Indeed, this is why, from a constructivist perspective, dysfunctional IOs are allowed to survive and grow despite their dysfunctional behaviour. Because IOs are perceived to be expert and moral authorities in world politics, constructivist argue, states perceive what they do and what they say as the right thing to do.

I have argued that this argument is flawed because it assumes that states delegate the development of norms and their translation into appropriate behaviour to IOs because they actually want to achieve the social goals inscribed in the mandates of IOs. If in world politics states separate talk from action as Krasner's organized hypocrisy metaphor suggests, this cannot taken for granted in the way constructivist and to a lesser extent rationalist explanations of dysfunctional IOs do. In such a world, states can create IOs which deal with problems that are not in their immediate national interest but need to be dealt with for some reason. States can and do use IOs to dump problems and let those IOs figure out how these problems can be solved best. However, such IOs will be marginalized and their normative role confined to a minimum if these organizations start to act proactively in a way that touches the interests of states. In short, the inner workings of IOs might be important for the kind of dysfunctions an IO develops, but what makes the organization dysfunctional is that states do not want other actors besides them which attempt to bridge the gap between talk and action in international politics.

This chapter argues that the UNODC has not achieved to play a significant role in the normative debates in international drug control. To the contrary, looking at the behaviour of the UNODC in relation to the two salient normative issue in international drug control of the past two decades – the adverse consequences of prohibition and the emergence of a public health approach to drug control – the UNODC's role in the politics of international drug control seems to have been confined to that of an elusive off-stage commentator. Its comments on the purpose of international drug control follow the evolution of the political process closely but the organization remains overly unclear about the meaning of these events for both the norm and the law in international drug control. While this elusiveness might have

helped to achieve co-existence and fuelled the tug-of-war which maintains the achieved state of co-existence, it certainly did not contribute to enable cooperation or norm development in international drug control. This behaviour of the organization is explained by the way states influence the executive director of the organization in his decision through the funding mechanism of the organization. States invest increasingly in the UNODC, but they did not strengthen those parts of the organization which would have enabled the organization to play a meaningful role in the politics of international drug control. Most of the investment came in 'earmarked' form and was directly assigned to specified projects. This weakens the headquarters which was the part of the organization that could become involved in the normative debates in international drug control and ensures that states achieve their primary aim in international drug control – co-existence.

This chapter set out to explore the mechanisms through which states shape the dysfunction of IOs. The first and second sections look at the ways in which the UNODC has behaved in relation to the struggle for co-existence in international drug control. The two sections argue that the UNODC's behaviour largely followed the broader normative discourse in international drug control. The first section looks at the way the UNODC dealt with the social norm of prohibition and its problematic effects on both the 'world drug problem' and on human rights. The second section then turns to the UNODC's behaviour in the 'harm reduction' debate. The third and the fourth section explain the UNODC's behaviour from two different perspectives. The third section looks into the internal working mechanisms of the organization and identifies the executive director of the organization as playing a central role for the organizations behaviour. The fourth section looks at the way the funding structures of the UNODC and the way states make use of this structures influence what the executive director does. The fifth section concludes that the insignificant and elusive role the UNODC played in the normative debates in international drug control is the role states have foreseen for the organizations. The dysfunction of the UNODC ensures that the primary aim of co-existence can be achieved in international drug control.

Committing to the Norm: The UNODC and Prohibition

The UNODC had been created as a technical organization. Its initial mandates were mainly concerned with assisting states in multilateral cooperation on drug control measures and providing services in technical assistance. However, over the past decade, the UNODC also became involved in politics. An important political aspect of the UNODC's work can be

found in its publications, especially its most prominent publication – the World Drug Report (WDR).

While, from their set up, the UNODC's WDRs and other publications are meant to provide technical guidance and compile information about how transnational drug markets work, they also include a wide range of interpretations which go beyond merely technical evaluations and fact-finding.

Sometimes, such political statements by the UNODC are subtle. For example, in the 2005 WDR, the UNODC, after having been criticized to overstate the value of illicit drug markets (see for example, Thoumi 2005), made an attempt to realistically estimate how much money is earned by the illicit trade with drugs. One of the central assumptions the UNODC made in its estimation model was that all drug markets are supply-driven, i.e. that drug consumers would actually consume more drugs when more drugs are available on the market (UNODC 2005: 125). This assumption was commented in a footnote of the 2005 WDR despite its significance for the estimation model and no further reference is made to justify it. The political message of the assumption that illicit markets are inherently a problem of supply – and therefore not of demand – lays in the perspective it suggests on illicit markets. The question if demand or supply are the main problem of illicit markets has been debated extensively in international drug control. The international drug control conventions at least implicitly suggest that supply of illicit drugs is the main factor why illicit drug markets exist⁶⁸.

At the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem – commonly referred to as the 'UNGASS', a tense debate was led by states about the question to what extent this assumption is consistent with reality. Demand for illicit drugs, some states argued, had at least the same effect on the intensity of the 'world drug problems' as supply. At the UNGASS, states consented that there is a 'shared responsibility' of states to reduce supply and demand for illicit drugs. In this sense, the UNODC's assumption of supply-driven illicit drug markets, even when introduced simply to make the estimation model less complex, is not without political content. It reveals an orthodox, supply-oriented understanding of illicit drug markets which, in the last consequence, suggests that those states not able to suppress the cultivation and trafficking of illicit drugs are responsible for the existence of an illicit market – according to the UNODC's estimate – USD 320 billion (UNODC 2005: 143).

⁶⁸ Indeed, the design of the 1988 Trafficking Convention can only be rationally explained when it is assumed that states wanted to put stronger controls on the supply-side of illicit drug markets, see Jojath (2009: 97).

Sometimes, however, the UNODC's political statements are more explicit. The 2009 WDR, for example, features a subsection titled "Why illicit drugs must remain illicit", which complains that "of all areas of international cooperation, drug control is uniquely subject to calls that the struggle should be abandoned" (UNODC 2009a: 163) and argues that the criminalization of certain substance is the best way to prevent an even larger 'world drug problem'. The point the subsection of the 2009 WDR is making is that between legalization of all drugs and prohibition of the currently controlled substances there are few alternatives and that from the two alternatives available prohibition might be the better one. These are clearly political statements. In another instance of attempting to gain political influence, the 2008 WDR includes a section about the history of international drug control. As a proof for the effectiveness and success of the international drug control, the 2008 WDR compares opium production and addiction rates in states in Southeast Asia before the inception of the first international drug control convention in 1912 and today. According to this table, production as well as addiction rates have significantly dropped during the century in which the production and consumption of opium in Southeast Asia were controlled by an international agreement (UNODC 2008a: 214) and states: "[c]omparing the situation in 1906/07 with the situation in 2007 shows a clear net improvement with regard to the most dangerous class of drugs: the opiates" (UNODC 2008a: 213). Again, the intent and political message of such play with numbers is obvious – without international efforts to control drugs through prohibition, addiction rates could still be the same as they have been at the beginning of the 20th century. However, such a comparison does hardly say anything about the effectiveness of the international control regime. Or as three renowned analysts of illicit drug markets have put it: "The frivolity of the comparison, because so much has changed apart from the formal controls, is indicative of the difficulty of providing a positive gloss to the performance of the current international system (...)" (Paoli, Greenfield and Reuter 2009: 258).

Despite such rather simplistic attempts to signal agreement for prohibition the UNODC did not simply ignore the largely scholarly debate about the adverse side-effects of prohibition. Despite the sometimes heroic language and flawed arguments the UNODC used to defend prohibition, its WDR did also take up the problematic side of drug prohibition. Most notably, in its 2008 WDR – the same report which made the attempt to compare consumption levels of opiates in 1907 and 2007 and relate it to the introduction of an international drug control system – the UNODC also featured a chapter that was concerned with evaluating the "achievements and unintended consequences of international drug control". The two-and-a-

half pages concerned with unintended consequences of international drug control might be considered the piece most critical towards prohibition ever published in a WDR. It outrightly admits that prohibition has adverse consequences which have not been intended at the inception of the international drug control system, neither in 1909 nor in 1961. In some instances it even dismisses the diplomatic language usually used by the UNODC when commenting on the more controversial aspects of international drug control and points out that the current system based on prohibition does not only have advantage. And it calls on states to take these unintended consequences into consideration when designing drug policies, especially those unintended consequences which directly affect the health and human rights of drug users. For example, the UNODC argued that prohibition contributed to the emergence of drug control policies in “which those who fall into the web of addiction find themselves excluded and marginalized from the social mainstream, tainted with a moral stigma, and often unable to find treatment” (UNODC 2008a: 216) and closely relates addressing this challenge to harm reduction measures (UNODC 2008a: 216-217). The chapter concludes with an subliminally yet unmistakably critical statement about the relationship between the performance of international drug control, the commitment of states and the prospects of international drug control: “[M]aking the drug control system more 'fit for purpose', would appear to need a triple commitment: reaffirming the basic principles (multilateralism and the protection of public health); improving the performance of the control system (by doing enforcement, prevention, treatment and harm reduction simultaneously); and mitigating the unintended consequences” (UNODC 2008a: 218).

Although this statement does not directly call the uses of prohibition into question, it could certainly be read as a step forward in the UNODC's role in the politics of international drug control. After nearly a decade of defending prohibition publicly and committing itself to the norm, the organization seemed to have been come to terms with its role as an IO and attempted to push the normative debates in international drug control in a new direction. At least, the concluding statement involved all the problems and questions that had politicized the once technical issue of international drug control.

The caution with which the UNODC prepared the 2008 WDR's thematic chapter, however, suggest that its concluding statement was intended to initiate a normative debate which could lead states out of its tug-of-war in international drug control politics or even end the struggle for co-existence. Much more, the fact that the statement appeared in the 2008 WDR shows how deeply the UNODC, even in criticizing prohibition and the commitment of states to

international drug control, was itself committed to the social norm of narcotic drug prohibition.

Initially, what later became this section of the 2008 WDR was circulated as an informal Conference Room Paper (CPR) at the 51st session CND two months before the publication of the report as a test and a provocation by the UNODC⁶⁹. The organization wanted to see in an informal way how states reacted on openly discussing unintended consequences of international drug control and harm reduction and circulating its position as a CPF at a CND session was seen as an adequate way to do so. The aim was to see to what extent the UNODC could count on raising project money for its annual budget without getting into trouble with zero-tolerance donors. If some major donors would not have agreed to the UNODC spelling out such a position, its executive director and senior managers would have been noticed by these states within short time. At least, this was the expectation of the UNODC's senior management which decided over the distribution of the CPR⁷⁰. The UNODC received a range of positive comments from non-governmental organizations and not a single comment from states. This even surprised the drafters of the paper. And after not having received negative comments, the UNODC decided to include the Conference Room Paper into the 2008 WDR⁷¹. If the 'making fit for purpose' CPR would have had the chance to incite a normative debate about the unintended consequences of prohibition and how they could be mitigated, it most likely would not have appeared again in an official UNODC document.

The UNODC is an 'honest broker' in the conflictive relations in international drug control. Its impartiality and expertise provide it with the resources to moderate the conflicting interests of states and achieve solutions which states would not have agreed upon alone. At least this is how senior staff of the organization perceived its role in international politics⁷².

If being an 'honest broker' means more than enabling the co-existence of conflicting interpretations of the international drug control conventions, then the UNODC has been only modestly successful in pursuing this role. The politics of international drug control have been driven by attempts of states to interpret the international drug conventions in a way that preserves their room of manoeuvre. Normative conflict in order to ensure co-existence rather than cooperation to moderate conflicts had been the defining element of the politics of

⁶⁹ Making drug control 'fit for purpose': Building on the UNGASS decade. Report by the executive director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime as a contribution to the review of the twentieth special session of the General Assembly. E/CN.7/2008/CPR.17.

⁷⁰ Interview with UNODC senior staff, Vienna, February 8, 2010.

⁷¹ Interview with UNODC senior staff, Vienna, February 8, 2010.

⁷² Interview with UNODC senior staff, Vienna, February 8, 2010.

international drug control in the past two decades. The UNODC's commitment to the social norm of narcotic drug prohibition has neither contributed to nor mitigated these strategies.

The argument that UNODC's commitment to prohibition has obvious reasons because its mandate is based on the international drug control conventions is only partly convincing. As I have argued in the previous chapter, the international drug conventions provide ample flexibility which would allow deviating from an uncompromising commitment to the irreplaceability of prohibition. The UNODC's behaviour simply reflected the degree to which the social norm of narcotic drug prohibition dominated international drug control and the UNODC's inability to evade its importance even in criticizing the norm.

Commenting on the Tug-of-War: The UNODC and Harm Reduction

Commitment to prohibition alone, however, does not make the UNODC dysfunctional. Although its commitment to prohibition can be seen as a comment on the state of the normative debate in international drug control rather than an attempt to bring those who deviated from the norm by exploiting the loopholes in the international drug convention to reason, this does not preclude that the UNODC could play a more significant role in the integration of harm reduction into the existing normative debates in international drug control. As states like Switzerland and the Netherlands have shown, harm reduction does not necessarily exclude prohibition. Even while committing to prohibition, the UNODC could still have played a role in mitigating the tug-of-war of defining normative debates in international drug control.

Similar to what has been said about the UNODC above, however, the organization obtained a rather passive role in the harm reduction debate as well. Despite the fact that harm reduction had been on the agenda of international drug control since the early 1990s – due to the INCB's critical comments in the issue – the UNODC kept largely out of this debate for a decade.

Judged by its mandate, the UNODC's behaviour is surprising. Existing evidence from the evaluation of harm reduction measures suggested that some of the measures were effective and efficient in alleviating some of the most disturbing consequences of drug prohibition. For an organization which is mandated to provide states with the evidence-base for effective drug control policies, developing a position on the existing evidence and introducing this position into the political discourse would seem to be a behaviour which could be expected. Internally,

such positions existed early on in the debate⁷³, however, neither in public nor in relations to the INCB or to states were these positions outlined.

In public, the UNODC remained largely silent on harm reduction before the INCB's 2003 Annual Report. It cautiously referred to harm reduction measures in its 1997 WDR (UNDCP 1997: 161) and a chapter about drug dependence treatment made reference to substitution therapy in its 2000 WDR (ODCCP 2000: 116-134). About its own attitude towards harm reduction, however, the UNODC remained silent.

In relations to the INCB, the UNODC made clear why this was the case. In a legal advice issued by the UNODC's Legal Affairs Section to the INCB, it was stated that the UNODC "has yet to adopt an official position on harm reduction" but that it supports "a balanced approach that would match supply reducing measures and (...) programmes aimed at reducing the overall health and social consequences and cost of drug abuse (...)".⁷⁴

Antonio Maria Costa, executive director of the UNODC from 2002 to 2010, however expressed a fundamentally different view in a report to the UNGASS Mid-Term Review in 2003: "[T]he concept 'harm reduction' has become a battlefield for recrimination, perpetuating an increasingly unhelpful debate (...). [T]he Conventions regulating the supply of drugs – making them available for medical purposes, or prohibiting them for non-medical uses – are forms of harm reduction. Law enforcement leading to the conviction of drug traffickers is reducing harm to society. Alternative development initiatives helping farmers to switch to licit crops are harm reduction measures; they also reduce the environmental damage of coca and opium cultivation"⁷⁵.

After the publication of the INCB's 2003 Annual Report – which made some concessions toward some harm reduction measures – the UNODC's position seemed to have changed in favour of a more open approach towards harm reduction. Needle exchange and substitution therapy gained more prominence in the UNODC's statements. This change, however, was not straightforward, but took place in an interlocking process of acknowledging that drug control had adverse consequences, that these consequences could be partly relieved by harm reduction, and by incorporating knowledge about harm reduction produced by other UN agencies in its publications and work.

⁷³ Interview with UNODC senior staff, February 22, 2010.

⁷⁴ Flexibility of Treaty Provision as Regards Harm Reduction Approaches: Prepared by the Legal Affairs Section UNDCP, E/INCB/2002/W.13/SS.5, para 6.

⁷⁵ 'Encouraging Progress Toward Still Distant Goals': Progress Report by the executive director to the Mid-term (2003) Review of UNGASS. April 8, 2003, UNODC/ED/2.

In 2004 the UNODC published a discussion paper which recommends – among others – that “low-threshold pharmacological interventions (...) not directly related to drug-free oriented programmes, but to immediate health protection have to be easily accessible [and] needle/syringe programmes for injecting drug abusers may be implemented where appropriate” (UNODC 2004b: 5) . Similarly, the 2004 WDR featured a section on HIV and drug use which concludes that “both scientific evidence and the experience with such programmes [to reduce HIV transmission among injection drug users, including substitution therapy, C.S.] would seem to indicate that a package would be effective in reducing the risk of HIV transmission among injection drug users and the risk of HIV diffusion from drug users to the general population.” (UNODC 2004a: 52).

Also in 2004, the UNODC co-authored leaflets that aimed at providing policy-makers with information about needle exchange programs⁷⁶, outreach to drug users⁷⁷ and substitution treatment⁷⁸ as a means of reducing the transmission rates of HIV among drug users. Although all three leaflets were officially released by the World Health Organization (WHO), the UNODC’s regalia were printed on all of them, underlining that the position put forward in the leaflets was supported by the UNODC.

Most notably, a joint WHO/UNODC/UNAIDS position paper published in 2004 states: “In countries with a significant prevalence of heroin or other opioid dependence, methadone and/or other substitution maintenance treatment programs should be considered as one useful treatment option (...)” (WHO/UNODC/UNAIDS 2004: 22). The publication concludes that “[s]ociety as a whole benefits from substitution maintenance therapy through reductions in the incidence of criminal behavior, reduced health and criminal justice system costs, reduced risks of HIV and other bloodborne viruses, and increased productivity. There is a strong case for investing in opioid substitution therapy, as the savings resulting from treating an individual far exceed the costs.” (WHO/UNODC/UNAIDS 2004: 32).

Similarly, a joint UNODC/WHO discussion paper titled “Principles of Drug Dependence Treatment” states: “Attempts to treat and prevent drug use through though penal sanctions for drug users fail (...). ‘Nothing less’ must be provided for the treatment of drug dependence

⁷⁶ Policy Brief: Provision of Sterile Injecting Equipment to Reduce HIV Transmission, WHO/HIV/2004.03 http://www.unodc.org/documents/hiv-aids/reduc_HIV_trans_drug_dep_treat_eng.pdf [retrieved November 14, 2011].

⁷⁷ Policy Brief: Reduction of HIV Transmission through Outreach, WHO/HIV/2004.02 http://www.unodc.org/documents/hiv-aids/Reduc_trans%20outreach_eng.pdf [retrieved November 14, 2011].

⁷⁸ Policy Brief: Reduction of HIV Transmission Through Drug-Dependence Treatment WHO/HIV/2004.04 http://www.unodc.org/documents/hiv-aids/reduc_HIV_trans_drug_dep_treat_eng.pdf [retrieved November 14, 2011].

than a qualified, systematic, science-based approach such as that developed to treat other chronic diseases considered untreatable some decades ago” (UNODC/WHO 2008: 1-2).

Furthermore, since 2004 a range of studies and best practice guides have been published under the auspice of the UNODC which recommend needle exchange and substitution as means to reduce the transmission of HIV among drug users – most of them referring to prison setting (see for example, UNODC/WHO/UNAIDS 2006, Jürgens 2007, Donoghoe, Verster and Mather 2009).

That the UNODC is not merely paying lip service to the inclusion of harm reduction measures into drug policy becomes clear in its technical assistance projects⁷⁹. In his reports to the CND the executive director of the UNODC has outlined the organizations technical assistance projects related harm reduction measures⁸⁰. Most of these projects aim at raising the awareness of policy-makers and governments officials for the relationship of injection drug use and the transmission of HIV, while some projects were also concerned with training prison staff in handling needle exchange programs in prison setting⁸¹.

However, this process of acknowledging that harm reduction measures could be useful in drug policy and become part of the UNODC’s technical work was not accompanied by a full commitment to the normative consequences of integrating harm reduction into international drug control. Most publications have been co-authored with other UN organizations and usually include a disclaimer that the views expressed in the publications are not necessarily the views of the organizations. Furthermore, such publications tend to include references to abstinence-oriented ‘fundamental principles’ of international drug control. The UNODC’s 2004 discussion paper on harm reduction, for example, concludes – after recommending harm reduction measures as a way to treat drug dependence – that “patients dependent of drugs who are motivated to stop drug abuse should be considered as the highest priority [for treatment, C.S.]. The United Nations Drug Conventions do not accept drug abuse as an inevitable fact of life (...). The prospective of a normal life with cannabis, cocaine, heroin, amphetamines and hallucinogens, legalized or not, is only an illusion“ (UNODC 2004b: 7).

⁷⁹ However, the exact amount spent on harm reduction projects or the share of spending on harm reduction measures of the overall budget remains unclear due to the UNODC’s rudimentary public reporting practice.

⁸⁰ Responding to the prevalence of HIV/AIDS and other blood-borne diseases among drug users: Report of the executive director. Presented at the 51st session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Vienna March 10-14, E/CN.7/2008/7, para 28-56, and Responding to the prevalence of HIV/AIDS and other blood-borne diseases among drug users: Report of the executive director. Presented at the 53rd session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Vienna March 10-14, E/CN.7/2010/11, para 18-39.

⁸¹ Responding to the prevalence of HIV/AIDS and other blood-borne diseases among drug users: Report of the executive director. Presented at the 53rd session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Vienna March 10-14, E/CN.7/2010/11, para 20.

Similarly, the UNODC refrained from recommending harm reduction as a policy option in the WDR even when underlining the advantages of harm reduction measures. For example, the 2004 WDR also features a section titled “Conceptual Advances in Drug Control”, in which needle exchange and opioid substitution are not mentioned as policy alternatives, despite the fact that such measures were referred to as important for the reduction of HIV transmission among drug users in the same report (UNODC 2004a: 52-56).

In the 2009 WDRs a chapter titled “Confronting Unintended Consequences: Drug Control and the Criminal Black Market” discusses a range of possibilities to address some of the adverse side-effects of drug prohibition – mainly in concern with the question how drug markets can be dried up (2009a: 163-183). While drug treatment in general is considered as a possibility to reduce the size of black markets, measures such as substitution and heroin maintenance are not considered in the report, despite the fact that such measures can have a profound effect on the illicit demand for drugs⁸². Instead the UNODC’s (2009a: 183) recommendation for demand reduction is “mainstreaming the half-a-percent” of heavy drug users in order to dry up the market.

The way in which the UNODC presented evidence about harm reduction in its publicly accessible statements and publications demonstrates three things. Firstly, the UNODC was not able to develop an independent position on the status of harm reduction measures in drug policies should have in drug policies. It largely followed the state of the debate in international drug control expressed in the annual reports of the INCB. It was only after the INCB made some promising comments about how needle exchange could be helpful that the UNODC published a chapter on needle exchange and outreach practices in the 2004 WDR. And it was only after the INCB attempted to define the term ‘medical use’ of narcotic drugs that the UNODC became more assertive of talking about the value of opiate substitution programs. This behaviour is hardly an attempt to ensure coherence among UN bodies concerned with questions of drug control. Nor is such behaviour an expression of deference to the ‘moral authority’ of the INCB⁸³. Closely following the INCB in its interpretation of the international drug control conventions helped the UNODC to make sure that its statements would not interfere with the interests of its major donors.

⁸² For example it is estimated by Swiss authorities that the substitution and heroin maintenance programs in Switzerland reduced demand for illicit heroin in Switzerland by 7.3 tons per year. Interview with Swiss government representative, September 4, 2009.

⁸³ Interview with UNODC senior staff, Vienna, February 8, 2010.

Secondly, the initial support for needle exchange and opioid substitution in the past six years has been limited to specific settings – such as HIV prevention programs in prisons – and been performed at a low profile. Publications on harm reduction matters were usually joined with the WHO and UNAIDS. Despite the success of the projects concerned with harm reduction in prison setting⁸⁴, these successes have rarely been made public in the way success in the control of drug markets have been celebrated in the WDR. Maintaining a low profile on harm reduction serves the same purpose as following the INCB interpretations of the international drug conventions concerning harm reduction – reacting on current developments in drug control matters, but only to an extent that the organization can hardly be held accountable for what it is saying. From these publications, it is often difficult to get a clear sense of what the position of the UNODC on harm reduction is.

Thirdly, the UNODC does not seem to have a coherent position on harm reduction. Statements in favour of harm reduction are often watered down with statements referring to abstinence-based treatment and strict enforcement, even when these two alternatives do not fit together. Harm reduction has not yet been integrated in the UNODC's repertoire of standard arguments on drug control measures. It appears in the UNODC's publications as a solution for drug problems that otherwise cannot be solved – as has been argued in the 2008 WDR – only to disappear and be replaced by other solutions shortly after that – as in the thematic chapter of the 2009 WDR.

In the past years, the UNODC has remained so elusive about harm reduction in its publication that it remains difficult to even identify a position at all. Similar to its commitment to the social norm of narcotic drug prohibition, the UNODC has avoided making it clear in which direction the normative discourse should be developed from the organization's perspective, if the perceived problems of cooperation in international drug control should be solved or at least mitigated.

The UNODC's behaviour concerning harm reduction suggests that the organization is largely engaging in 'muddling through'. Depending on the audience it targets, the UNODC's statements about harm reduction ranges from what one could see as cynical mockery – when Antonio Maria Costa refers to alternative development as harm reduction – to full endorsement of some measures – for example in the case of the discussion paper on substitution therapy co-published by the UNODC and the WHO and UNAIDS.

⁸⁴ Interview with UNODC staff, February 28, 2010.

The extent to which the UNODC's elusiveness has had an influence on the way states were leading the normative discourses in international drug control remains unclear. It is possible that the UNODC's behaviour was helpful for both sides in the discourse by providing them for arguments for and against prohibition and harm reduction, respectively. What can be said with some degree of certainty, however, is that the UNODC was not embodying or serving a "widely shared set of principles" as Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 23) argue. With its comments on harm reduction, the UNODC was reacting on what states and the INCB were doing in international drug control. The UNODC was providing comments on what these actors were doing. And it was not providing them as a leader in the discourse. To the contrary, with its reactive pattern, the UNODC obtained the role of what one might call an elusive off-stage commentator who was, instead of helping to make sense of the normative debate in international drug control, contributing to the confusion the tug-of-war between orthodox and liberal interpretations of the international drug control conventions had already caused.

Elusiveness as Survival: How Executive Directors Shape the UNODC's Role

The previous sections have portrayed the UNODC as a side-lined actor with neither an influential position in the political process nor a clear message for those it has been created for to sort out the problems that make cooperation difficult in international drug control. While I have argued here that this role can be best described as one of an elusive off-stage commentator on the tug-of-war in international drug control, others have been more bluntly demanding that the UNODC clarifies its position.

Transnational advocates like the Transnational Institute or the International Drug Policy Consortium have called on the organization to remain with the facts and give harm reduction more weight in its publications⁸⁵. The U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations in Vienna during the first half of the 2000s has – according to unofficial reports – repeatedly threatened the executive directors of the UNODC to withdraw funding if the UNODC does not cede to promote harm reduction⁸⁶. The UN's Office for Internal Oversight Services noted in a report in 2001 that executive director, Pino Arlacchi, had overstated success of

⁸⁵ See, for example, IDPCs statement on the UNODC on its website: <http://www.idpc.net/policy-advocacy/global-advocacy/global-system-drug-control/unodc/read-more> [retrieved November 14, 2011].

⁸⁶ Allegations pointing in this direction have been made in an open letter to the delegates of the Forty-eighth session of the CND signed by more than 300 non-governmental organizations. See: <http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/archives/drugsreform-docs/cnd010305.pdf> [retrieved November 14, 2011].

international drug control beyond the “limits of credibility”⁸⁷ suggesting that inadequate representation of data threatened the legitimacy of the organization. And one staff of the UNODC has – off the record – described the behaviour of the organization in the normative discourse as a result of the cowardice of the executive director and the senior management to take a clear stance in the normative debates in international drug control.

These critiques of the UNODC’s behaviour have mostly emerged because the organization is a reactive rather than a proactive participant in the politics of international drug control. However, explanations for the way the UNODC behaves are still lacking. Pressure and ignorance alone do not seem to be convincing explanations for the UNODC’s ambivalence. If this was the case, it could be expected that the UNODC would have been giving in to either one or the other side. The question is why it has not done so yet.

This and the following section argue that two interlocking circumstance have strongly shaped the UNODC’s behaviour in the past years and defined its role in international drug control to a large extent. This section is concerned with how the UNODC – or more exactly its executive director and senior management – organized its relationships to states and how this contributed to the elusiveness of the organization’s behaviour. The next section then looks at the way in which states organized relationships with the UNODC to play their part in the creation of an elusive actor in international drug control.

Organizational mismanagement in the years around the turn of the century has certainly limited the UNODC’s room of manoeuvre⁸⁸. But more importantly, the struggle for co-existence rather than cooperation in international drug control – carried out among states and the INCB – has strongly shaped how the UNODC’s acts. What the UNODC does and what it says in the politics of international drug control is only rarely of importance to what states do. It is for this reason that the UNODC has attempted to keep a low profile which resulted in its ambiguous position in international drug control.

This can be best seen in the way relations between states and the UNODC are structured. Cox and Jacobson (1973b: 429-430) identify two different models of how IOs – through their executive heads – and states relate to each other. In the oligarchic model, the role of the executive head is dominated by powerful states. They consider the issues the organization is

⁸⁷ Triennial review of the implementation of the recommendations made by the Committee for Programme and Coordination at its thirty-eighth session on the in-depth evaluation of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme, E/AC.551/2001/4, para. 28.

⁸⁸ See for example, Triennial review of the implementation of the recommendations made by the Committee for Programme and Coordination at its thirty-eighth session on the in-depth evaluation of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme, E/AC.551/2001/4.

mandated to deal with as salient and therefore are prone to define the room of manoeuvre of the executive head with precision, in many cases constricting it to make sure that the organization acts in their interests.

In the monarchic model, the executive head is central to the definition of the role of the IO. Together with what Cox and Jacobson call the ‘organizations establishment’ – influential individuals loyal to the institution – the executive head enjoys considerable room of manoeuvre, as long as powerful states are not seriously affected by what the organization does. In the monarchic model, stable individual relationships ensure that the organization and the structure of influence are defended against attempts of states to gain more influence. The executive head and the establishment might be divided about the goals the organization should pursue, but in order to preserve the organization and the structure of influence, individuals of the establishment eventually unite in their loyalty to the organization. In monarchic IOs, the individuals of the organization’s establishment are, in practice, more accountable to each other than they are to states. As long as powerful states are not affected by this situation and start exerting control over monarchic organizations, executive heads and organizational establishments can preserve their room of manoeuvre. Cox and Jacobson’s models are ideal types (Cox and Jacobson 1973: 429). However, most IOs tend to be characterized by one type.

In the case of the UNODC, the monarchic model predominates. The organization is centred on the executive director and the senior management, which manage relations with major donors as well as with the other states in the CND. The rest of the bureaucracy is somewhat detached from the political process. As a manager of the UNODC’s bureaucracy, the executive director exerts considerable control over what the UNODC does. Although the means and extent of control vary with the executive director, all executive directors have been able to control not so much what the bureaucracy does but how it is presented to states and a wider public. Former employees have raised concerns about the way and the extent to which control exerted by the executive director distorts the ability of the organization to provide objective knowledge and evidence-based policy advice.

Francisco Thoumi, a renowned expert on illegal drug markets who worked for the UNODC as a consultant until 2000, has raised serious concerns about the way in which then executive director Pino Arlacchi interfered in the compilation of the second WDR. According to Thoumi (2002: 181), Pino Arlacchi was the only ‘peer reviewer’ of the report’s manuscript after a long and complex process of production which followed scientific standards and had

included – as Thoumi (2002: 177) has put it – ‘world experts’ which had reviewed every chapter before a final draft was sent to the executive director. After having reviewed the manuscript, Arlacchi decided to eliminate several substantial chapters including a chapter critical to alternative development and one about synthetic drugs. Alternative development at the time was one of the predominant – although contested – areas in which the UNODC was performing projects. Synthetic drugs were the fastest growing illicit drugs at the beginning of the 21st century. As a drug problem, synthetic drugs affected advanced industrial countries to a large extent. Both were sensitive issues for the international drug control in general and the UNODC in particular. What remained from the manuscript after Arlacchi’s review was basically a statistical overview of trends in illicit drug markets, a few chapters on the basics of demand-reduction and a short, uncritical chapter on alternative development as a way to reduce production.

These changes were made by Arlacchi, according to Thoumi (2002: 178), because the original manuscript did not reflect “his vision of the world drug situation” in which the “world drug problems was on the verge of being solved”. In the executive directors perspective showing progress in the solution of the ‘world drug problem’ was one of the two goals the WDR should achieve. The second was “to provide a large number of facts and one-liners that the press could use” (Thoumi 2002: 179). After all, through Arlacchi’s intervention, the WDR’s function was to entertain rather than to inform. During Arlacchi’s term as executive director, which lasted from 1998 to 2002, the UNODC’s bureaucracy was largely detached from its executive director. Although Arlacchi was involved in very direct decision-making within the organization, especially in relations to staff decision, his involvement was erratic and unpredictable, which often lead to paralysis in the organization . Thoumi (2002: 177) reports that the executive director was difficult to get in touch with even for those working directly under his provision. And Fazey (2003) – also a former UNODC employee – describes the UNODC as a largely detached organization in which career bureaucrats “outnumber the specialists and occupy critical posts surrounding the ED [executive director], so that he does not have to talk to anyone who might disagree with him” (Fazey 2003: 162). Furthermore, Fazey, a former head of the UNODC’s demand reduction section, suggests that the UNODC was essentially managed by generalists – who were not sensitive to demand-control question (Fazey 2003: 164) – and lawyers who see “themselves not only as upholding the Conventions but as making sure (...) that the rest follows suit” (Fazey 2003: 162). Threats of non-renewal of contracts or ‘punishment posting’ in field offices of the UNODC were widely used as

means to keeping staff in line with a supply-oriented, prohibitive understanding of international drug control (Fazey 2003: 164).

In short, during Pino Arlacchi's term, those who provided the expertise to the organization – i.e. those who attempted to solve problems in international drug control – and those who made the decision were not engaged in an exchange that would have led to a transfer of expertise within the organization. Exchange was basically organized around hierarchical control within the organization.

After Pino Arlacchi was replaced as executive director by Antonio Maria Costa in 2002 this situation changed. However, the gap between those who made decision - the executive director and his senior management – and those who provided the expertise remained although to a lesser extent. While Arlacchi had managed the UNODC very directly, by taking most important and – according to a former senior manager whose letter of resignation leaked to the press – also many decisions of lesser importance, Antonio Maria Costa concentrated on his function of representing the organization to the outside. Off the record, some interviewees would even agree to the interpretation that executive directors tend to be a good fund raisers but leave the management of the organization largely to the senior management.

This made the organization and what it did more visible. But in many ways it did not change the way in which expertise within the organization and organizational behaviour related to each other. The UNODC as an international bureaucracy and the UNODC as an actor in international politics often were two different kinds of entities.

An intriguing recent example for this comes from the UNODC's Crime Programme of the organization and its involvement in research on human trafficking. Human trafficking became an issue for states in the late 1990s after trafficking of women from Eastern Europe for sexual exploitation came to be seen as a problem in Western Europe and North America. Human trafficking, by definition, has many aspects and can be seen from many different perspectives: as a problem of illegal migration, as a problem of forced labour, as a problem of transnational law enforcement, as a problem of lacking coherence in criminal law and judicial standards or as a human rights issue, to name just a few of the more prominent perspectives here. Each of these perspectives is important, but each of them leaves many of the other aspects of the phenomenon out.

Consequently, a broad range of IOs started to provide expertise about the phenomenon from their perspective. Besides different UN agencies, the ILO, the IOM, the OSCE and the EU became aware of the topic and the consequences it had for the organization and its members.

In terms of data and analysis, the IOM was the leading expert among IOs. Otherwise being largely neglected by states, the IOM – thanks to its access to national data on illegal migration and its decentralized structure – was able to provide answers to some of the pressing questions states had about human trafficking. The problem with this was, however, that human trafficking, by definition, does not necessarily coincide with illegal migration. Trafficking can also occur within state borders – the biggest part of it does so – and many trafficked persons cross borders legally as tourists before actually being forced into exploitative schemes. The perspective of the IOM, therefore, provided only a partial picture of the problem of human trafficking.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime was aware of this situation and with the ratification process of the UN Convention Against Transnational Crime – which included a Protocol Against the Trafficking in Human Beings – being underway, decided to enter the competition for providing expertise on issues in human trafficking other IOs had turned a blind eye on. The result of these efforts was a report titled “Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns” which largely relied on reports from IOs, non-governmental organizations and research institutes (data from governmental organization amounted to 27% of all data used in the report, UNODC 2006: 38) in order to present a comprehensive overview of the phenomenon and include human trafficking within states, on which only little official data was available. The aim of the report was to “identify the main reported patterns of trafficking in persons (...), including the relationship between origin, transit and destination countries, sub-regions and regions” (UNODC 2006: 38). The focus of the report, therefore, was on developing an understanding of the phenomenon of human trafficking. In order to make the report as evidence-based as possible, data collection followed social science standards (UNODC 2006: 106-123).

States, however, did not react on this “attempt to close the knowledge gap” (UNODC 2006: 10) in human trafficking in the way the UNODC expected. Instead of being welcomed as one of the most comprehensive treatments of the phenomenon from a global perspective with a sound social scientific background, states expressed their discontent with the report. They criticized the report as being inappropriate for a UN agency because it was filed without consulting states and relied on non-official sources and for being incorrect because the reported scale of human trafficking did not match their own data.

Subsequently, the UNODC compiled a second report called “Global Report on Trafficking in Persons” in which more official data was included. This second report’s focus was on the “collective global response to human trafficking” (UNODC 2009c: 13) rather than on the

phenomenon itself. The report argues that “[d]ue to the nature of the information collected, it can say much less about the activity itself”, because “[c]riminal justice data do not accurately represent the nature or extent of the underlying activity more than a fisherman’s catch represents the state of the fish in the sea” (UNODC 2009c: 13).

In order to produce the expertise states demanded from it, the UNODC had not only traded sound methodology against data which were of no use to make statements about the phenomenon itself (and which did only partly generate value added because the U.S. State Department published a similar report on an annual basis since 2001) but also chose to discredit its own methodology and data it used in the ‘Global Patterns’ report. In this case, expertise was a resource for the UNODC – its Crime Programme, which is concerned with human trafficking, has seen a steady rise in project funding in recent years. However, it was not expertise based on sound methodology and interested in the problem as such, which proved to be a resource. The expertise that counted for states as well as for the UNODC’s establishment was the expertise states expected from it.

From the perspective of the organization, remaining elusive on its normative position was a viable strategy. Raising new issues, pointing at the contradictions international conventions and state actions produce and proposing solutions is often not an option for the UNODC because it would have put in danger the monarchic structure of influence mainly concentrated on the raising of funds for the organization. As the example of the two reports on human trafficking shows, states jealously observed what the UNODC was doing and with that set an incentive for the UNODC to remain ambiguous. It was with elusiveness and ambiguity that the UNODC’s executive director and the senior management could ensure that their fund-raising strategies were working out best. In order to remain at least partly able to act and thereby maintain the existing structure of influence, retreating to the position of an elusive off-stage commentator in the political discourse which reacts rather than acts often became the best behavioural option for the UNODC and its executive heads.

The Creation of Elusiveness: Major Donors and Disinterest in a Functional UNODC

The previous section has argued that the executive directors of the UNODC shape its role in international drug control in important ways. They trade a meaningful role of the organization in the normative discourse in international drug control with their ability to raise funds from its major donors. Withdrawing from these discourses seems to be strategy by which the executive director can secure funding from states of various proveniences and at the same

time make sure that the more powerful states are not touched in their interests by what the organizations does.

This, however, does only partly explain why the UNODC has obtained a dysfunctional role in the normative discourses in international drug control. The other, and more important, part for of the explanation of the organization's behaviour is concerned with what states expect the organizations to do and they expect it not to do.

If states wanted the organization to play a more decisive role in the politics of international drug control, they had the means to strengthen the normative role of the organization. They could, either collectively or unilaterally, provide the UNODC with the necessary funds which would allow the organization to develop a meaningful position on the normative issues in international drug control and eventually to increase its normative profile. At the core of the UNODC's elusiveness lays its funding mechanism⁸⁹, but how this funding mechanism is used by states is not a function of either its behaviour or its monarchic structure of influence. The use of the funding mechanism is a function of the interests states have in the development of the normative discourse in international drug control. Co-existence can be achieved under normative conflict, and it might even be achieved better under such circumstances.

Some analysts of international drug control have argued that the funding structure of the UNODC is the key to understand why so little has changed in the conventions and the normative discourse in international drug control over the past two decades (Fazey 2003, Fazey 2007, Jelsma 2002, Bewley-Taylor 2004). The leverage the UNODC commands as a political actor in international drug control is significantly shaped by the contributions of Sweden and the U.S. The pressure powerful donors – especially the U.S. whose contributions accounted for between 7% (2006) and 13% (2009) of all general purpose funds in recent years – can exert on the UNODC is considerable when they threaten to withdraw all or parts of their contributions. Confronted with such threats of withdrawal, it seems obvious why the UNODC has never achieved a political role in which it could actually serve as an 'honest broker'.

However, blaming the U.S. for lacking a meaningful political role of the UNODC is short-sighted. The core problem of the UNODC is not that there are some states which have an interest in determining what the organization does. To the contrary, at the core of the UNODC's marginal role lays the fact that no state has a real interest in a strong normative actor in international drug control. At least this is what the funding behaviour of its 'major


⁸⁹ Other reasons are lack of oversight and ineffective governance by major donors. Interview with Swedish government representative, Vienna, February 18, 2010.

donors’ – those states which fund the UNODC with some regularity – in the past eight years suggests.

Apart from rather small budget of USD 184.3 million in average in the years 2003 to 2010 – which indicates in itself that states are only marginally interested in what the organization does – both the absolute and relative distribution of unearmarked and earmarked contributions to the organization suggest that state have a much stronger interest in the UNODC service providing functions than in its normative function.

States contribute to the UNODC’s budget in three ways. First, approximately 10% of the annual budget of the organization is funded through the regular budget of the United Nations. These funds are taken from the annual membership fee states have committed themselves to pay to the United Nations. Over these funds, states do not have much control. They are allocated to the UN’s programmes and specialized organization through a sub-committee of the General Assembly. But how funds are used by their beneficiaries is largely out of the control of states.

Figure 2: UNODC Funding Structure 2003 – 2010, Share of Overall Budget



Sources: UNODC website⁹⁰, Annual Reports of the UNODC (2007a, 2008b, 2009b, 2010a, 2011b) and author’s own calculation

The rest of the UNODC’s budget comes from voluntary contribution. These contributions are either donated to the UNODC for general use – usually called unearmarked or general purpose funds. Or they are assigned to specific projects as so called special purpose or

⁹⁰ <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/donors/index.html?ref=menuaside> [retrieved November 14, 2011].

earmarked funds. Over the former, the UNODC has largely the same control as it has over the funds that come from the UN's regular budget. These are the funds that pay headquarters functions and could be used by the organizations to bolster its normative role in international drug control. Over the latter, the UNODC has only very limited control. These funds are paid to the UNODC to perform projects in the field. Through these funds, states purchase the expertise, the network of field offices and the legitimacy of UNODC when they want to see some more or less precisely defined problems in drug control to be dealt with. States either design the projects by themselves or have great leverage in changing a project which is offered by the UNODC.

Table 3: General Purpose Funding by Major Donors 2006 – 2009 in Million USD

	2006	2007	2008	2009
Australia	0.39	0.40	0.47	0.38
Austria	0.10	0.05	0.00	0.27
Belgium	0.00	0.06	0.36	0.18
Canada	0.53	0.56	0.58	0.72
Denmark	0.85	1.19	0.98	0.96
EC	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Finland	0.29	0.30	0.49	0.73
France	0.85	0.84	0.89	0.38
Germany	0.77	0.79	0.91	0.82
Ireland	0.51	0.81	0.54	0.16
Italy	2.56	2.69	1.77	0.00
Japan	0.88	0.79	0.58	0.92
Luxembourg	0.12	0.07	0.16	0.13
Netherlands	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.34
Norway	1.77	0.19	1.78	1.26
Spain	0.21	0.24	0.23	0.13
Sweden	2.27	1.20	1.06	1.51
Switzerland	0.04	0.06	0.01	0.00
Turkey	0.15	0.26	0.20	0.20
UK	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
USA	1.00	1.00	1.22	1.35
Brazil	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Colombia	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.04
Russia	0.10	0.10	0.08	0.08
Total	13.38	11.61	12.31	10.56

Source: Annual Reports of the UNODC (2007a, 2008b, 2009b, 2010a)

Also, states are eager to make sure that special purpose funds are not used to cross-finance headquarters functions of the organizations.

The UNODC's core problem is the share of its budget it can freely command. Already in 2003, the UNODC has mentioned that the ratio between general purpose funds and special contributions has been dropping since the late 1990s (UNODC 2003: 22). Since 2003, this situation has aggravated. The share of general purpose funds has dropped from nearly 19% in 2003 to 5% in 2009. Funds from the regular budget have increased in absolute terms but in relation to the overall budget they have dropped from 14% in 2003 to 8% in 2010. This significant drop in general purpose funds put the UNODC under pressure to raise funds for its headquarters functions.

An analysis of individual contributions for the years 2006 to 2009 shows that state preferring liberal drug policies⁹¹ and states insisting on prohibitive policies⁹² are of equal importance to the UNODC when it comes to general purpose funds. While the 'like-minded' states contribute between 18% (2007) and 36% (2009) of the general purpose funds in recent years, contributions of 'zero-tolerance' states accounted for 24% (2008) to 37% (2009) respectively. In the light of the financing structure of the organization, remaining elusive in political positions commenting strongly on non-issues and reacting on pressure with about-face changes in arguments might be a worthwhile strategy for the UNODC to secure at least minimal general purpose funding from a broad range of different states.

The role of an elusive off-stage commentator that the UNODC plays in the normative discourse in international drug control is, in this sense, not a voluntary one and it is neither an exclusive function of its inner working mechanisms. The development of the funding behaviour of its major donors suggests that its role stems from a general disinterest in funding the UNODC's headquarters functions. A rather small and weak IO in international drug control seems to be all that states want – even those states which could seemingly profit from a more independent actor capable of shaping the normative discourse in international drug control in their favour. These states made no attempt to provide the organization with the necessary leverage it would have needed to become less concerned with its monarchic structure of influence and its need to secure funding by retreating to a weak position. The UNODC's normative role has been side-lined by states collectively.

⁹¹ Liberal states are those which had joined the group of like-minded states in the 52nd Session of the CND, see Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Report on the fifty-second session; E/CN.7/2009/12, p. 119.

⁹² Japan, Sweden, Russia, and the U.S.

The politics of co-existence in international drug have strongly shaped the UNODC's role in the normative discourse in international drug control. Those states who are, at least in the perspective of many transnational advocates, most likely to oppose this role are acting towards the organization in the same way as those who are favouring prohibitive international drug control policies. They increase special purpose funding and neglect donations which would enable the UNODC to develop its position as an actor in the politics of international drug control. Judged from their funding behaviour, none of the advanced industrial states commonly referred to as the major donors of the organizations has an interest in a functioning UNODC which enables cooperation among states in drug control matters beyond the point necessary for the co-existence of a variety of different approaches to drug control.

The dysfunction of the UNODC in international politics therefore is first and foremost a function of a lack of interest of states to achieve cooperation in international drug control.

Elusiveness and the Politics of Co-Existence: Who Benefits from Dysfunction?

This chapter has been concerned with the UNODC's role in the normative discourse in international drug control. It has argued that the UNODC does not play the role functionalist or constructivist expectations of what IOs do in world politics suggest. Instead of playing a leading role in developing and championing norms and behavioural rules which could lead to the achievement of the stated goals of states in international drug control – the significant reduction of the 'world drug problem' – the UNODC has retreated to a role of a commentator of what states do international drug control. And even in this role, the UNODC is hardly a critical voice. It remains elusive about its own position how norms in international drug control could be developed in a way that leads out of the current impasse. With its elusive commentaries on international drug control, the UNODC has kept itself aloft the more controversial issue which have driven normative discourses in international drug control over the past – such as the intersection of drug control and human rights or the 'harm reduction' debate – and left the playground of normative discourse to states. In doing so, it has also resigned from developing a role in which it could have influenced these discourses. The UNODC is not only an elusive commentator, it also comments off-stage – reacting on what states demand from the organization rather than providing the basis for evidence-based or just international drug control.

This elusiveness of the organization – its dysfunction as an actor in international politics – is best explained as a strategy of survival. Talking out of both sides of its mouth helps the

UNODC to secure the minimal influence it has on states in persuading them to fund the organization. Fund-raising is the central role of the executive director of the organization and stepping on someone's toe by championing a particular set of norms or principles does not pay in an environment in which existing norms and legal frameworks sufficiently ensure that states get what they want by not cooperating extensively. I have argued that the executive directors of the UNODC and the senior management have developed internal and external mechanisms which ensure that organization remains elusive in what it says. Internally, elusiveness is – when necessary and in differing degrees – ensured by managerial control. Externally, the UNODC acts with caution when taking up new ideas and pays deference to states when – despite all precautionary measures – its publications touch the interests of states. By remaining elusive, the UNODC creates the basis for its executive director to raise funds undisturbed.

These observations are not entirely new, nor are they surprising for an organization that relies heavily on voluntary contributions from states. Most analysts of international drug control have blamed the U.S. for the weakness of the organization. They argue that all the cautious and submissive behaviour of the UNODC is caused by constant threats of the U.S. to restrict or withdraw funding, if the organization does not as the U.S. wants it to do. This is certainly true as the U.S. is an important funder of the organization and can be expected to use its financial influence to direct the organization's behaviour in a way that does not touch its interests.

However, a closer look at the UNODC's funding structure suggests that U.S. behaviour alone cannot explain why the UNODC acts in the way it does. All major donors have kept the organization short of financial leverage which could have helped the organization to develop a less deferent role in the normative discourses in international drug control. General-purpose funding – the funds the UNODC can command freely – has been declining in relative terms over the past seven years, while the UNODC's overall budget has grown considerably. States have strengthened the UNODC's role in the field by increasingly investing in its project work, but they neglected the head-quarters functions of the organization which needed to be funded at least partly through general-purpose funds. This added to the need of the organization to act cautiously. Especially, those states which could be expected to be interested in a more outspoken UNODC were not counteracting this imbalance in the funding structure or even just trying to mitigate the influence the U.S. and other 'zero-tolerance' states had on the organization.

This suggests that the weak normative role of the UNODC was rather an outcome of collective disinterest than a particular interest of the U.S. None of the major donors of the organization had an interest in creating and supporting an IO capable of taking the leadership in the normative discourse in international drug control. With the opportunities the strong norm of narcotic drug prohibition and the weak law of international drug control created for all major donors there was no need to increase cooperation in drug issues or develop existing norms. Preserving the state of co-existence which had been created by the exploitation of loopholes in the international drug conventions was in the interest of most of the major donors of the UNODC – and it was even more so for those states which were attuned to more liberal approaches of drug control. In the same way major players benefited from the tug-of-war of international drug control, they benefited from the UNODC's dysfunction.

5 Functions of Dysfunction: The UNODC's Role in Fighting the 'Narco-State' in Guinea-Bissau

Politically, the UNODC is a weak IO. The UNODC's role in the politics of international drug control, partly because of a lack of consensus and partly because of the weak law in which the norm of narcotic drug prohibition is embodied in, is not "to embody, serve, or protect widely shared set of principles" (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 23) in order to foster cooperative behaviour among states when it comes to drug control. To the contrary, states have limited the UNODC's normative role to an elusive commentator on the normative discourses they are leading. The organization reacts to states' expectations rather than setting agendas, monitoring state behaviour or ensuring compliance. This is hardly a functional role, because it does neither increase efficiency of decision-making nor the development or consolidation of existing norms.

Nevertheless, the UNODC's budget has been growing over the past decade. Budgetary growth has mainly been related to increasing earmarked contributions to the organization. While unearmarked contributions have remained stable, states with all sorts of interests in international drug control have increasingly funnelled money into the organization for specific projects.

This points at the fact that states do not have an interest in strengthening the UNODC's authority in the politics of international drug control. However, the significant increase in earmarked voluntary contributions indicates that states do have an interest in the organization's technical expertise and operative capacity to solve drug-related problems where they occur. Judged by the development of its budget, the UNODC might be playing an insignificant role in the development of the normative foundations of international drug control, but it seems to serve the interests of states well when it comes to its technical performance. Be it because of the increased efficiency of centralized project implementation or because of the legitimating veil IOs provide for "activities that might be unacceptable in their original state-to-state form" (Abbott and Snidal 1998: 19), the funding structure of the UNODC suggests that politically dysfunctional IOs can still be functional agents of state interests.

This would provide a simple explanation for why dysfunctional IOs persist and grow. As dysfunction is a matter of perception, one could argue that those who see dysfunctional IO just ignore the fact that the normative role of IOs is only a part – and maybe the smaller part – of what IOs actually do. Despite their dysfunctional behaviour in international politics,

equipped with the necessary expertise and discretion from individual state interests, IOs do what states could not do alone.

So, are dysfunctional IOs just a matter of perspective? Are they politically flawed but operationally sound actors in world politics which serve as agents for states? Do they grow and persist because of their ability to transform technical expertise into effective outcomes on the ground?

This chapter looks at the mechanisms of state delegation to dysfunctional IOs by the example of the UNODC's engagement in police capacity building in Guinea-Bissau in order to provide an answer for these questions. The tiny, West African state has received considerable public attention since the mid-2000s because of its alleged role as a hub for cocaine trafficking from Latin America to Western Europe. The UNODC was delegated the task to – among others – assist the country in the establishment of police capacities to fight drug trafficking on its territory. These capacities have been lacking in Guinea-Bissau which is one of the reasons why the country has been targeted by drug traffickers as a transit destination.

The chapter traces how the UNODC became involved in police capacity building in Guinea-Bissau, how it worked to implement a project concerned with the creation of a police unit specialized on organized crime investigations and how the implementation process was shaped by actors internal and external to the organization.

The case of the UNODC's work in Guinea-Bissau is exemplary because it shows that states can profit from dysfunctional IOs even when they fail to achieve the goals defined at the outset of a project. There might be cases in which the UNODC performed better and there might be cases in which the organization performed worse. However, doing police capacity building is considered to be one of the UNODC's core tasks and one in which it is strongest⁹³. The aim of this chapter is not to argue that the UNODC has failed to achieve anything in Guinea-Bissau or wasted the money invested in the organization by donors. The reason for the fact that the project has not developed in the way which donors have imagined it to develop are complex. Blaming a particular actor for it would oversimplify the situation. The aim here is to develop a deeper understanding of the opportunities the existence of a dysfunctional IO creates for states and why states make use of these opportunities independent from the chances of achieving sustainable problem solution or even the management of a problem. In

⁹³ Even critics of the organization admit that the UNODC performs strongest when it comes to the implementation of the 'control aspects' of the international drug conventions. See, for example: <http://www.idpc.net/policy-advocacy/global-advocacy/global-system-drug-control/unodc/read-more> [retrieved November 14, 2011].

this sense, this chapter is concerned with exploring the baseline for organizational growth and persistence. When an IO is sent on a hopeless mission and still can profit from that even the failure of a project can have a function for states.

The chapter is organized in six sections. The first section is concerned with the emergence of West Africa in general and Guinea-Bissau in particular as a trafficking route in the transnational black market for cocaine. This section looks at the role of the UNODC in placing West Africa and Guinea Bissau on the international agenda. The second and third sections are concerned with how states reacted on the emergences on the new problem of cocaine trafficking through West Africa. While the second section is concerned with what states were saying should be done, the third section explores what they have done and why they have done in the way they did. The fourth and fifth sections turn to the process of implementation. The fourth section is concerned with the UNODC's role in implementing what states had decided to do and the impediments the organizations has met during the implementation process. The fifth section is concerned with the achievements of the organization. The concluding section turns to the boarder implications of the case study for the explanation of growth and persistence of the UNODC.

From the Gold Coast to the Coke Coast: Framing Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa


Africa was the region of least concern in international drug control. Cannabis use and production was an issue on the continent, but the drugs usually associated with highly organized trafficking networks, exalted profits, violence and severe addiction did not affect Africa the way they did other regions of the world. Cocaine is produced in Latin America. Heroin mainly comes from Central and Southeast Asia. Most of these drugs are consumed in North America, Europe and Australia. In Africa, cocaine and heroin were not a particular concern in international drug control politics. Cocaine seizures on the continent usually did not exceed one ton annually⁹⁴. Similarly, heroin was only a small problem on the African continent when compared to the prevalence rates in Western Europe, North America or Russia. The most dangerous drugs, it seemed, caused the least problem on the African continent⁹⁵. Africa was rarely ever mentioned in international drug control politics.

⁹⁴ According to the World Drug Reports statistical annexes.

⁹⁵ There is, however, a history of drug trafficking in West Africa which reaches back to the 1950s. Especially, heroin was trafficked through Nigeria since decades, see Ellis (2009).

This has changed, however. In the years 2005 to 2009 up to 12 tons of cocaine have been seized in West African countries or off the West African coast annually. These seizures often came in large – and on the African continent indeed unprecedented – quantities ranging between several hundred kilograms and several tons. In the largest seizure made on the African continent so far, 3.7 tons of cocaine were discovered on a ship off the coast of Sierra Leone. Between 2005 and 2010 more than 50 seizures of more than 100 kg were made in as much as a dozen West Africa countries. The UNODC (2011c: 26) estimated that between 21 and 62 tons of cocaine were passing the West African region between 2005 and 2010 annually.

Figure 3: Cocaine Seizures in West Africa of more than 100kg, 2005 – 2010⁹⁶



Source: UNODC (2011c: 13) and author's own calculation.

The sudden rise in cocaine seizures along the West African coast came as a surprise to many. Large scale cocaine trafficking had commonly been associated with direct routes from producing regions to the large demand markets in North America and Western Europe. The Caribbean and Central America had been used as transit routes from the major producing regions in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia to the U.S. To Western Europe, cocaine was either transported by sea hidden in ship containers or modified boats or smuggled on commercial flights by so called 'drug mules'. That drug traffickers would chose West Africa as a transit route to the consumer markets in Europe had not been expected.

⁹⁶ Figures represented included seizures of more than 100kg only. Calculation of average seizures per country is based on the number of countries in which seizures of more than 100kg have occurred in the respective year. The basis of calculation for the individual years was 3 (2005), 7 (2006), 12 (2007) 7 (2008), 2 (2009), 2 (2010). Seizures in international waters have been allocated to the country closest to the point of interception.

In comparison to the transit routes in Central America, the West African cocaine trade was rather modest. The UNODC estimated that at least 140 tons of cocaine were passing through Mexico alone on their way to the U.S. and Canada annually (UNODC 2011c: 12)⁹⁷. The DEA seized 20 tons of cocaine – more than the estimated annual consumption of the whole West African region⁹⁸ and at least a third of the cocaine trafficked through West Africa on an annual basis – in a single operation on a ship in the Gulf of Mexico⁹⁹.

If anything, in quantitative terms, the West African cocaine trade was an alternative route for cocaine destined to Europe. The bulk of the estimated 130 tons of cocaine consumed on the European continent was still smuggled into Europe directly by sea or air (UNODC 2011c: 12). Whatever caused some cocaine traffickers to funnel their drugs through West Africa was not so attractive or deterring that it could entirely change the dynamics of the cocaine market. The side-effects of drug markets so visible in countries in Central America did not reach Africa. Cocaine trafficking through West Africa did not spark wide-spread violence as it did in other countries along trafficking routes such as Mexico or Guatemala. Although it cannot be fully excluded that involvement in cocaine trafficking provided a motivation for a coup d'état in Guinea-Bissau in 2009¹⁰⁰, drug related crime and violence have never reached the levels of those in Central America or the Caribbean.

Nevertheless, the emergence of large scale cocaine trafficking in West Africa appeared to be alarming, because so few was known about the impacts drug trafficking could have in these states, its societies and the stability in the region. One of the most alarmist voices in the speculations surrounding the new trafficking route in West Africa was the UNODC. The organization had been present in the region since a decade with a regional office in Dakar. In accordance with the negligible drug trafficking problems in the region, capacity building for law enforcement in large scale drug cases had not been a priority of the regional office in Dakar. However, confronted with the large seizures and the need of European law

⁹⁷ Of these 140 tons, 17 tons are estimated to remain in Mexico for domestic consumption, see UNODC (2011c: 12). Although no estimates are available, it is likely that some of the shipments along the 'Pacific route' – as the trafficking route through Central America is called – is directly shipped to the U.S. by sea. This means that the part of the 140 tons estimated being trafficked along the Pacific route does never get Mexico. However, it is likely only a fraction of the shipments do not pass Mexico.

⁹⁸ The UNODC estimates that 13 tons of cocaine are consumed in West and Central Africa. See, UNODC (2011c: 26).

⁹⁹ "DEA, Coast Guard Make Record Maritime Cocaine Seizure", U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration Press Release, March 21, 2007. <http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/states/newsrel/wdo032107.html> [retrieved November 14, 2011].

¹⁰⁰ Interview with UNODC consultant, Bissau, September 07, 2011.

enforcement agencies to make sense of this new situation, the UNODC became involved in framing the new drug situation in the West African region.

The UNODC's framing of the situation in West Africa had three central features which were underlined in extensive reporting on West Africa by the UNODC's office in Dakar and the UNODC's Policy Analysis and Research Branch¹⁰¹. Firstly, the UNODC presented drug trafficking as a threat for the stability of the whole region. Drug trafficking was not just another problem in West Africa, it threatened to destroy what had been achieved in the region in the past decade. In one report, entitled "Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa", the UNODC (2008d: 28) states that the drug trafficking situation in West Africa suggests "a scenario closer to Central America than to the Balkans. Many small operators appear to be trying their hands at drug trafficking (...). Given the economic desperation and entrepreneurial ingenuity of the populace, many more will likely enter the markets in the near future."

Secondly, the UNODC argued that West African states were defenceless against drug traffickers. Lacking the capacity to conduct large scale investigations, the judicial system to convict drug traffickers and the correctional system to detain them, these states had no other choice than to let drug traffickers do their business on their territories. Furthermore, the UNODC argued, for example, that a police officer's salary in a West Africa country amount to only a few grams of street value cocaine and that therefore the potential that drug trafficking could undermine legitimate governance structures in West Africa was especially high, because law enforcement was vulnerable to corruption. This lead Antonio Maria Costa to the conclusion that, "[d]rug traffickers seek the path of least resistance. In Africa, they have found the weakest link. West Africa is a trafficker's paradise, partly because of its geographical position as a link between Europe and South America and partly because its national governments are unable to mount effective security exercises against the drug traders"¹⁰².

Thirdly, the UNODC held European states responsible for the changing drug situation in West Africa. The cocaine seized in West Africa was not intended to be sold on local drug markets. Indeed, in most West African countries there is not much that could actually be called a market for cocaine. In a speech titled "Europe's Cocaine Problem is a Curse...And Not Only for Europe", Costa argues: "[W]ealthy Europeans looking for coke stimulation are destroying entire nations (...) Africa faces a crisis of epic proportions, by and large fuelled by Europe's

¹⁰¹ See, UNODC (2007b, 2007c, 2008d, 2009d, 2010b, 2010c, 2011c).

¹⁰² "Rebels without a clue", The Age, March 11, 2011, Op-ed by Antonio Maria Costa.

cocaine users”¹⁰³. In Costa’s perspective, “Africa is under attack and cannot defend itself” and the “international community is reacting, but not as forcefully as needed”¹⁰⁴. Or as one UNODC report (2008c: 4) has put it:

[T]here is a danger of history repeating itself. In the nineteenth century, Europe’s hunger for slaves devastated West Africa. Today, its appetite for cocaine could do the same. The former Gold Coast is turning into the Coke Coast. The problem is so severe that it is threatening to bring about the collapse of some West African States where weak and corrupt Governments are vulnerable to the corrosive influence of drug money.

Together, the three features of the UNODC’s West African drug trafficking narrative culminated in the portray of a troubled region in which the state was brought at the verge of collapse by drug traffickers and the inactivity of those responsible for the crisis. Antonio Maria Costa concluded that Guinea-Bissau and other West African states were corroded by drug trafficking “to the point that they risk collapse”¹⁰⁵ and that a “narco-attack” on West Africa will “cause political instability, socio-economic hardship and even a regional crisis”¹⁰⁶. In its framing, the UNODC successfully pushed the emergence of a cocaine trafficking route through West Africa into a worst case scenario in which everything seemed to work in favour of drug traffickers and against those interested in a stable region with functioning states. West Africa was portrayed to be in a deep crisis. The conclusion drawn from this scenario was straightforward and nearly inevitable: without decisive action by those responsible for the situation, West Africa could become yet another region devastated by reckless criminals.

In the UNODC’s framing of the West African cocaine trafficking crisis, Guinea-Bissau played a central role. Although the country was neither the place where the largest seizures were made nor the one from which most of the cocaine was seized in Europe, Guinea-Bissau was framed as the hot spot and major hub of cocaine trafficking in West Africa. It became a

¹⁰³ “Europe’s Cocaine Problem is a Curse...And Not Only for Europe”, Statement of Antonio Maria Costa at the Conference for Cocaine, Madrid, November 15, 2007. <http://www.antoniomariacosta.com/> [retrieved November 14, 2011].

¹⁰⁴ “Europe’s Cocaine Problem is a Curse...And Not Only for Europe”, Statement of Antonio Maria Costa at the Conference for Cocaine, Madrid, November 15, 2007. <http://www.antoniomariacosta.com/> [retrieved November 14, 2011].

¹⁰⁵ “Europe’s Cocaine Problem is a Curse...And Not Only for Europe”, Statement of Antonio Maria Costa at the Conference for Cocaine, Madrid, November 15, 2007. <http://www.antoniomariacosta.com/> [retrieved November 14, 2011].

¹⁰⁶ “Africa under Attack”, Statement of Antonio Maria Costa at the ECOWAS High-level Conference on Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa, Praia, October 28, 2008. <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/speeches/2008-28-10.html> [retrieved November 14, 2011].

model case of the West African drug crisis and a *pars pro toto* example of how West Africa was bound to look like, if the West African cocaine transit route was not consequently shut down as soon as possible. Despite its unclear relevance for the organization of trafficking in the region – apart from two seizures of more than 600kg in 2006 and 2007 there is not much verifiable information about drug trafficking on the country's territory – the case of Guinea-Bissau attracted the attention of global media as well as researches claiming that Guinea-Bissau had become “Africa's first narco-state” (Bybee 2009: 18).

There have been good reasons for the concern about the country. Police and other law enforcement or security agencies in the country lacked the knowledge, capacity and equipment to effectively control the Guinea-Bissau's territory. The country's coastline includes more than 80 small islands, many of them remote and uninhabited and some of them with still existing infrastructure from the colonial time. It was suspected that some of the large scale trafficking operations were taking place on these islands far off the capital Bissau, where the capacities of the Navy were concentrated.

On the main land, approximately 3000 police officers were on duty. However, few of them had the equipment and training to become engaged in conducting investigations into drug trafficking cases. One UN Police Advisor estimated that at least three quarter of the current police forces in the country did only have rudimentary qualifications and were not able to contribute to more than very basic community policing services¹⁰⁷. Further, in many police stations even basic equipment such as paper and pens are lacking, which makes it virtually impossible for the police to contribute to the rule of law in the country¹⁰⁸.

Besides geography and training, a big obstacle to an effective ‘defence’ against the ‘narco-attack’ was seen in lacking equipment. The Navy consisted of four boats, of which only one was a boat possibly capable of intercepting boats crossing the Atlantic loaded with cocaine¹⁰⁹. Control over the airspace was rudimentary and did only include civilian aviation. The Air Force's only means consisted of a few pieces of anti-aircraft artillery. Aircrafts and pilots which could have intercepted incoming aircrafts delivering cocaine were missing. On the ground, police forces lacked appropriate vehicles, fuel, communication means and even handcuffs. Another obstacle in the fight against drug trafficking was the lack of a functioning judicial and penitentiary system. The judicial system was considered to be vulnerable to

¹⁰⁷ Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, September 6, 2011.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, September 6, 2011.

¹⁰⁹ As of September 2011. According to Jane's – an private defence intelligence agency –the existing fleet of Guinea-Bissau's Navy is capable of “fishery protection duties and customs patrol” but is “routinely confined to port due to a lack of fuel or maintenance”. See: <http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Sentinel-Security-Assessment-West-Africa/Navy-Guinea-Bissau.html> [retrieved November 14, 2011].

pressure and corruption. However, even if drug traffickers had been convicted, sentences could hardly be executed because a correctional system – apart from a few holding cells in local police stations – were missing¹¹⁰.

However, even if the police and other security agencies were trained and equipped, the judicial system working and a penitentiary system existing, it seemed doubtful that investigations against drug traffickers would have been successful.

Reports indicated that high ranking individuals were involved in drug trafficking. The Chief of the General Staff as well as the Heads of the Navy and the Air Force were suspected to be key figures in the facilitation of drug trafficking through the country¹¹¹. The army was repeatedly involved in irregularities in drug trafficking cases. In the first large seizure in Guinea-Bissau in which the police accidentally discovered 674 kg of cocaine in a car, for example, the army played an important role in covering the seizure and in impeding investigations. In the immediate aftermath of the seizure, police forces stored the cocaine in a safe of the National Treasury because they lacked safe storing facilities on their own. Allegedly, the drugs were removed from this safe in the same night the seizure had taken place by four men in army uniforms and disappeared. Governmental investigations into the removal of the drugs from the safe were repeatedly impeded to the point that the inter-ministerial commission tasked with investigating the case was never able to compile and publish a report “due to reasons beyond our control”, as the spokesman of the ministry of transport has put it¹¹². After the failure of the inter-ministerial commission to produce the report, two high-ranking police officers were dismissed because of their alleged involvement in the case¹¹³. However, no further inquiries were made into the background of the disappearance of the drugs.

In another case, which involved the second-largest cocaine seizure in Guinea-Bissau, four soldiers were arrested together with two foreign nationals in a car loaded with 635kg of cocaine¹¹⁴. Repeatedly, law enforcement officials had been threatened in order to pressure them to abandon investigations into drug cases¹¹⁵ and the military was accused of playing an

¹¹⁰ Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, September 6, 2011.

¹¹¹ “US names two Guinea-Bissau military men ‘drug kingpins’”, BBC News, April 6, 2010.

¹¹² Cited in “GBissau fails to release report on 600kg of missing cocaine”, Agence France Presse English, June 8, 2007.

¹¹³ “GBissau axes two top police officers over missing cocaine”, Agence France Presse English, June 11, 2007.

¹¹⁴ “Guinea-Bissau soldiers arrested with 635 kilos of cocaine”, Agence France Presse English, April 4, 2007.

¹¹⁵ “Guinea-Bissau prosecutor threatened over drugs haul”, Agence France Presse English, July 29, 2008.

“Minister threatened as African drug war heats up”, Associated Press, July 31, 2008.

important role in obstructing probes into drug cases¹¹⁶. Allegedly, government officials to the highest ranks were involved in enabling or at least allowing cocaine trafficking through Guinea-Bissau. In connection to a case of a Venezuelan airplane which landed on an abandoned air strip in Guinea-Bissau allegedly loaded with 500kg of cocaine, attorney general Luis Manuel Cabral was confronted with death threats when an investigation was initiated into the case. According to Cabral, the threats were made because “[t]here are some people among high-ranking figures in politics, the army and the security forces who do not want this investigation to be held”¹¹⁷. After these and other cases of suspected involvement of high-ranking army officers in drug trafficking, the U.S. Treasury had named the heads of the Air Force, Ibraima Papa Camara, and the former Navy chief, Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto ‘drug kingpins’ under the Drug Kingpin Act, which inhibits any business contacts with individuals listed on the so called ‘Drug Kingpin’ list¹¹⁸

The UNODC reported extensively on the situation in Guinea-Bissau and achieved – if consciously or not remains unclear – within a short time that Guinea-Bissau did not only become perceived as a model case of the impact of drug trafficking in the region but as a ‘narco-state’ in which everything was possible for drug traffickers¹¹⁹.

The UNODC was certainly not alone in shaping Guinea-Bissau’s image as a narco-state and the trafficking situation. For example, a senior agent of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) stated: “A place like Guinea Bissau is a failed state anyway, so it’s like moving into an empty house. You walk in, buy the services you need from the government, army and people, and take over. The cocaine can then be stored safely and shipped to Europe (...)”¹²⁰. And in a report sponsored by the International Peace Institute two renowned organized crime analysts compare drug trafficking in the region to an “invisible tide” which is “rising on the shores of West Africa, creeping into its slums, its banks, its courts, its barracks, and its government ministries” (Cockayne and Williams 2009: 1). But the UNODC’s extensive reporting had shaped the perception of what was happening in West Africa with

¹¹⁶ “Guinea Bissau military blocking probe into drug haul“, Agence France Presse, September 9, 2008.

¹¹⁷ Cited in “Guinea-Bissau prosecutor threatened over drugs haul“, Agence France Presse English, July 29, 2008.

¹¹⁸ The full list of 1026 individuals and entities (as of September 21, 2011) sanctioned under the Drug Kingpin Act can be retrieved on the U.S. Treasury’s website: <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/drugs.pdf> [retrieved November 14, 2011].

¹¹⁹ According to Bybee (2009: 18), a narco-state is defined as a state that “has been taken over and is controlled and corrupted by drug cartels and where law enforcement is effectively non-existent”.

¹²⁰ Cited in “Cocaine Trade: How a tiny West African country became the world’s first narco state“, The Observer, March 9, 2008.

detailed accounts and statistical analyses from the ground which it could provide because of its presence in the region. By framing West African cocaine trade as a crisis which potentially could get out of hands at any time, the organization paved the way to take action in the region.

A Drop in the Ocean: Taking Action Against the 'Narco State' in Guinea-Bissau

The UNODC successfully framed the drug trafficking situation in West Africa as a crisis and it was hardly doubted that action had to be taken. Nor was there a doubt that this action had to be taken in West Africa, despite the fact that the root causes of the problem were seen in the demand for cocaine on the European continent.

Drug trafficking and organized crime in West Africa was discussed twice in the Security Council in December 2009 and again in February 2010 as a threat to peace and stability in the region. Based on its reports and the corresponding threat assessments, the UNODC as well as the UN Secretary General called on states to take immediate action to fight the establishment of a cocaine trafficking route in West Africa. In one report to the Security Council, Secretary Ban Ki-moon writes: "Given the country's inability to combat this new phenomenon alone, a collective response is required. Vital technical and financial support from regional and international partners is therefore urgently needed"¹²¹.

The calls of the UNODC and the UN's Secretary General on states to take action did not remain unheard. In the UN, two major initiatives were launched to prevent the perceived crisis in West Africa. At its 51st session the CND adopted resolution 51/18 entitled "strengthening international support for States in West Africa in their efforts to combat drug trafficking". It "invites Member states and relevant IOs to intensify their efforts in support of those West African States most affected by the problem of drug trafficking"¹²².

On the regional level, the UN, under the lead of the UNODC, promoted a campaign named the "West African Coast Initiative". The West African Coast Initiative is an attempt to strengthen the capacities of law enforcement agencies of West African countries with respect to the investigation of drug trafficking and organized crime cases. This includes the creation of so called Transnational Crime Units which should be able to lead intelligence-based investigations and operations. The West African Coast Initiative has been established in December 2008 in the context of the ECOWAS Political Declaration on the Prevention of

¹²¹ Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in that country. S/2007/576, para 33.

¹²² Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Report of the fifty-first session (28 November 2007 and 10-14 March 2008). E/2008/28, E/CN.7/2008/15, p. 41.

Drug Abuse, Illicit Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in West Africa. In February 2010, the “Freetown Commitment”, which marked the official start of the implementation process of the initiative in Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone, was signed¹²³.

In the context of these actions taken by states under the lead of the UN, Guinea-Bissau, as the perceived hot-spot of the West African cocaine trade, received special attention. Even before the CND adopted the resolution 51/18, European states organized, under the auspice of the Portuguese government, a fund-raising conference for Guinea-Bissau in late 2007. The aim of the conference was to secure funding for the implementation of the “Operational plan to support the government of Guinea-Bissau in the fight against drugs” which had been set up by the UNODC and the government of Guinea-Bissau¹²⁴.

In relation to this conference, European states decided to pledge USD 4.3 million paid by the European Commission for a UNODC project in Guinea-Bissau¹²⁵. The project, called “Guinea-Bissau Anti-Trafficking – Establishment of a Specialized Unit within the Judicial Police to investigate and combat Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime”, was set up for a duration of 44 months and was later extended by another twelve months, supported with an additional USD 0.3 million¹²⁶. In total, European states, through the European Commission, plan to spend USD 4.7 million over a period of 56 months for the creation of a police unit trained and equipped to investigate drug trafficking and organized crime cases. Furthermore, the project aims at increasing the local INTERPOL Office’s capacity to provide criminal intelligence about drug trafficking and organized crime in the country¹²⁷.

After all, the constant calls of the UNODC for action seemed to have triggered a response by states. Normatively, they committed themselves to cooperate in order to alleviate the emerging crisis in West Africa. On the operative level, those seen as responsible for the crisis took action and started to assist the endangered region in their fight against the ‘corrosive power’ of drug trafficking.

¹²³ At the time of writing, the Units have not been fully operative in any of the four countries.

¹²⁴ There has been no public accessible report of this conference and neither is the “Operational plan to support the government of Guinea-Bissau in the fight against drugs” publicly available. For more information on the conference see: <http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/index48989EN.html> [retrieved November 14, 2011].

¹²⁵ The UNODC is involved in other projects in Guinea-Bissau concerned with the reform of the penitentiary and judicial system of the country. These projects also contribute to the fight against drug trafficking as they provide the basis for legal system capable of not only investigating cases but also prosecuting them. Furthermore, there is also a project concerned with drug demand reduction.

¹²⁶ The project is commonly known under its project abbreviation GNB/U-44. At the time of writing, while the USD 0.3 Mio had been pledged by the European Commission, the described extension of the project was still pending and depended on evaluation of the project’s first phase. However, the extension is widely expected to take place by UN and European Commission personnel on the ground.

¹²⁷ The project outline is an UNODC internal document, which cannot be publicly retrieved. Statements made here are based on the revised project plan of February 23, 2011. Extension of the project was pending at the time of writing and depended on outcomes of the first phase of the project.

However, the extent to which the reaction of European states on the expertise and principled calls of the UNODC to take action in West Africa was based on the authority of the organization remains questionable. In the light of the problems identified in Guinea-Bissau's law enforcement agencies, pledging USD 4.7 million is merely a drop in the ocean. In a 2007 report about the vulnerabilities of Guinea-Bissau the UNODC identified – besides cultural ties to both Latin America and Europe and a very fragile economy – three problems which were seen to be in direct connection with vulnerability to drug trafficking: a poorly resourced police, an inefficient judicial system and a nearly inexistent correctional system (UNODC 2007c: 14-16). The European Commission's project aimed at building capacities of the police. Other projects were concerned with improvement in the penitentiary system and in the judicial system.

Neither funding nor staffing and the aims of the initial project were in any way adequate to the situation as the UNODC had described it. As the project title indicates, the major aim of the project was to establish, equip and train a specialized police unit capable of handling investigations into drug trafficking. For a deployment in the hotspot of a new trafficking route, which was suspected to develop into a beachhead of Latin American drug traffickers and in which drug trafficking seemed to be intimately related to political power, the UNODC's mission to Guinea-Bissau seemed to be inherently ill-equipped. With these project aims, the 'narco-attack' could hardly be expected to be halted.

Why the Drop Has Not Become a River: Donor Interests in the Fight against the 'Narco Attack'

Explaining why European states decided to engage in Guinea-Bissau with a rather symbolical contribution, is not an easy task. Donor representatives as well as staff of IOs on the ground hesitate to provide explanations for the discrepancy between the alleged magnitude of the crisis and lack of a more comprehensive and more active involvement of West European states into stemming the inflow of drugs into the country and the disentanglement of power and crime. Indeed, while most of those concerned with the drug trafficking situation in the country would agree, off the record, that a mere USD 4.7 million will not drive the traffickers out of the country and put Guinea-Bissau's law enforcement agencies in the capacities to investigate large scale drug cases, providing an explanation for this behaviour of the UNODC's donors seems to be much more difficult.

One reason for this could be seen in the need of European law enforcement agencies to make sense of the situation in the countries along the West African coast. Funding the improvement of information sharing capacities about the situation on the ground is – compared to the creation of new police units – cheaper, more effective and in the direct interests of the donors of the project. In the improvement of the intelligence capacities of Guinea-Bissau's police agencies, USD 4.7 million would do a lot to appease the concerns of those engaged in fighting cocaine inflows into Europe.

Some within the European law enforcement community suspected that Latin American drug traffickers aimed at building a 'beachhead' on the African continent which allowed them nearly uncontrolled and uncontrollable access to European consumer markets¹²⁸. They suspected the situation could evolve similar to the one in Miami in the 1980s, when drug traffickers from Latin America had established a direct and nearly uncontrolled link to the North American consumer market. However, with not much more than some large seizures and limited knowledge about the *modi operandi* of the West African traffickers, their motivations or the actual size of the trafficking route, such allegations could be neither proved nor refuted¹²⁹.

There is an obviously functional aspect of strengthening the intelligence capacities of Guinea-Bissau's law enforcement agencies. Without capacities to gather intelligence about transnational trafficking networks and sharing this information, large scale investigation into organized crime are hardly possible. Equally, in order to investigate drug trafficking cases, police units need to be able to receive and process information produced and shared by police units of other countries. In this sense, investing in the capacity to gather intelligence is favourable both for donors and for receiving countries.

There was also another aspect of the development of the intelligence capacities of Guinea-Bissau's police system. While the *modi operandi* of the drug traffickers shipping cocaine from Latin America to West Africa were believed to be known – seizures indicated that most of the cocaine was smuggled by sea and some by air in modified airplanes – European law enforcement agencies had difficulties in determining how the cocaine was brought from Africa to Western Europe. Better intelligence and increased capacity to share information was also in the interest of European states wanting to know how cocaine was getting into their countries.

¹²⁸ Interview with Swiss government representative, Bern, February 24, 2010.

¹²⁹ Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, September 6, 2011.

However, for those interested in criminal intelligence sharing with Guinea-Bissau, the UNODC's GNB/U-44 project became of more interest only after its initiation. During the first phase of the project, local beneficiaries were extended from the Judicial Police to the locally run INTERPOL office¹³⁰. Similarly, in the context of the West African Coast initiative, Guinea-Bissau and three other West African states have – with the support of the UNODC – started the process of creating so called 'Transnational Crime Units' which are planned to combine the gathering and sharing of critical intelligence on serious crime with the operative capacities not only to investigate but also to intercept transnational trafficking activities.

The attempts to strengthen the integration of Guinea-Bissau's law enforcement agency in the global transgovernmental network of criminal intelligence sharing has so far only seen limited success. The creation of the Transnational Crime Unit is still under way and it is likely that they will not be operative anytime soon. The local INTERPOL office – after having been equipped with a better information system and vehicles which allow its investigators to extend the office's reach beyond the capital Bissau – has received over 200 requests for information from foreign law enforcements services in 2010, which indicates that Guinea-Bissau's law enforcement agencies become better integrated in investigations which cross borders. According to one UN police advisor, however, the office has not responded to any of these requests¹³¹. For the time being, the European law enforcement agencies attempts to make more sense of what is happening along the West African cocaine trafficking route have not been successful. While technical capacities have been deployed, making use of them to reveal the structure and workings of organized crime in Guinea-Bissau and gain leverage in the fight against cocaine traffickers targeting Europe was not possible.

The integration of Guinea-Bissau into transgovernmental networks of criminal intelligence sharing might have been a projected long-term aim of the GNB/U-44 project and the Transnational Crime Units starting to populate the policing landscape in West Africa in the wake of the implementation of the West African Coast Initiative. And if the West African Coast Initiative succeeds, better and more timely information about drug trafficking and its perpetrators could actually become the most important long-term spin-off of international police capacity-building efforts in the region. However, creating a new partner in the global criminal intelligence sharing network was hardly the initial aim of the GNB/U-44 project. Strengthening intelligence capacities was an idea that only gained leverage during project

¹³⁰ Guinea-Bissau's INTERPOL Office had not been included in the initial list of beneficiaries of the GNB/U-44 project. Interview with European Commission representative, Bissau, September 9, 2011.

¹³¹ Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, September 6, 2011.

implementation. It is hardly the explanation for why donors were only modestly interested in supporting Guinea-Bissau in the building of adequate police capacities.

Finding other explanations for the rather half-hearted engagement of Western European states in the fight against the raising ‘narco-states’ along the West African shore is not as simple as one might expect. If the increased trafficking of cocaine through West Africa was of real concern to Western European states, more financial leverage for the UNODC could have been expected. If the concern about Guinea-Bissau was purely symbolic, pledging even USD 4.7 Mio seems to be too much.

Determining how, by whom and why the decision to set up the GNB/U-44 project was made in the way it has been, is difficult because neither are there publicly accessible records of the conference which preceded the decision nor is the European Commission eager to publicly explain the rather modest commitment.

Some individuals with background knowledge on this decision might agree, off the record, that the UNODC’s account on Guinea-Bissau as a state imminently threatened to be taken over by organized criminals and the subsequent media attention the nearly forgotten country has had its effects on taking the decision to become engaged, after all. The UNODC certainly played a role in bringing the issue of the West African cocaine trade on the international and public agenda. And it has played an important role in framing the surprising increase in cocaine seizures in West Africa as an emerging crisis and threat to the stability of the region. Guinea-Bissau had become a model case for West African cocaine trafficking, which could hardly be ignored because of the risk that relations between drug traffickers and government officials could become institutionalized to an extent which could cause problems well beyond its borders¹³². With this, the UNODC had triggered a political process which led to the establishment of a project in the country. That ‘something’ should be done and that Western Europe should play a leading role in taking action seems to have been out of question by the end of 2007.

However, what should be done was another question. While the process of decision-making about the GNB/U-44 project remains largely in the dark, from the project’s initial outline it seemed that main of its aims appealed much more to the interests of European states than to the expectation that a tiny, overstrained West African state needed to be helped out of a crisis which threatened its stability and ability to enforce its laws. As in any police reform project, the project in itself was crafted to achieve a quick change in the trafficking situation in

¹³² “How Britain could save a ,narco-state’”, Prospect, September 5, 2011.

Guinea-Bissau. In the light of the rather obvious but deeply rooted reasons for why Guinea-Bissau had become targeted by Latin American drug traffickers, an initial project duration of four years seems rather short-termed and most of the indicators established to measure success of the project point in the direction that a quick establishment of some sort of functioning law enforcement agencies was the primary aim of those funding the project¹³³. This newly established police unit should also – according to the project outline – be able to effectively conduct operations which measurably decrease cocaine trafficking through the country and – at the same time – increase the amount of seized drugs on the territory of Guinea-Bissau. While this is not necessarily a contradiction because a short-term increase in seizures can actually be interpreted as a sign of declining organized criminal activities – in such an interpretation, an increase in seizures indicates the breaking up of established trafficking routines (see UNODC 2005) – achieving both aims within such a short time period seems to be a very optimistic, if not to say utopian.

According to Mainzinger (2010: 59) there are good reasons why donors push for ‘quick wins’ in police reform projects. Often, quick results in police reform are needed to stabilize the security situation on the ground or fill the gap after law enforcement has collapsed, as it sometimes happens in civil war settings. Quick wins in police reform can help the local population because – although they are often imperfect – they help to restore some of the basic functions of a state. In the case of Guinea-Bissau and its trafficking problem, however, neither were quick wins necessary to restore the security situation nor were they actually helpful for the cause the project had been created to achieve. Drug trafficking was – from all that was known about it – largely confined to the Latin American traffickers which were concerned with shipping cocaine over the Atlantic and a fraction of the local political and military elite involved in facilitating trafficking from Latin America and organizing trafficking further North. Locals involved in trafficking operations were mainly paid in kind, but even these drugs rarely stayed in the country and were shipped to Europe, where the street value of cocaine was significantly higher. An immediate threat to the security situation in the country was not visible. Neither were there increased levels of violence, not to say ‘drug gang’ or ‘drug cartel’ violence, nor did cocaine consumption rise in an alarming way. In this sense, there was no immediate threat to the security in this country which would have made the donors’ push for quick wins necessary or unavoidable. Besides this, the focus on the quick materialization of project aims could also have counterproductive results for the work of the

¹³³ With functioning, things usually taken for granted such as regularly paid salaries and furnished offices are meant here.

specialized police unit. Putting pressure on the process of establishing, equipping and training a police unit specialized on serious crime investigations can lead to shortened vetting procedures, shallow training and lacking operational knowledge. In respect to one of the formulated project aims which states that “the Judicial Police’s Specialized Unit is fully operational and conducts operations” by the end of the projected period one interviewee, off the record and only slightly exaggerating, estimated that it would take several decades before any law enforcement agency in Guinea-Bissau would be able to conduct a sophisticated ‘sting operation’ which could lead to the targeted conviction of organized criminals in the country. Quick wins, however, do also appeal to donors for other reasons. Their administrative system is organized in relatively short planning cycles of two to four years. Within this period of time, donors usually expect to see some achievements in funded projects¹³⁴. In the case of Guinea-Bissau, the rationale of a quick return on investment – which can be demonstrated in a measurable decrease in trafficking activities – seemed to have played a much more important role than the actual need to improve the security situation in the country for donors to insist on a short time frame and ambitious project aims. The aim of the project from a donor perspective was to stop cocaine trafficking through the country, not to divert the threat that a state would be undercut by drug traffickers.

European states have not decided to engage in international cooperation to restore Guinea-Bissau’s law enforcement capabilities because of the authority of the UNODC. The UNODC’s alarmist voice might have made it inevitable that European states take some action. However, the decision how European states started to engage in international cooperation to stem “the invisible tide” (Cockayne and Williams 2009: 1) of cocaine and drug money which was perceived to hit the West African coast had been driven more by what states were willing to do in the perceived major hub of the West African cocaine trade.

And this was, obviously, not much. Donors put the UNODC under pressure to achieve a quick change in the situation despite the huge challenges the organization was confronted with in restoring Guinea-Bissau’s policing capacity. The project’s aims were already in the projects initial set up utopian and the inclusion of new aims and beneficiaries did not make the task of the UNODC easier.

If the West African cocaine trade would have presented an immediate threat to Western European states, one could expect massive investment in Guinea-Bissau’s law enforcement agencies. If lacking intelligence was perceived to be a real problem, more resources could

¹³⁴ Interview with European Commission representative, Bissau, September 9, 2011.

have been expected to be deployed to make the local INTERPOL office work. If West African cocaine trafficking posed a threat to public health, security or law and order in Europe, one could have expected public outcries about the rather minimalist engagement in ‘Africa’s first narco-state’. Instead, donors scrambled – while the project was on going – new project aims under the GNB/U-44 umbrella without significantly increasing the projects funding and without being criticized for it by the UNODC or the media so eager to report about Guinea-Bissau falling prey to Latin American drug traffickers. Including intelligence sharing into the project might have raised the appearance that the project was functionally coherent – indeed, trafficking can hardly be seriously challenged without useable intelligence and its timely availability – but made it even more difficult to achieve anything by the project. Such behaviour suggests that donors were much more concerned with doing something in Guinea-Bissau after all than with achieving something in particular by channelling project funds into the country through the UNODC. What this ‘something’ was, however, remains largely unclear. This is partly due to the fact, that it is difficult to unravel what the intentions of those making the decisions to pledge funds for a UNODC project in Guinea-Bissau were. However, as I will argue in the following section, this is also because their intentions were unclear at the outset of the project and remained so while the project was running.

Doing the Dirty Work for States: Negotiating Allocation of Project Resources

When the UNODC started to implement projects in Guinea-Bissau in early 2008, it entered a complex political landscape populated by IOs concerned with a wide range of problems. Guinea-Bissau, being one of the poorest countries in the world, had hosted a bulk of international governmental and nongovernmental organizations in the past decade, which were concerned with everything from environmental issues to re-building public infrastructure which had been destroyed during the civil war in 1998. Local government officials were used to be working with staff of IOs and accustomed to the procedures by which projects were implemented and donor money spent.

Internationally assisted security sector reform, the realm of international technical cooperation in which the UNODC’s police capacity building mission fitted in best, had already been an issue in the country before. Although on a very much lower profile than the UNODC’s police capacity building projects, Guinea-Bissau had hosted the United Nations Integrated Peace-Building Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) since 1999¹³⁵. The UNIOGBIS, initially

¹³⁵ Established by Security Council Resolution 1233 (1999). Until 2009, the UN office in Guinea-Bissau was called United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS). The name was changed

mandated to establish the political framework and leadership to enable general and presidential election in the country after the end of the civil war¹³⁶ in the country, had become, among others, involved in Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau after its mandate was extended in 2004 and 2009¹³⁷. It was in this institutional context that the UNODC had to integrate its project concerned with creating the capacity of Guinea-Bissau's Judicial Police to conduct large scale investigations against drug traffickers and other organized criminals. What had been largely ignored in the UNODC's reports on the drug trafficking situation – that there was international assistance on the ground and that IOs were involved exactly with those players who were accused of facilitating trafficking in the country – would soon become problematic for the organizations work and success in the implementation of the project.

Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau, as in many other post-conflict societies, concentrated on the reform of the armed forces. The military elite had played a decisive role during the civil war¹³⁸ and in the peace-building process that followed the war. It had proved to be factor of destabilization – at least in the perspective of the international community – as it had removed three elected presidents from their position in the history of the country.

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of soldiers were therefore priorities of the United Nations in the run up to the first elections after the civil war and had remained so after the extension of UNIOGBIS' mandates. Demobilization presented a thorny issue because affiliation with the army provided especially officers with social status¹³⁹ and because the question of financing pensions for demobilized soldiers was not resolved for nearly a decade¹⁴⁰.

with Security Council Resolution 1876 (2009) in accordance with a recommendation in the Secretary General's report on the situation in the country of June 2009 (S/2009/302).

¹³⁶ The civil war in Guinea-Bissau lasted from June 1998 to May 1999. It was initiated by a military coup attempt against President João Bernardo Vieira. During the civil war, thousands died, most of the public infrastructure of the country was destroyed and nearly a quarter of its population was internally displaced.

¹³⁷ See, Security Council Resolution 1580 (2004) and Security Council Resolution 1876 (2009).

¹³⁸ The army had played an important role in Guinea-Bissau since the liberation wars in the 1960s and 1970s and enjoyed strong historical legitimacy during decades. On the history of Guinea-Bissau, see Lobban and Mendy (1996). Today, the army is still considered one of the main power centres of the state. Interview with the Director of the National Institute for Studies and Research (Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisa – INEP), Bissau, Sept 8, 2011.

¹³⁹ Guinea-Bissau's army has more officers than non-commissioned officers and soldiers. Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, September 5, 2011.

¹⁴⁰ At the time of writing, the process of establishing a pension fund for demobilized members of the army was still on-going. Negotiations for the establishment of the fund had taken more than five years. So far, approximately 50% of the amount needed to establish the army's pension fund has been allocated. Interview with the Director of the National Institute for Studies and Research (Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisa – INEP), Bissau, Sept 8, 2011.

In this environment, the reform of the police, the judicial system and the penitentiary system had long played only a minor role in the UN's engagement in the country. Before the UNODC started its projects in the country, UNIOGBIS employed a single law enforcement advisor¹⁴¹. Although this law enforcement adviser was already concerned with drug trafficking through the country before the two large seizures in 2006 and 2007, the UNIOGBIS did not show a particular interests in developing this issues, because, among other reasons, the suspicion that the military elite was involved in drug trafficking was already established before talks about the 'narco-state' had raised world-wide public attention¹⁴². Making such allegations public was seen as a threat to the achievements that had been made in the establishment of relations with the military elite¹⁴³.

Before the UNODC published its first alarming reports about the drug trafficking situation in West Africa and placed Guinea-Bissau in the centre of its reporting, the UN's mission in Guinea-Bissau had already been established for several years and had developed an understanding of its mission in the country. Drugs did virtually play no role in this understanding, the attempts to reform the security sector resembled those made in other countries of the region and staff on the ground largely lacked a sense of being involved in an environment defined by revenues from drug trafficking and organized crime activities¹⁴⁴.

Bringing police reform into a Security Sector Reform context is a task which can be met by a range of impediments from all involved parties – i.e. donor countries, local governments and IOs. The Security Council had assigned the Secretary-General to strengthen the UN's efforts to reform the judicial system of the country and assist local authorities in building capabilities to fight drug trafficking in Guinea-Bissau in its resolution 1876 (2009). Furthermore, in consultation with the Secretary General, the European Commission and some European states had recognized the need and responsibility to become engaged in police reform in Guinea-Bissau¹⁴⁵. However, such general commitment to engage in reforming the police of an entire country are only the beginning of a series of more detailed planning and implementation steps riddled with problems and frictions¹⁴⁶.

¹⁴¹ Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, Sept 8, 2011.

¹⁴² Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, Sept 8, 2011.

¹⁴³ Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, Sept 8, 2011.

¹⁴⁴ There had been allegation that the army's establishment was involved in small arms trafficking in the region before drug trafficking became an issue in Guinea-Bissau. See, for example, Kohnert (2010).

¹⁴⁵ "Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in that country", S/2009/302, p 6.

¹⁴⁶ See, for a general overview over problems of police reform in the context of security sector reform, Marenin (2007) and Mobekk (2005).

In Guinea-Bissau, police reform was met with the problem that the resources and expertise needed to achieve a comprehensive reform of the police in the country were not available. In its resolution 1876 the Security Council defined eleven tasks concerning Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau. Of these tasks, five were directly or indirectly connected to reforming the police of the country. These five tasks did not only include building capacities to fight drug trafficking and organized crime, but also more general aims such as the creation of an environment in which the respect for the rule of law is guaranteed¹⁴⁷. This meant, besides creating organizational structures capable of conducting large scale investigations, to virtually reorganize the entire police forces of the country.

Since 2007, when a single UN police advisor was engaged in the country, the UN's police mission to Guinea-Bissau had been enlarged but, it is still small compared to the challenges a police reform in the country is facing. This leads to a situation in which the UN has to set priorities on certain projects and pool the available resources in order to achieve at least some of the aims the Security Council has issued to the Secretary General. However, even when available resources are joined across the different UN organizations on the ground, staff often lacks key qualifications to advise local counterparts in comprehensive police reform. For such a task, not only specific knowledge on policing is required, but also expertise in organizational development, accounting, in local and international politics or project management (Mainzinger 2010: 70). These qualifications are largely lacking among the UN-staff in Guinea-Bissau¹⁴⁸. This, however, is not a specific problem of police reform in Guinea-Bissau but one that is inherent to many police reform attempts lead by IOs (Mainzinger 2010: 70). The GNB/U-44 project did not take place in an isolated context. It was part of the decade-long international engagement of IOs in Guinea-Bissau and the efforts to reform the security sector of the country. The available resources needed to be pooled, to achieve at least some progress in the policing situation in the country and the available expertise in the form of UN police advisors was not fully adequate for the situation on the ground. It was in this context that the project had to be implemented.

Achieving rapid change in the drug trafficking situation in Guinea-Bissau was the stated aim of donors, when they decided to invest into the creation of a specialized police unit concerned with drug trafficking in the country. The drug trafficking situation was – and still is –

¹⁴⁷ Security Council Resolution 1876 (2009), S/RES/1876 (2009), p.2-3.

¹⁴⁸ Interview with UNODC staff, Bissau, September 6, 2011.

perceived to be grave and constituting a threat to stability in the country¹⁴⁹. Delegation of the task to the UNODC was, among others, an expression of this expectation. The European Commission did lack the expertise and staff to implement a police reform mission and expected the UNODC to have the organizational ability and local expertise to perform such an endeavour in Guinea-Bissau. Furthermore, no European country was willing to provide bilateral technical assistance for reforming the police in the country¹⁵⁰. With no other option readily available to take immediate action, the UNODC was a viable partner for the European Commission for the implementation of its plan to improve Guinea-Bissau's drug law enforcement capacity by creating a specialized police unit concerned with investigating large scale drug trafficking cases.

These are largely technical goals which were planned to be achieved by providing technical advice to local government authorities in charge of creating and maintaining such a specialized unit. In the case of GNB/U-44 this was the Judicial Police of Guinea-Bissau, which is in charge of investigating drug trafficking and organized crime cases and the local INTERPOL office, which is responsible for information exchange with foreign law enforcement agencies.

However, as one UNIOGBIS staff has put it, no police reform is purely technical¹⁵¹. In many ways, those charged with implementing projects in the police sector reform in Guinea-Bissau were concerned with decision-making of political relevance. This is not only because Security Sector Reform always touches the power balance in a country, as one UN staff consultant has put it¹⁵², but also because donors insist on the 'local ownership' of such projects.

According to Nathan (2007) 'local ownership' is a necessary condition for successful and accepted Security Sector Reform. Local ownership is associated with increased legitimacy of the reform process and enhanced commitment to the outputs of these processes by those who have to bear its consequences¹⁵³. If principles of local ownership are disrespected, Nathan (2007: 3) argues "domination and paternalism by external actors generate resentment, resistance and inertia among local actors" and the steps to reform the security sector of a country "are unlikely to be implemented properly and sustained". Local ownership, therefore, is not only a matter of respect towards local actors but also of prudence of donor governments

¹⁴⁹ Interview with European Commission staff, Bissau, September 9, 2011.

¹⁵⁰ Portugal is now providing some direct technical assistance to Guinea-Bissau's judicial police. Interview with UNODC staff, Bissau, September 6, 2011.

¹⁵¹ Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, September 8, 2011.

¹⁵² Interview with UNODC staff, Bissau, September 6, 2011.

¹⁵³ For a similar position see OECD (2005).

and their responsibility toward taxpayers. Without granting full local ownership, investments in Security Sector Reform are likely to be wasted.

The possible disadvantages that come with respect for the principles of local ownership – prolongation of reform processes and lacking control over spending of donated funds – are, in this perspective, only short-termed and a matter of perception. If due process ensures better outcomes, being patient and accepting that funds are spent according to local rather than external agendas are acceptable price tags for increased security in a country.

Local ownership puts staff of IOs in a position in which the process of project implementation has to be negotiated with those in charge in the local government and administration. At the heart of local ownership is the idea that local actors design reforms and external actors provide them with the resources – material and immaterial – necessary to make this process work. In this sense, entering negotiations with local governments and administration is the part IOs play in Security Sector Reform.

However, insistence on local ownership puts IOs as service providers in a weak position between donor and local government interests. Both donors and local actors inevitably have their own agendas which can diverge. If this is the case, IOs can experience severe tensions in project implementation because they have to be attuned to two agendas none of which they are likely to contribute to the satisfaction of those behind these agendas.

Donors expect IOs to implement the projects they are paying for efficiently and effectively, which means – at least in projects largely perceived to be of technical nature as in the case of GNB/U-44 – that donors expect a timely implementation according to predefined technical standards and results in measurable indicators. In the case of the GNB/U-44 project this meant that the European Commission expected the UNODC to create a small and effective police unit equipped with all resources necessary to conduct and complete complex investigations within 44 months where no such structure had existed before. It was in this context that one UNIOGBIS staff associated to the implementation process of GNB/U-44 stated that UN organizations operating in the field should not and cannot be reduced to “charity organizations” but have to insist on technically feasible solutions which can be justified towards donors even against the preferences of local counterparts¹⁵⁴.

On the other hand, the Head of Guinea-Bissau’s Judicial Police – the major local counterpart of the UNODC in the GNB/U-44 project – is not necessarily interested in establishing the specialized police unit exactly the way donors have pre-defined the project. This is not due to the lack of political will to conduct any kind of reform in the Judicial Police but because he

¹⁵⁴ Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, September 4, 2011.

had different priorities in how the organization of the Judicial Police is to be set up¹⁵⁵. For example, the unit had been expanded by the Head of the Judicial Police from a planned strength of 35 officers to a current 110 without an increase in funding for equipment or facilities. The specialized unit as it exists now is oversized and underfunded to effectively perform its mission¹⁵⁶.

Furthermore, some of the central technical equipment needed to effectively investigate drug trafficking cases had not been allocated three months before the end of the regular project duration. Especially, a drug analysis laboratory could not be established. Such a laboratory, however, is essential in the investigation of drug trafficking cases because the procedures used to verify drugs in the immediate aftermath of a seizure are not accepted as prove before court. Capacity to test for drugs according to procedures approved by court practice is therefore essential for keeping suspected traffickers in custody. Despite the relative low financial costs of establishing the laboratory of USD 50'000, the UNODC had not succeeded in the first 40 months of the project to establish the laboratory within the Judicial Police or initiate negotiations between the Judicial Police and the Ministry of Health for a common use of existing laboratories which would have the capacity to perform approved drug testing¹⁵⁷.

Additionally, the so called 'mobile units' of the specialized branch of the Judicial Police had not been established in the first 40 months of the project. These mobile units were an integral part of the project because they would have investigations and interdictions of drug trafficking to be more flexible in the regions of Guinea-Bissau. The current unit, as it has been established after 40 months, is concentrated in the headquarters of the Judicial Police in the country's capital of Bissau. Mobile units of five to six officers, equipped with adequate shelter, vehicles and a speed boat, should have enabled the specialized unit to decentralize its activities and interdict drug shipments upon arrival in the more remote areas of the country. Furthermore, the mobile units were also planned to build the core of a permanent decentralization of investigation capacities. For this, mobile units are foreseen to obtain permanent housing and move their mobile shelters in to other regions of the country. With this strategy, investigation capacity could be further decentralized and reach all regions of the country. After 40 months of the project and 4 months before the end of the first phase of the project, the mobile shelters had not been delivered to the Judicial Police. Neither had adequate

¹⁵⁵ Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, September 4, 2011.

¹⁵⁶ The loss of efficiency is not only due to lack of equipment. According to one UNIOGBIS staff, a unit of 35 officers would have been sufficient to provide basic drug trafficking and organized crime investigation capacities in a country with a territory of 36'125 km². A larger unit creates unnecessary administrative tasks which could make the unit less effective. Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, September 5, 2011.

¹⁵⁷ Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, September 5, 2011.

locations for the first two mobile units been evaluated. And even if the establishment of the two mobile units would still succeed before the end of the project's first phase, UN police advisors doubt that the specialized unit could make adequate use of them because it lacks the technical capacity to transmit information necessary for investigation to the mobile unit and supplying the mobile units with food and fuel¹⁵⁸.

In these three examples, resources of the project were not allocated in the way preferred by the European Commission and UN (including UNODC) staff issuing advice to the Head of the Judicial Police¹⁵⁹. Both the reason for why the Head of the Judicial Police had an interest in a larger, centralized unit with an integrated drug testing laboratory as well as who actually took the decisions to allocate resources not according to the preferences of the donor can hardly be determined. In this and similar cases of decision-making, it is often difficult to reconstruct decision-making processes ex-post because they often resemble what Lipson (2007: 85-87) has called 'organized anarchy', denominating decision-making under the conditions of unclear preferences, unclear technologies of decision-making, fluid participation and ambiguity. In decision-making processes shaped by organized anarchy, the question why a decision was taken and who actually has taken the decision often cannot be determined¹⁶⁰.

However, in all these examples, the reasons for the failure to allocate decisive resources according to the projects aims or advice from UN police experts are not uniquely to be found in the lacking will or deviating preferences of local counterparts. An equally important reason was that international police advisors were put in a weak position by conflicting expectations of donors about their role in the process of implementing the project. On the one hand, the UNODC as the leading organization in this project is expected to allocate project funding efficiently. This means that allocation of resources should be guided by the expertise of the police advisors on the ground in order to achieve the best results in the creation of a specialized police unit under the given financial situation of the project. On the other hand, the UN is expected to respect the basic principles of 'local ownership' which include that initiatives in security sector reform should be guided by local government representatives rather than planned from the scratch and implemented according to this plan by IOs or other external partners.

¹⁵⁸ Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, September 6, 2011.

¹⁵⁹ Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, September 8, 2011 and Interview with European Commission representative, Bissau, September 9, 2011.

¹⁶⁰ For the purpose of this study, answering the question why preferences of donors and local government representatives differ is not as important as demonstrating that diverging interests exist and what effect they have on those put in charge of implementing the project by donors.

It would be too harsh to claim that by demanding sound technical implementation and local ownership at the same time donors deliberately sabotaged the implementation process of their own project. But it is not too much to say that putting the UNODC in the role of a guardian of due process and the role of a watchdog of sound technical implementation at the same time has brought staff on the ground in an inconvenient position. Between these two – often only rudimentary defined – roles of the UNODC in police reform in Guinea-Bissau, the room of manoeuvre of the organization's staff is small. The staff of the organization – the involved police advisors – are put in a weak position in negotiations about resource allocation because they are under pressure by donors to allocate resources and thereby transforming funding into measurable outcomes and at the same time confronted with local actors recalcitrant to accept pre-defined organizational solutions which do not apply to their interests¹⁶¹.

The problem with this weak position is that those leading the negotiations are not in the position to make use of their already small room of manoeuvre because they had been assigned a technical and not a political task. In these political tasks, what one UNIOGBIS staff has called the 'soft factors' of project implementation – knowledge of the local political landscape, the ways by which influence on local actors can be facilitated, knowledge about the problems and preferences of the local counterparts – are often more important than technical expertise for a successful implementation of the project¹⁶². However, most police advisors are technical experts, lacking diplomatic training and experience as well as the information to fully make use of these 'soft factors' in negotiations¹⁶³. Learning processes on the side of international police advisors directly engaged in resource allocation negotiations are an essential part of the explanation for why resources are often not allocated as effectively and efficiently as donors expect them to be.

If such learning processes are joined with the pressure by donors to allocate resources due to short or expiring project deadlines, the room of manoeuvre of staff on the ground is further limited. Often, protracting the allocation of funding with unclear proposals is a way by which recalcitrant local actors put additional pressure on police advisors in order to achieve reform outcomes which are in their interest. With virtually no room of manoeuvre in such situations, it is often the better choice for staff of IOs on the ground to allocate resources in ways not in line with their own expertise than not to allocate resources at all because 'quick wins' are important for donors.

¹⁶¹ This is not to say that local governments or other local counterparts lack the will to reform. However, they might have different interests in the reform process than donors or external advisors.

¹⁶² Interview with UNIOGBIS staff, Bissau, September 8, 2011.

¹⁶³ For a similar argument, see Mainzinger (2010: 70).

Although donors complain that resources are wasted if they are not allocated according to the project plans, they are also involved in doing so. In the case of the GNB/U-44 project, the European Commission became directly involved in negotiations about resource allocation toward the end of the first phase of the project, starting “to do the UNODC’s job”¹⁶⁴ in order to achieve at least the delivery of equipment for the mobile units before the end of the project duration. Even within the European Commission’s mission to Guinea-Bissau – which is in charge of overseeing the project’s progress – staff doubts that this will be a sustainable solution. However, having the equipment for the mobile units delivered seems to be better even to the major donor of the project than not having achieved anything visible in the past 40 months.

In sum, the major tasks of IO staff engaged in the GNB/U-44 project was to define – in negotiations with local counterparts and under the pressure of donors – what is possible and what is not possible in reforming and creating the capacities of Guinea-Bissau’s police to fight serious crime and especially drug trafficking. This leads staff on the ground away from the tasks they have actually been assigned to and involves them in political decision-making. Instead of providing technical advice, they become players in the political game surrounding the allocation of resources and makes them responsible for the visible ‘quick wins’ states expect when delegating to IOs. Obtaining this role, however, includes learning processes on the side of IO staff, which do prolong implementation processes. Under these cross-cutting pressures, it becomes difficult to achieve what states expect from them – an allocation of resources which guarantees sustainable capacity building in the law enforcement sector.

More Dirty Work To Do: Taking the Blame for Failure in Fighting the ‘Narco-State’

States sent the UNODC to Guinea-Bissau to fight large scale drug trafficking in the country. As a corollary, because drug trafficking was assumed to be intimately with local government institutions, the UNODC was also part of the fight against the ‘narco-state’ Guinea-Bissau. Driving drug trafficking out of the country would also have ended the alleged involvement of local government institutions into drug trafficking.

If, to what extent and how the drug trafficking situation has changed in Guinea-Bissau in recent years cannot be fully assessed for simple reasons. Since the two large seizures in 2006 and 2007 no other large seizure had been made in the country and – due to weaknesses in the

¹⁶⁴ Interview with European Commission representative, Bissau, September 9, 2011.

judicial system discussed above – there had been no convictions for large scale drug trafficking in local courts. In the first half of the year 2011, cocaine seizures have amounted to 600g. This is hardly what one expects in a so called ‘narco-state’. Assessing the drug situation in a country in which information about how much drugs are flowing through the country and who is involved to what extent in the facilitation of trafficking is largely based on speculations is therefore difficult.

Despite the dramatic decrease of seizures in the country, few believe that the problem of the West African cocaine trafficking has been solved or even just successfully limited. Three interpretations of the decline in seizures in Guinea-Bissau and West Africa in general have been put forward.

The first interpretation, and somewhat the ‘official’ position of the UNODC, is that the achieved improvements in policing capacities have pushed cocaine trafficking further South along the African Atlantic shore¹⁶⁵. In this interpretation, the decline seizures are the expression of a ‘balloon-effect’ in which increasing law enforcement capacities push drug trafficking into regions in which such capacities are still lacking.

Secondly, some believe that drug trafficking has become more and better organized because of the global attention the ‘narco-state’ rhetoric has raised on Guinea-Bissau. In this interpretation, drug traffickers and their co-conspirators within the local institutions have changed their *modi operandi* in drug trafficking in order to become less detectable, but drugs are still flowing into the country. What has changed is the capacity of Latin American drug traffickers and their local counterparts to conceal what they are doing.

Thirdly, others believe that the capacity of the local police is still underdeveloped to a degree to which investigation of large drug trafficking cases is not possible. In this respect, one representative of the European Commission in charge of overseeing the development of police reform in Guinea-Bissau called the seizures produced by Guinea-Bissau’s Judicial Police “ridiculous”¹⁶⁶ and described the GNB/U-44 project a nearly complete failure.

What all three interpretations of the decrease of seizures have in common is that they are speculations. They assume that drug trafficking is an on-going business in the country (or at least the region) despite the fact that measurable indicators point in a different direction¹⁶⁷.

¹⁶⁵ See, for example, the respective statement of Antonio Maria Costa in a press briefing on the launch of the West African Coast Initiative, July 8, 2009. See: http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2009/090708_West_Africa.doc.htm [retrieved November 14, 2011].

¹⁶⁶ Interview with European Commission representative, Bissau, September 9, 2011.

¹⁶⁷ A fourth interpretation would be that there are indeed no large scale drug trafficking operations in Guinea-Bissau anymore and that the ‘narco-state’ rhetoric was heavily exaggerated from the beginning. While some agree to the latter, few do so in consideration of the former. Those who do, argue that it was nearly impossible to

This is certainly in the nature of the business with which these interpretations are concerned. Drug trafficking is purposely concealed. However, assessing failure and success on the basis of speculations about the development of a complex criminal endeavour such as large scale drug trafficking does hardly allow to develop a deeper understanding of what dysfunctional IOs can achieve in the provision of services.

Other indicators established to measure the outcomes of GNB/U-44 in the outline of the project are equally unhelpful to develop an understanding of the impact of the project. The GNB/U-44 was initiated as a technical cooperation project and it was the European Commission's stated aim to achieve technical goals, such as the creation of investigation capacities and integration in international criminal intelligence sharing. However, as has been argued above, technical cooperation has always a political dimension. This political dimension, which is often overlooked by donors, does also have to be taken into account when asking about the successes and failures of the UNODC in Guinea-Bissau.

From a technical perspective, few of the project aims had actually been achieved¹⁶⁸. While a specialized police unit to investigate drug trafficking and organized crime cases has been created within Guinea-Bissau's Judicial Police, the unit lacks operational capabilities to perform effective investigations.

The European Commission, as the major donor of the project, largely sees the UNODC as responsible for the failure to achieve the project aims¹⁶⁹. From the point of view of the donor, the UNODC is not putting enough pressure on its local counterparts to implement the project according to the project plan. This, in the view of the European Commission, leads to delays in the implementation of the project because the lack of pressure creates room for negotiations about resource allocation between the organization and its local counterparts – in the case of the GNB/U-44 project the Head of the Judicial Police. Furthermore, internal management of the project is seen as part of the failure to achieve the goals of the project. For example, the UNODC's project manager in Guinea-Bissau has no control over the finances of the project. Project expenses are administrated by the regional office of the organization in Dakar, which leads to both delays and a lack of room of manoeuvre for the project manager in negotiations with local counterparts. This also threatens the consistency of the project as project managers frequently leave their position in frustration because of the lack of autonomy they

avoid accidental seizures if a large amount of cocaine was actually trafficked through the country and that the amount of cocaine seized when leaving the country should therefore be larger.

¹⁶⁸ Interview with European Commission representative, Bissau, September 9, 2011.

¹⁶⁹ This and the following information have been stated in an Interview with a European Commission representative, Bissau, September 9, 2011.

experienced. In the years 2009 to 2011, the GNB/U-44 project had been managed by five different project managers. In respect to the financial reporting, the European Commission – who is one of the UNODC’s most important donors – had to put diplomatic pressure on the UNODC’s headquarter in Vienna to make sure that the requested annual reports of the projects were delivered. According to one representative of the European Commission in Guinea-Bissau responsible for overseeing the GNB/U-44 project, it is only because the European Commission has an agreement with the United Nations which inhibits the European Commission to request external audits of UN agencies that mismanagement of the GNB/U-44 project has had no further consequences to UNODC, so far. However, in the view of those responsible for overseeing the project, the UNODC is a “black hole” for donor funding¹⁷⁰.

The perspective of UNODC and other UN staff on success and failure in fighting the ‘narco-state’ in Guinea-Bissau differs. Technical goals of the project – when measured by the indicators defined in the project outline – have not been achieved. But this is also seen as an outcome of expectations donors have put in the project. Creating, equipping and operating a specialized police unit is a task that can hardly be achieved within 44 months in any institutional and political context and certainly not in one which is marked by internal political conflicts among local decision-makers and a nearly complete lack of capacity at the beginning of the project. Some of the processes necessary to establish a police unit – such as the vetting of its members – are time consuming but of high importance for the future capacity and acceptance of the unit¹⁷¹. Further, some of the decisions that had to be taken in the establishment of a functioning police unit are viewed as political issues by local counterparts.

Besides vetting, which is a politically sensitive issue¹⁷², more technical issues – often considered to be unproblematic by donors – can become part of negotiations between staff of IOs and their local counterparts. The drug testing laboratory in the case of the GNB/U-44 project is a good example for this. Confronted with a political and institutional setting most UN police advisors are not familiar with and with only a few having expertise in leading negotiations about resource allocation, the process of implementing project goals can easily become protracted.

¹⁷⁰ Interview with European Commission representative, Bissau, September 9, 2011.

¹⁷¹ Mainzinger (2010: 77-78) argues that vetting processes are of utmost importance because the integrity of police officers is essential to the acceptance of police forces especially in contexts in which the police was involved in corruption, human rights abuses and other criminal offences.

¹⁷² In another police reform project in Guinea-Bissau which was concerned with community policing – the so called ‘model police station’ project – vetting procedures were discussed at the level of the under-secretary of state in the Ministry of the Interior, see Mainzinger (2010: 78).

In this sense, technical indicators are unhelpful to understand the achievement of the project because the UNODC has failed to achieve them is neither coincidental nor exclusively an outcome of organizational failure. By introducing the expectation that the UNODC will be following local ownership principles during the implementation process, the task of the organization's staff has changed from a technical into a political one. This politicization of the process turned the technical aspects of the project into a matter of negotiations and put the staff on the ground under pressure to fulfil rather political than technical functions.

From a perspective less concentrated on the achievement of measurable change on a range of indicators, however, there are at least some achievements. After all, that a specialized unit was created within a relatively short time is in itself an achievement, even if the unit might not look like the European Commission has wanted it to look. Further, the constant involvement of local counterparts – such as the Head of the Judicial Police and the Director of the INTERPOL office – with UN police advisors is seen to have a positive effect on transparency in decision-making on questions of project implementation. Even among donors, it is acknowledged that the working relationships between staff of IOs and their local counterparts makes decisions in the implementation process less erratic and decision-making procedures “more orthodox”, as one representative of the European Commission has put it¹⁷³. Others see the increased transparency and accountability which come with established working relationships as well as the exchange of experience as a central achievement of the police reform projects in Guinea-Bissau¹⁷⁴. And the director of the local INTERPOL office – one of the beneficiaries of the GNB/U-44 project – emphasized that good working relationships with international police advisors created the basis for learning processes within the agency which can lead – together with the provision of basic equipment and training – to improvements of the investigation capacities of the organization¹⁷⁵.

Donors, staff of IOs and local ‘beneficiaries’ of the project all have their own perspective on the difficulties and achievements of GNB/U-44. From a technical point of view, not much has changed in Guinea-Bissau's capacity to conduct complex investigations in drug trafficking and organized crime cases. While the specialized unit has been created, it is currently not capable to operate in the manner imagined by the major donor of the GNB/U-44 project. From the organization's perspective, the question is, if the predefined project aims were based

¹⁷³ Interview with European Commission representative, Bissau, September 9, 2011.

¹⁷⁴ Interview with UNODC staff, Bissau, September 6, 2011. See, also, Mainzinger (2010: 78) for comments on similar effects of the ‘model police station’ project.

¹⁷⁵ Interview with Director INTERPOL Office Guinea-Bissau, September 7, 2011.

on realistic expectations and planning. Creating, equipping and training a police unit specialized on drug trafficking and organized crime does take time, especially when mastering the ‘soft factors’ of security sector reform on the side of IO staff is a major prerequisite for the successful implementation of a project.

Answering the question how the UNODC has been fighting the ‘narco-state’, however, is not a matter of perspective but a matter of the mechanisms at work in this case. The UNODC (and its partners in the GNB/U-44 project) has been doing the dirty work for states in Guinea-Bissau. Through the European Commission, Western European states have delegated the task of accomplishing a mission in which many things were undefined at its outset. Defining the exact parameters of the project was part of the process of implementing the project. It had to be negotiated with the local counterparts in the field. At the same time, donors expected its international partners to accomplish project goals within the time frame defined at the outset of the project, despite the fact that the pre-defined goals of the project were overly optimistic and were not applicable to the situation in Guinea-Bissau.

Denominating these activities as ‘dirty work’ does not refer to the fact that the UNODC had to negotiate the terms of project implementation with its local counterparts on the ground. This is part of the process of project implementation. Rather, the ‘dirty work’ the UNODC had to do on the ground is defining the interests of donors which they did not have at the outset of the project during the implementation process. Ex-post evaluation of the UNODC’s work does not take into account that the project was ill-equipped to achieve its goals with both the time and the financial resources to achieve its goals from the outset.

In short, the GNB/U-44 project was largely symbolic action by Western European states. A real interest in changing the drug trafficking and policing situation in Guinea-Bissau was largely lacking – except for the interest in integrating the countries’ law enforcement agencies into worldwide information sharing. The project was more about ‘doing something’ against the raise of a ‘narco-state’ in West Africa than about achieving particular outcomes. The UNODC and other UN agencies on the ground were left with the task to make ‘something meaningful’ out of this situation. However, if what the organization achieved was in the interests of its donors could only be identified during the process of implementation.

Dysfunctional IOs might be the best places for states to dump problems on which they want to react but do only have rudimentary defined preferences on how they want to react. Dysfunctional IOs are often weak political actors unable to resist state demands and expectations. Contrary to what Barnett and Coleman (2005) have observed in the case of the

INTERPOL, which was able to ‘turn the table’ on states, the UNODC, at least in the case of the GNB/U-44 project, had to play the role states had assigned to the organization. This means that the UNODC, despite having affected some change in Guinea-Bissau and despite the fact that it was not in control of many of the factors which contributed to the perceived failure of the GNB/U-44 project, will be held responsible for those failures.

States and the Functions of a Dysfunctional Political Actor

That the UNODC is engaged in Guinea-Bissau is uncontroversial. This is not surprising because the UNODC has largely framed cocaine trade through West Africa as a crisis which needed immediate reaction if drug trafficking should not evolve into a long-term threat to the stability of the region. Any reaction by states, it seemed, was perceived to be better than none.

There are, however, controversial dimensions of the UNODC’s engagement. Firstly, what the UNODC does in Guinea-Bissau and other West African states is largely symptom control. In a global perspective, most cocaine is still getting to Europe without making a detour through West Africa. Although the establishment of a new trafficking route through West Africa is likely to have been caused by increased demand for cocaine in Western Europe, it is also partly the consequence of a ‘balloon effect’ produced by the increased interception of cocaine shipments from Latin America to Europe. Fighting drug trafficking in Guinea-Bissau will hardly change the dynamics of demand and supply in what the UNODC (2011c) has called the “transatlantic cocaine market”.

Secondly, in resolution 51/18 states committed themselves to “continue their efforts to reduce the demand for illicit drug in with the provisions of the international drug control treaties”. Demand was seen as the main reason for why West Africa had become a transit route for cocaine. In this respect, not much has happened on the European continent since it became clear that West Africa was targeted by drug traffickers. Demand for cocaine is rising in many European countries and efforts in West Africa have not been matched by efforts at the source of the problem.

Thirdly, the engagement of European countries in Guinea-Bissau is modest and self-serving at best. A budget of less than USD 5 million appears to be not much more than a drop in the ocean in the light of the problems identified in Guinea-Bissau’s law enforcement sector. Furthermore, the increased concentration on intelligence gathering and information sharing is also in the interest of donors. It enables them to gain more information about cocaine trade and the routes the cocaine takes from West Africa to Europe.

Fourthly, at the local level, achievements of the UNODC's engagement have been mixed so far. Large seizures have decreased in the whole region. In Guinea-Bissau there had been no seizures of more than 100kg in the past four years. However, available information also suggests that the international measures taken – the development of functioning law enforcement structures in the country – have transformed the way drugs are trafficked in West Africa. Seizures of large quantities of highly concentrated cocaine indicate that at least some drug traffickers in the West African region have changed their strategy¹⁷⁶.

If there has been any causal impact of the GNB/U-44 project, police reform in Guinea-Bissau more general, or the sum of all security sector reforms in the country on drug trafficking cannot be determined. The GNB/U-44 project had become a largely political project, despite its technical mandate. Staff on the ground has been left with doing the dirty work for states – sorting out what their donors want and what can be achieved in a situation in which 'doing something' is better than doing nothing.

In many respects, European states, by funnelling money through the UNODC into Guinea-Bissau's law enforcement structures have circumvented the controversial dimensions of their engagement.

The reason for this is that crisis management – the dealing with rather than solving of problems – in international drug control is largely taking places under the veil of normative conflict. That the European Commission engagement in Guinea-Bissau is half-hearted at best and mainly concentrates on achieving quick results instead of sustainable reform of policing practice in Guinea-Bissau has never become part of the discourse in the politics of international drug control.

In this sense, the UNODC provides states with opportunities to take action where they could not act in decentralized manners not only because of its expertise and operative capabilities but also because its dysfunctional political role detaches action from the normative conflicts states are engaged in.

The bureaucratic set up of the organization, its funding mechanism and internal frictions enable states to pragmatically deal with problems in international drug control in a way that furthers their own interests.

¹⁷⁶ On June, 4, 2010, two tons of highly concentrated cocaine had been seized in The Gambia. The high concentration of the cocaine suggests that the cocaine was stored in order to be further processed before being shipped to Europe. See, "Two tons of cocaine seized in The Gambia", BBC News, June 8, 2010. Similarly, in June 2009, six drug processing 'drug laboratories' including precursor chemicals were seized in Guinea. See, "UN denounces Guinea 'drug labs'", BBC News, June 6, 2009.

In the case of Guinea-Bissau, the organization went to a place, where nobody else would go. It did not so because of normative or technical considerations, but because states were paying the organization to do so. States did not pay enough, but at least the organization was able to get involved in Guinea-Bissau.

In the end, what the UNODC had achieved in Guinea-Bissau was less than states had expected. And what it has achieved was not what donors had expected. But what it had achieved with the means it had at its disposal was more than one could expect in the light of the problems the organization was faced with. If the UNODC's behaviour in Guinea-Bissau had been directly guided by the norms states have established to control drugs, such achievements would not have been possible.

The case of the UNODC's engagement in Guinea-Bissau shed light on the functions of dysfunctional IOs in international politics. It underscores the argument that an explanation concentrating on functional service providing capacities of IOs is shorthanded. Dysfunctional IOs do not persist or grow because they provide sound technical advice and transform the interests of states into directed change on the ground. To the contrary, performing well in project implementation is not central to an IO's survival. The functions of dysfunctional IOs in world politics are more complex. It is not expertise and problem-solving capacity but the fact that IOs to go (and have to go) where no state would go, that makes IOs valuable agents of states interests in world politics.

States use IOs to dump problems in which they have either only limited interest or for which a solution of a problem cannot be expected. They send IOs where no state wants to go and leave them with the task to detect what can be done about the problems they encounter.

Dysfunctional IOs – because they are often weak political actors – are of special interest to states because they can hardly expose their donors for the hypocritical behaviour. What makes dysfunctional IOs valuable for states is that they offer them opportunities to take symbolic action with only little risk of being blamed for not seriously caring about problems in which they have only marginal interests. In short, dysfunctional IOs take over the dirty work of implementing technical projects at the risk of being exposed to failure when states are not concerned enough about a problem to take it in their own hands.

Dysfunctional IOs are not necessarily passive agents in this game. Even when they are weak political actors – as it is the case with the UNODC – they can contribute to the way in which problems are shaped. However, contrary to Barnett and Finnemore (2004) I argued here that these actions of IOs can hardly be perceived as causally prior to state action. Much more,

states seize the opportunity to engage dysfunctional IOs to do their 'dirty work' when the organization offered itself by attempting to frame a problem in a way that suits the organization's interest. In this sense, the dysfunction of IOs is part of the explanation why they persist and grow.

Because of their dysfunctional behaviour as political actors, dysfunctional IOs are valuable agents for states. They are hinges that enable states to take pragmatic action on policy issues in which normative conflict about how to solve problems prevails. They are the operational capabilities of states not despite but because they are dysfunctional, friction-riddled bureaucracies. As weak political actors, dysfunctional IOs can be sent to places where no state would go and be given tasks that are more of symbolic value than actually serve as problem-solving. In the case of Guinea-Bissau, the UNODC has done the dirty work of sorting out state preferences in a case in which interests of states had been poorly defined at the outset of the project and it has been taking the blame for the 'failure' of the project. The UNODC never stepped up against its donors. As a dysfunctional IO and weak political actor, it was not in the position to do so. This makes dysfunctional IOs like the UNODC valuable agents for states when they act to deal with rather than solve problems in world politics.

6 Conclusion

The conclusion of this study has three major aims. Firstly, it summarizes the insights emerging from the study of the UNODC as an actor in international politics and a service provider for states. Secondly, it asks which lessons can be learned from the case of the UNODC for the development of a theoretical perspective on dysfunctional IO not relying on the argument that IOs are authorities in world politics and that this is the major reason for their persistence and growth. Thirdly, it asks if, in the light of the insights gained from studying the UNODC, what can be learned from the case of the UNODC in order to reform dysfunctional international organizations.

States and the UNODC: How Dysfunction Breaks the Impasse

In the existing literature, dysfunctions of IOs tend to be associated with the absurdity of bureaucracies. International bureaucrats, driven by the need to preserve their organizations, its routines and behavioural norms, produce solutions for problems which are so detached from the real world that what IOs do appears to defy rational logic. Hypocritical behaviour – the separation of talk and action – helps IOs to survive even when problems and proposed solutions are ajar. However, because bureaucracies are autonomous and authoritative actors, states do not and cannot tame the bureaucrats getting out of control in the IOs they have created. States tend to adopt the perspectives of IOs on problems and solutions, reproducing the routines of dysfunction in their approval of policies made by IO.

This study has approached the dysfunctions of IOs from a different perspective. As a starting point it has taken the observation that IOs often lack the power to persuade and socialize other actors in world politics. This, however, is prerequisite for existing theories to explain why dysfunctional IOs persist and grow.

The study then looked at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in order to develop an understanding of how dysfunctions can be of functional value for states. In doing so, this study has looked at the UNODC not as a single, unified actor in world politics but as an organization which plays different roles in international politics and operational work in the field. The dysfunctions of the organization are most distinct in its role as an actor in international politics.

In its relations with the states that are shaping the politics of international drug control, the UNODC is weak. It has failed to obtain a clear position on harm reduction, one of the issues that heavily shaped the politics of international drug control in the past two decades. In many ways, over the past years, the UNODC has become a passive bystander in the politics of international drug control. In the development of norms under the circumstance of changing problem constellations – a central function of IOs according to functionalist theories – the UNODC has only played a minor role.

On the operative level, the situation for the UNODC is more complex. In the case of Guinea-Bissau, which this study turned its focus on, the UNODC might have failed to achieve the technical aims defined at the outset of the project. But UNODC staff on the ground achieved within relatively short time to get involved with local counterparts in reform processes which were rather political than technical, despite the technical mandate of the project. Although the specialized police unit does not yet exist in the form envisioned by donors, the UNODC managed to at least establish the structure which can build the basis of a functioning serious crime unit.

Under the circumstances the organization had to operate the question is if more could have been expected. The UNODC has been doing the work that states were not willing and interested in doing. In terms of resources, engaging in the building of police capacities in Guinea-Bissau was a largely pragmatic act of the donors of the project in order to do something about a problem that had been framed as a crisis by the UNODC. The framing of the West African cocaine trade as a crisis and Guinea-Bissau as the centre of this crisis by the UNODC might have triggered state action in Guinea-Bissau. But what the UNODC has been doing in police capacity building has been driven by the (un)willingness of states to devote resources to the alleviation of this crisis.

On the operational level, the UNODC was not achieving what its donors were expecting from the organization. Advising the government of Guinea-Bissau was a largely political process in which UNODC staff was engaged in the role of a negotiator. In these negotiations the UNODC defined, together with the beneficiaries of its project, the allocation of project resources. Instead of implementing a thoroughly planned project by advising local authorities, UNODC staff was engaged in defining how project money should be spent. In this sense, the UNODC's major role in the creation of a specialized anti-drug trafficking police unit was to sort out the often unclear preferences of its donors and to plumb what could be achieved with the resources available and within the time frame defined by donors. What could be done was

not much, but in the light of the modest interests of its donors in actually changing the situation in Guinea-Bissau, it was what could have been expected from the organization.

The advantage of looking at an IO not as a single actor but as an entity acting in two different kind of environments and being met with different expectations at the international and the operational level is that frictions between the normative and operative functions of an IO become more important for the understanding of why dysfunctional IOs persist and grow.

What is commonly identified as organizational hypocrisy – the discrepancy of talk and action of an organization – is seen as the usual way of how IOs work in the perspective of this study. Frictions in the governance of operations are understood to be the norm while attempts of the headquarters to make action coherent with norms emerging from international politics are seen as exceptions. These frictions are what make the UNODC an attractive service-provider for states. They grant ‘technical’ cooperation relative independence from unresolved normative conflicts, and enable at least pragmatic action in issue-areas in which otherwise paralysis dominates.

Both growth and persistence of the UNODC are best explained by obtaining a perspective in which the dysfunction of the organization in its role as a creator and developer of norms is seen as an advantage by states for the operative functions of the organization. The UNODC has only survived and grown over the past years because earmarked contributions have been heavily increasing. Unearmarked donations have lost their relative importance for the organization over the past years. Especially, those states which can be expected to profit most from a more autonomous UNODC basing its policy advice on scientific evidence rather than the social norm of narcotic drug prohibition have not increased their unearmarked contributions to the organization. European states pursuing alternative approaches in their domestic drug policies and which actively attempted to make use of the loopholes in the international drug control conventions are investing more in the UNODC in recent years. But they do not strengthen the political role of the organization. Donations from these states have concentrated on earmarked funding, suggesting that even those states which could have an interest in policy change are emphasizing the operative role of the organization.

Hence, the function of the dysfunction of the UNODC is directly connected to state interests. States tolerate the political role of the organization and support this role as far as it is necessary in order to keep the organization operating. Even those states allegedly interested in strongly prohibitive international drug control policies are supporting the UNODC with rather

symbolic general purpose funding. From its operative role, however, states can profit by customizing operations to their interests.

In short, the UNODC is a service provider for states concealed as an actor in the politics of international drug control. The political role the UNODC plays is weak enough to attract funding from states for projects which serve their interests.

The persistence and growth of the UNODC, therefore, can be best explained by understanding the UNODC as a hinge between what states do in the politics of international drug control (fending off interventions into their domestic drug control policies by maintaining a status of co-existence) and what states want to achieve in technical cooperation in international drug control (controlling the illicit economy of transnational markets for narcotic drugs by the limited efforts of pragmatic action). For both of these sets of interests, a dysfunctional UNODC provides states not only with acceptable opportunities but also with a kind of an insurance concerning the risks of such action. If pragmatic dealing with crises does not work out in the way states expected (and it often does not) the organization rather than its donors will be blamed.

In the case of the UNODC, states are not necessarily interested in a coherent IO serving as a ‘transmission belt’ of normative consideration, but in an IO which does what they are not willing to do alone and takes the blame if this does not work out. In this sense, the delegation of problem management to the UNODC in the case of the West African cocaine trade does not fully break the impasse states have created in international drug control. But if the normative conflicts among states would have been fully taken into consideration at the time of delegation, it seems unlikely that any delegation would have taken place.

The Role of Dysfunctional International Organizations: Delegation as Blame-Shifting?

What are the lessons that can be learned from this case study for established theories of IOs?

The approaches best equipped to explain the persistence and growth of dysfunctional IOs so far have argued that these organizations survive because dysfunction enables them to function effectively in an environment of diverse expectations. While legitimacy presents a problem when dysfunctions are enduring, in many respects being dysfunctional is advantageous for IOs. In these perspectives, dysfunction is good for IO (because they survive) and bad for states and other actors in world politics (because the jobs delegated to IOs are not accomplished appropriately). Dysfunction, therefore, is first and foremost an issue taking place within IOs. The persistence and growth of dysfunctional IOs is best explained by the

power of IOs to persuade and socialize other actors in world politics. In the end, the fact that IOs are authorities in world politics enables their survival even when they are not fulfilling the expectations of states.

The perspective advocated in this study argues that dysfunction is also good for states, because states – like IOs – need to separate talk from action in order to remain capable of taking action. Dysfunctional IOs serve as ‘hinges’ through which states separate talk from action. They manage crises where norms are not able to solve problems. This sheds a different light on the dysfunctions of IOs. They are not only an issue of organizations but also one of states and what they expect from IOs.

The UNODC – because of its dysfunctional role in international politics – is able to act on the ground with relative discretion and can, despite financial constraints, achieve limited successes where an organization extensively engaged in normative discourse would be hardly able to respond to a crisis as the one in West Africa at all.

The persistence and growth of dysfunctional IOs in this perspective is explained by the way in which states can make use of these dysfunctions. Where dysfunction provides flexibility for states to create solutions for domestic problems and enables them to take international action when necessary, IOs reflect the interest and expectations of states to organize themselves in a way that Krasner (1999) has identified as ‘hypocritical’. In an international environment in which states tend to separate talk from action, international institutions persist because they provide states with opportunities. As this study suggests, so do IOs. The persistence of the UNODC despite its dysfunction as an agent of norm elaboration can be explained by the opportunities these dysfunctions provide for states in managing problems and externalizing the risks of such problem management to the organization. As the example of the UNODC’s project in Guinea-Bissau shows, states can use IOs as tools to experiment with possible solutions and – when these solutions do not work out – shift the blame for failure on them.

In short, dysfunctional IOs survive when their dysfunctions reflect the interests of states and at the same time enable them to take action through the organization when interests are at stake. IOs are hinges through which states separate talk from action in international politics and as long as they are capable of taking action when states expect them to take action, dysfunctional IOs are not very different from functional ones from the perspective of their donors. Even when interests of states are only modestly touched by a problem or emerging crisis, dysfunctional IOs create opportunities for states to take action.

Of course, the insights from a single case study cannot easily be generalized. What has been said above are educated speculations about the role of a diverse population of actors in world politics. It cannot be excluded that some dysfunctional IOs are indeed bureaucratic authorities in international politics which can persuade and socialize other actors. It is possible that the UNODC is indeed a single case or part of a minor category of IOs which are not accepted as authorities because of the special circumstances they operate in.

In order to make a more general argument about the role of dysfunctional IOs in world politics, comparative studies of dysfunctional IOs are necessary, which are able to unveil patterns in the relations of states and (dysfunctional) IOs. Such studies would have to be able to comparably 'measure' the relations between the intensity of normative conflict among states in an issue-area and the way in which states strengthen the normative and operative functions of IOs respectively. This study suggests that the intensity of normative conflict – i.e. the degree to which states tend to establish a state of co-existence rather than cooperation in an issue-area – is positively correlated to the strengthening of operative capacities of IOs.

If states use IOs as managers of problems when an interest in problem solving is lacking, earmarking is expected to be the dominate way of states to make use of the operative capacities of IOs. Furthermore, in issue-areas with intense normative conflicts which emphasis co-existence rather than cooperation among states, this study suggests, the level of discretion IOs are granted in completing their operative tasks is relatively high. This is not necessarily an advantage for IOs, because, as the case of the UNODC in Guinea-Bissau has shown, being left alone by donors can result in a very restricted room of manoeuvre for IO staff on the ground. However, from the donor perspective, granting IOs discretion in dealing with problems fulfils two functions. First, it enables states to take action where they would not take action alone (although there is not necessarily an interest in achieving results) and it leaves the complex and risky task of implementing projects to an actor in world politics which can easily be blamed for failure.

Measuring normative conflict and operative discretion is difficult. These are concepts which cannot easily be quantified. As this study has shown, normative conflicts have to be identified in the practice of international politics. It cannot be deduced from indicators relating to the properties of states such as the expected costs and benefits of an international agreement. Similarly, discretion in completing operative tasks cannot be seen in terms by which states delegate them to IOs. For both normative conflict and discretion, qualitative assessments remain the best way of understanding the relations between states in IOs. Nevertheless, developing a more fine-grained approach to perceive differences in normative conflicts in an

issue-area over time could be helpful to make sense of the growth of dysfunctional IOs. If the relations between states and dysfunctional IOs identified in the case of the UNODC follow a more general pattern, the growth of such organizations through earmarked contributions and other ways of assigning IOs to specific operative tasks should be connected to increasing normative conflict in an issue-area.

Especially in respect of the question of the growth of dysfunctional IOs in comparative and longitudinal perspectives, more research is needed. As Susan Strange (1998) has put it, “international organizations never die”. Partly, they survive because they are intimately connected to state bureaucracies which have an interest in sustaining them. However, some IOs stop growing while others are increasing their budget and extending their mandates. Such variations remain unaccounted for by explanations focusing on transgovernmental relations. As I have argued in this study, the way in which states and IOs relate to each other under the constraints of social norms and international legal frameworks plays a decisive role in explaining why even a dysfunctional IO is growing.

This study also provides reasons for why developing a deeper understanding of persistence and growth of dysfunctional IOs is important. The central questions those studying IOs have been concerned with relate to the order states create by establishing IOs. Realist and neorealist explanations of IOs argue that they are epiphenomena supporting and institutionalizing power asymmetries. Constructivists see them as autonomous authorities in an increasingly bureaucratized world order. For scholars of global governance, IOs are the core of an ‘organized world’ in which the interests of all actors in world politics – not only those of powerful states – have a voice.

This study suggests that most IOs are more than just epiphenomena. The discretion they are granted by states in completing tasks makes them at least partly autonomous actors in world politics which can make a difference. Their impacts and achievements might be limited and in many ways seem to be not more than a drop in the ocean. But providing services enables IOs to make a difference despite all the constraints they are confronted with. In doing so, IOs are not just sustaining power asymmetries.

This study also suggests that IOs are less than actors capable of ordering the world. They are bureaucratically organized, but they do not necessarily resemble bureaucracies in their impact on what states and other actors in world politics do. IOs rarely are monopolists. In many issue-areas, various IOs are competing for funding. This competition hardly resembles the monopolistic positions bureaucracies obtain in domestic politics. More importantly, IOs need

states much more than states need them. This is most apparent in those organizations directly dependent on funding. The UNODC is just one example here, UN Habitat and UNHCR are other examples of IOs heavily relying on voluntary donations. Other IOs might be less dependent on financial contributions directly, but states do have stakes in the decision-making processes of all IOs. Even the World Bank and the IMF – which have greater leverage in controlling their budgets – are not independent from states. They are constrained, for example by the fact that states have a great influence in decision-making processes in which, as Woods (2006: 65) has put it “politics gets too often in the way”. This makes IOs attentive to state interests and often diminishes their potential to create order where states seemingly have failed to do so.

The case study of the UNODC suggests that states use IOs as tools, but they are not purely epiphenomenal. States sometimes need agents which complete urgent tasks pragmatically and without questioning the normative background of their actions. IOs, even those having large bureaucracies and research capacities at their disposal, can achieve small successes in managing crises. That is why states create, support and appreciate them and use them as trouble shooters as well.

This is hardly a role which creates order in the world. However, it is an important role, because due to the discretion IOs are often granted by states, IOs do things states could not accomplish in the same way.

In order to better understand how and under which circumstances state use IOs to manage crises, to what extent dysfunctions of IOs really matter in world politics and who benefits from IOs which function as service providers for states, a more general perspective on the functions of dysfunctional IOs needs to be developed.

Should Dysfunctional International Organizations be Reformed?

The major problem with dysfunctional IO is that they tend to neglect the norms and values inscribed in their mandates. This is why some scholars call them hypocritical.

It is one thing to state that IOs exist in an environment in which norms, values and institutions play a subsidiary role when compared to state interests as it has been done in this study and that therefore the hypocrisy of IOs might be of less importance to world politics than the hypocrisy of states.

It is another thing, however, to ask if IOs had the potential to become promoters of these norms and values if the grip of states interested in co-existence rather than cooperation on them is eased. Could dysfunctional IOs, if appropriately reformed, become what their

mandates have foreseen them to become? Is it possible to take the torn structures of IOs and their bureaucracies and transform them to something that is of actual value not only for states but for public goods and broad social goals they have been created to achieve?

‘Democratizing’ IOs has been propagated as a way to reform IOs in recent years. Including more ‘stakeholders’ into decision-making, the argument goes, would not only commit the actions of IOs to their mandates but also make the results of their actions more accepted by these stakeholder and, hence, more effective.

In the wake of the global governance debate in international relations a broad literature has developed which argues that relevant decision-making has been shifted ‘upwards’ to IOs. Intransparent procedures (Woods and Narlikar 2001, Keohane and Nye 2003), the exclusion of relevant actors (Nanz and Steffek 2004), the lack of ‘arguing’ – as opposed to ‘bargaining’ – in international fora (Risse 2000) and the inability to reverse decisions by those affected by them have become seen as direct threats to democracy in the “post-national constellation” (Habermas 1998). Inclusive, transparent and accountable IOs have been promoted as remedies for these unjust and dangerous developments (see, for example Zürn 2004, Zweifel 2006). If only IOs were designed in a way which makes them adhering to democratic principles – the argument goes – they could become the core of a global democracy.

There is no lack of ideas about how IOs could be reformed to make them more democratic. They range from publishing the records of board meetings of the IMF and the World Bank over giving the civil society a voice in WTO negotiations to the creation of a ‘second chamber’ of the United Nations where citizens instead of states are represented. In a nutshell most of these reform proposals point in the same direction: the more democratic IOs are, the better – i.e. more coherent and just – the decisions they take will be.

This might also be true for dysfunctional IOs. Including civil society would facilitate the mainstreaming of notoriously ignored interests, ensure the respect for human rights and make sure that policies follow the mandates of IOs instead of the interests of powerful states or bureaucratic routines. The question this study raises is, however, if this would be always be a good solution.

‘Democratizing’ IOs would almost certainly strengthen the impact of norms on their behaviour. Instead of being bureaucratic entities with often hypocritical tendencies, ‘democratic’ IOs would become governed by those whom they should serve. Ignoring norms and mandates would become more difficult for IOs. By democratizing IOs, the “bureaucratization of the world” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 157) could be tamed.

The problem with the ‘democratization’ of IOs is, however, that more might not be necessarily better in three ways. First, the involvement of more actors in decision-making does not necessarily create better norms. As Bob (2010: 185) has argued, the inclusion of non-governmental actors in international norm creation can have the effect that norms are watered-down to an extent to which all that emerges from such processes are “zombie policies”, which are “so devoid of content that, while alive on paper, they are in reality dead”. Especially when conflicts among ‘stakeholders’ about what should be done are more distinctive than commonalities, including more actors does not necessarily mean that better norms will be created. Interests sometimes are incommensurable – especially when actors as diverse as non-governmental organizations are included in politics – and including them into decision-making processes does not make them compatible.

Secondly, more control might not necessarily make IOs behave in more appropriate ways. All organizations need hypocrisy to survive. And – as sociological as well as rationalist organizational theorists have argued – organizations are skilled in concealing hypocrisy in order to make sure they survive. Establishing ‘democratic’ control mechanisms which were effective would mean to confine the autonomy and discretion of IO to a controllable minimum. This, however, would also diminish some of the most valuable features of IOs. Even orthodox rationalist approaches argue that autonomy and discretion of IOs is not an outcome of ‘agency loss’ but a decisive feature of what states – and other actors in world politics – expect from IOs (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Hawkins et al. 2006). More control could render IOs meaningless actors in world politics.

Thirdly, more coherence might not necessarily make IOs more effective. To the contrary, as this study has argued, it could paralyse IOs. In cases in which IOs operate under the veil of on-going normative conflict among states (and other actors in world politics), attempts to forcibly mainstream norms into the operative behaviour of IOs could paralyse them. When it is clear and acknowledged that something must be done but there is no consensus on how it should be done, pragmatism is sometimes a good way to achieve at least some problem management where problem solution is not possible. Take, for example, the case of cocaine trade through West Africa, discussed in this study. While it was obvious what the root of the emerging cocaine trade in West Africa was – increasing demand for cocaine in Europe – and that assisting West African states in developing appropriate law enforcement capacities was mainly targeting symptoms rather than curing the disease, taking action under unclear circumstance was better than not taking any action at all.

More coherence in how states (and other actors) had reacted on this crisis would have included – at least in addition to the projects in West Africa – persuading European states to increase their efforts in cocaine demand reduction. This, however, would have been an endeavour deemed to failure.

Proposals to reform the UNODC point in similar directions. While a ‘democratization’ of the UNODC has not been called for yet, some have suggested making the organization less dependent on voluntary donations. Increasing the share of regular budget funding should help to make the UNODC less biased towards prohibition. This should make the organization a more neutral actor in world politics¹⁷⁷. Others are calling for more transparency in international drug control, especially when it comes to the evaluation of the effectiveness of prohibition¹⁷⁸. Even states have taken measures to make the UNODC’s behaviour more transparent. The UNODC’s Independent Evaluation Unit had been significantly strengthened by major donors in recent years against the will of the executive director and the senior management¹⁷⁹.

Although these (proposed and conducted) reforms appear to be modest when compared to what transnational advocates and scholars are suggesting for more prominent IOs, they do include some of the elements of what has commonly become seen as ‘democratic’ IOs. What these proposals want to achieve are fewer inroads of political power and more insight into the internal working mechanisms of the organization. This would strengthen its political role and – with the exception of the Independent Evaluation Unit – cause the organization’s behaviour to become more evidence-based.

The consequences of such reforms can hardly be assessed, as behavioural change is very likely to depend on how strongly the organization would be pressurized by other actors to adhere to the principles inscribed in its mandate. However, the fact that some transnational advocates are already putting pressure on the ECOSOC and the CND to mainstream human rights into political discourses of international drug control¹⁸⁰ suggests that such pressure would be increased if the UNODC would be made more transparent. In this sense, it is likely that the UNODC would become engaged in more normative conflict than it is now at the risk that the operative functions of the UNODC are paralyzed by on-going normative conflicts in

¹⁷⁷ The TNI is advocating a more neutral UNODC.

¹⁷⁸ The Vienna Declaration is calling for more transparency in international drug control and an independent, evidence-based review by IOs.

¹⁷⁹ Interview with Swiss government representative, Vienna, February 12, 2010.

¹⁸⁰ The IDPC and the Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme are calling on institutions of international drug control to adhere to the UN’s idea of ‘system-wide coherence’. See also Barret et al. (2008).

international drug control. The UNODC – like any other organization – has only limited influence on the normative conflicts states are leading. And as long as these conflicts remain unresolved, the UNODC might be the actor that wins least from increased pressure on the organization to adhere to concepts such as ‘system wide coherence’ or ‘shared responsibility in international drug control’.

In sum, the lessons that can be learned from the case of the UNODC about the reform of dysfunctional IOs are mixed. Dysfunction of the UNODC contributes to the evasion of paralysis in international action on narcotic drug measures. On the other hand, international drug control is an issue area in which non-governmental organizations still have minor influence in decision-making processes. This might be – among other things – one of the reasons why the prohibitionist paradigm in international drug control has never really been challenged.

The political issue states needed to resolve if they want to reform the UNODC is whether they want international drug control to provide them with the room of manoeuvre to adapt domestic drug policies flexibly to the problems they encounter or whether they want international drug control to be coherent with other social norms in world politics. If flexibility and pragmatic management of crises in narcotic drug matters is the major aim of international drug control a dysfunctional UNODC, which is a weak and elusive political actor, is in the interest of most states. And if a coherent normative framework based on scientific evidence and adhering to other social norms is the aim, then reforming the UNODC could be helpful, although states largely would have to abandon the operative function of the organization.

In both cases, however, the underlying problem of international drug control is likely to remain untouched by such reforms. No IO – functional or dysfunctional – is likely to overcome the current ‘state of convenience’ in international drug control. Ensured by three strongly embedded but flexible international conventions, this convenient state in international drug control, in which those states who make the rules and provide the funding for institutionalized international ‘cooperation’, is likely to remain.

International drug control has been, at least in the past two decades, about finding a balance in which co-existence between ‘zero-tolerance’ and ‘alternative’ approaches in domestic drug policies is possible. None of the advanced industrial states engaged in creating this balance and funding institutionalized international ‘cooperation’ on drug matters is likely to want to

see their efforts being overturned by an IO. Even a reformed – independent, autonomous, well-funded and ‘democratically’ governed – UNODC is likely to be side-lined by these states quickly. International drug control is not about solving the transnational problem of drug trafficking. Neither is it about designing policies which serve those suffering from the ‘world drug problem’ – the peasants cultivation raw products in producing areas, the drug addicts in the large demand markets and the citizens confronted with violence and insecurity in countries along certain transit routes – most. It is about ensuring that each state powerful enough to take part in making the social – as opposed to the legal – rules of international drug control can carve out room of manoeuvre for designing those domestic drug policies it deems to be best.

From that, states are dissuaded neither by expertise nor by moral argument. IOs – dysfunctional or not – have only two choices. Either they play according to the rules created for them by states or they are getting side-lined by states to a point where their role in world politics is closer to absurdity than to authority.

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